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INTRODUCTION
What is the relationship between the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth
Amendment? Does the Amendment "incorporate" the Bill, making the Bill's
restrictions on federal power applicable against states? If so, which words in
the Fourteenth Amendment work this change? Are all, or only some, of the
provisions of the first ten amendments "incorporated" or "absorbed" into the
Fourteenth? If only some, which ones, and why? Once "incorporated" or
"absorbed," does a right or freedom declared in the Bill necessarily constrain
state and federal governments absolutely equally in every jot and tittle? Or, on
the other hand, can a guarantee in the Bill ever lose something in the transla-
tion, so that only a part of the guarantee-perhaps only its "core"--applies
against state governments by dint of the Fourteenth Amendment?
These questions have framed a debate that, in the words of Judge Henry
Friendly, "go[es] to the very nature of our Constitution" with "profound effects
for all of us."1 Professor Van Alstyne has written that "it is difficult to imagine
a more consequential subject, ' an assessment confirmed by the extraordinary
number of twentieth-century legal giants who have locked horns in the de-
bate-Hugo Black, Felix Frankfurter, William Brennan, Henry Friendly,
William Crosskey, Louis Henkin, Erwin Griswold, and John Ely, to name only
a few. Perhaps even more extraordinary has been the willingness of Supreme
Court Justices to reinforce their judicial pronouncements on the issue with
extra-judicial elaborations. For example, after his retirement from the bench and
shortly before his death, Justice Frankfurter published as his parting words to
I. Henry J. Friendly, The Bill of Rights as a Code of Criminal Procedure, 53 CAL. L. REV. 929, 934
(1965).
2. William W. Van Alstyne, Foreword to MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, NO STATE SHALL ABRIDGE: THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS, at ix (1986).
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the legal community an elaborate "memorandum" on "incorporation" in the
Harvard Law Review, piling up case citations and other material to support his
own preferred solution to the issue.3 Three years later, Frankfurter's great
sparring partner, Justice Black, publicly responded in his Carpentier Lectures,
breaking "a longstanding rule of not speaking out on constitutional issues.' 4
And in two James Madison Lectures delivered twenty-five years apart-each
aptly titled "The Bill of Rights and the States"--Justice Brennan expanded upon
his own proposed solution to the incorporation conundrum.
5
When we shift our attention from lectures and law reviews to United States
Reports, we see much more evidence of the centrality of the incorporation
debate to twentieth-century constitutional law. Consider, for example, the lead
paragraph of the most famous footnote in Supreme Court history: "There may
be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality when
legislation appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the Consti-
tution, such as those of the first ten amendments, which are deemed equally
specific when held to be embraced within the Fourteenth."6 In the half-century
since Carolene Products, the Court has taken the hint of footnote four. A list
of cases applying various parts of the Bill of Rights against states reads like
the "greatest hits"7 of the modem era: New York Times v. Sullivan,8 Abington
School District v. Schempp,9 Mapp v. Ohio,10 Miranda v. Arizona," Gideon
v. Wainwright,2 Duncan v. Louisiana,13 and on and on. Some cases, like
Sullivan, merely applied provisions of the Bill of Rights that had long before
been deemed "embraced within" the Fourteenth Amendment; others, like
Duncan, achieved notoriety precisely because they decided to "incorporate"
previously "unabsorbed" clauses. Speaking only of the latter set, Justice
Brennan ranked the incorporation opinions ahead of reapportionment and
desegregation cases as "the most important [series of decisions] of the Warren
era." 4 In remarks sharply critical of Brennan and his brethren, Solicitor Gen-
3. Felix Frankfurter, Memrandum on "Incorporation" ofthe Bill ofRights Into the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment, 78 HARV. L. REv. 746 (1965). Judge Friendly notes that this memorandum
was Frankfurter's "last published work." Friendly, supra note 1, at 934 n.27.
4. William C. Warren, Foreword to HUGO LAFAYETrE BLACK, A CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH, at x-xi
(1968); HUGO LAFAYETTE BLACK, A CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH, at xvi-vii, 34-42 (1968).
5. William J. Brennan, Jr., The Bill of Rights and the States, 36 N.Y.U. L. REV. 761 (1961) [hereinafter
Brennan I]; William J. Brennan, Jr., The Bill of Rights and the States: The Revival of State Constitutions
as Guardians ofIndividual Rights, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 535 (1986) [hereinafter Brennan II].
6. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
7. This phrase is meant to suggest the importance of the cases and not necessarily their correctness.
8. 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (freedom of speech and press).
9. 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (nonestablishment of religion).
10. 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (exclusion of evidence obtained by unreasonable search and seizure); see also
id. at 661-66 (Black, J., concurring) (relying in part on right against compelled self-incrimination).
11. 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (privilege against compelled self-incrimination and right to counsel).
12. 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (right to counsel).
13. 391 U.S. 145 (196S) (right to criminal jury).
14. Brennan 11, supra note 5, at 535-36; see also William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the
Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489, 492-93 (1977).
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eral Erwin Griswold offered an even more sweeping assessment of the stakes
involved: "I can think of nothing in the history of our constitutional law which
has gone so far since John Marshall and the Supreme Court decided Marbury
v. Madison in 1803. "15
And yet, despite the importance of the topic and all the attention devoted
to it, we still lack a fully satisfying account of the relationship between the first
ten amendments and the Fourteenth. Minor variations aside, three main ap-
proaches have dominated the twentieth-century debate. The first, represented
by Justice Frankfurter, insists that, strictly speaking, the Fourteenth Amendment
never "incorporated" any of the provisions of the Bill of Rights. 16 The Four-
teenth requires only that states honor basic principles of fundamental fairness
and ordered liberty-principles that might indeed happen to overlap wholly or
in part with some of the rules of the Bill of Rights, but that bear no logical
relationship to those rules. The second approach, championed by Justice Black,
insists on "total incorporation" of the Bill of Rights.1 7 The Fourteenth Amend-
ment, claimed Black, made applicable against the states each and every provi-
sion of the Bill, lock, stock, and barrel-at least if we define the Bill to include
only the first eight amendments. Faced with these diametric views, Justice
Brennan tried to steer a middle course of "selective incorporation."' 8 Under
this third approach, the Court's analysis could proceed clause by clause, fully
incorporating every provision of the Bill deemed "fundamental" without
deciding in advance whether each and every clause would necessarily pass the
test. Methodologically, Brennan's approach seemed to avoid a radical break
with existing case law rejecting total incorporation, and even paid lip service
to Frankfurter's insistence on fundamental fairness as the touchstone of the
Fourteenth Amendment. In practice, however, Brennan's approach held out the
possibility of total incorporation through the back door. For him, once a clause
in the Bill was deemed "fundamental" it must be "incorporated" against the
states in every aspect, just as Black insisted. And nothing in the logic of
selective incorporation precluded the possibility that, when all was said and
done, virtually every clause of the Bill would have been deemed fundamental.
As we shall see, there is something to be said for each of these positions,
but each is also fatally flawed. An alloy of the three seemingly incompatible
elements will prove far more attractive and durable than each unalloyed compo-
nent. But before such an alloy can profitably be forged, we need to do a
15. Erwin N. Griswold, Due Process Problems Today in the United States, in THE FOuRTEENTH
AMENDMENT 161, 164 (Bernard Schwartz ed., 1970) (citation omitted).
16. See Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 59-68 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); Frankfurter,
supra note 3.
17. See Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 474-75 & n.1 (1942) (Black, J., dissenting); Adamson, 332 U.S.
at 68-123 (Black, J., dissenting); Duncan, 391 U.S. at 162-71 (Black, I., concurring); BLACK, supra note
4, at 34-42.
18. See Ohio ex rel. Eaton v. Price, 364 U.S. 263, 274-76 (1960) (separate opinion of Brennan, J.);
Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117, 154-60 (1961) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964)
(Brennan, J.); Brennan I, supra note 5; Brennan II, supra note 5.
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considerable amount of preparatory work. In Part I, we shall examine antebel-
lum ideas about whether the original Bill of Rights applied against the states.
In Part II, we shall study with care the text and context of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Finally, in Part III, we shall return to the Black-Brennan-Frank-
furter debate, which I shall attempt to synthesize with a new model of incorpo-
ration.
This synthesis, which I call "refined incorporation," begins with Black's
insight that all of the privileges and immunities of citizens recognized in the
Bill of Rights became applicable against states by dint of the Fourteenth
Amendment. But not all of the provisions of the original Bill of Rights were
indeed rights of citizens. Some instead were at least in part rights of states, and
as such, awkward to incorporate fully against states. Most obvious, of course,
is the Tenth Amendment, but other provisions of the first eight amendments
resembled the Tenth much more than Justice Black admitted. Thus, there is
deep wisdom in Justice Brennan's invitation to consider incorporation clause
by clause rather than wholesale. But having identified the right unit of analysis,
Brennan posed the wrong question: Is a given provision of the original Bill
really a fundamental right? The right question is whether the provision really
guarantees a privilege or immunity of individual citizens rather than a right of
states or the public at large. And when we ask this question, clause by clause,
we must be attentive to the possibility, flagged by Frankfurter, that a particular
principle in the Bill of Rights may change its shape in the process of absorption
into the Fourteenth Amendment. This change can occur for reasons rather
different from those offered by Frankfurter, who diverted attention from the
right question by his jaundiced view of much of the original Bill and by his
utter disregard of the language and history of the privileges or immunities
clause. Certain hybrid provisions of the original Bill-part citizen right, part
state right-may need to shed their state-right husk before their citizen-right
core can be absorbed by the Fourteenth Amendment. Other provisions may
become less majoritarian and populist, and more libertarian, as they are repack-
aged in the Fourteenth Amendment as liberal civil rights-"privileges or
immunities" of individuals-rather than republican political "right[s] of the
people," as in the original Bill.
Before we can properly elaborate and evaluate this synthesis, we must
cover a considerable amount of ground. The best place to begin our journey
is Barron v. Baltimore.19
19. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).
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I. ANTEBELLUM IDEAS
A. Barron
In 1833, the Supreme Court confronted for the first time the argument that
a state government had violated one of the provisions of the Bill of Rights.
Narrowly framed, the issue raised by Barron was whether the Fifth Amend-
ment's takings clause limited not just the federal government, but states and
municipalities as well. The Court, however, saw that the reasoning behind John
Barron's contention radiated much further. Perhaps the Court could have ruled
for Barron without necessarily implying that each and every prohibition of the
Bill of Rights would thenceforth bind states. For example, unlike the takings
clause, the words of the First Amendment explicitly spoke of "Congress" as
the target of limitation; and the logic underlying other particular provisions may
also have made it peculiarly awkward to apply them against states. But the
reasoning behind Barron's contention clearly would have required state compli-
ance with a vast number of Bill of Rights prohibitions whose general language
and logic made them indistinguishable from the takings clause. If the Fifth
Amendment phrase, "nor shall private property be taken for public use without
just compensation" limited states, so too, it would seem, did the Fourth Amend-
ment phrase "no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause," the Eighth
Amendment phrase "excessive bail shall not be required," and so on. Barron
thus presented a question "of great importance," as Chief Justice Marshall
acknowledged at the outset of his opinion for the Court.2 ° But Marshall imme-
diately added that the question was "not of much difficulty," and went on to
dismiss Barron's argument in less than five pages.
One can quibble around the edges,21 but the core of Marshall's argument
is compelling. To be sure, the takings clause nowhere explicitly says that it ties
the hands of the federal government only and not the states. But as Marshall
explained, because state governments were already in place in the 1780's, the
dominant purpose of the Constitution was to create, yet limit, a new central
government. "[L]imitations on power, if expressed in general terms, are natural-
ly, and, we think, necessarily applicable to the government created by the
instrument"--that is, the federal government.22 Though he did not cite it by
name, Marshall seems to have had in mind here the sweeping dictum of
20. Id. at 247.
21. For example, the Court suggested that the limits imposed on states by Article I, Section 10 were
"generally" to protect citizens of other states, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) at 249. This characterization obscures the
Federalist framers' view of the centrality of the attainder, ex post facto, and contracts clauses as protections
against one's own state. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425,
1440-41 (1987), and sources cited therein. Marshall, of course, knew better. See Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S.
(6 Cranch) 87, 138-39 (1810) (Marshall, CJ.) (Article I, Section 10 "may be deemed a bill of rights for
the people of each state"). Marshall's Fletcher opinion went unmentioned in his Barron opinion.
22. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) at 247.
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Hamilton's Federalist No. 83: "The United States, in their united or collective
capacity, are the OBJECT to which all general provisions in the Constitution
must necessarily be construed to refer.
' 23
Close inspection of the original Constitution confirms the soundness of the
Hamilton-Marshall rule of construction. In Article I, Section 9, for example,
we find a purely general prohibition akin to the takings clause in its language
and logic: "No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed." Yet as
Marshall forcefully noted,' this general prohibition limits only the federal
government hence the framers' inclusion of a separate clause explicitly limiting
states, in Article I, Section 10: "No State shall... pass any Bill of Attainder
[or] ex post facto Law." The absence of any similarly explicit language limiting
states in the takings clause cut strongly against Barron's claim. Had the framers
of the clause meant to limit states, wrote Marshall, "they would have declared
this purpose in plain and intelligible language," 25 like the "No State shall"
phrasing of Article I, Section 10.
But does not the language of the First Amendment cut exactly the other
way, suggesting that where the Bill of Rights aimed at limiting only the federal
government, it used an explicit word like "Congress" to signal that intent? Once
again, Marshall offered a careful parsing of Article I, Section 9 to drive home
his point: "Some of [the clauses in this section] use language applicable only
to congress: others are expressed in general terms. 26 If the word "Congress"
in the First Amendment could justify applying the takings clause and other
general wording in the Bill of Rights to the states, then the same should hold
true for Article I, Section 9: the words "the United States" in the Section 9
clause---"No Title of Nobility shall be granted by the United States"--should
logically imply that the general wording of the attainder and ex post facto
clause of Section 9 applied against the states. Yet as we have seen, the Consti-
tution plainly suggests otherwise. Marshall saw the language of Section 9 as
especially relevant because it was "in the nature of a bill of rights,"27 as
various Federalists had pointed out during the ratification period to counter
Anti-Federalist concerns about the apparent absence of such a bill in the
original Constitution.'
Purely as a matter of textual exegesis and application of lawyerly rules of
construction, Marshall's argument is hard to beat. Why weren't the framers and
ratifiers of the Bill of Rights entitled to rely on a natural and sensible rule of
23. THE FEDERALIST No. 83, at 503 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) [hereinafter
all citations to THE FEDERALIST are to this edition].
24. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) at 248.
25. Id. at 250.
26. Id. at 248.
27. Id.
28. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 84, at 510-12 (Alexander Hamilton).
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construction implicit in the Constitution itself and made explicit by Publius in
his influential defense of the document?29
The legislative history of the Bill of Rights confirms that its framers and
ratifiers did so rely. Various state conventions endorsed amendments limiting
the new central government, some phrased in general language, others using
words explicitly targeted at the central government---"Congress," the "United
States," and so on.30 Yet no one ever suggested that the general language,
simply because of its juxtaposition with other clauses worded differently, would
limit state governments as well. When Madison distilled these endorsements
into his own list of proposed limitations, he suggested that most of these
limitations be inserted in Article I, Section 9. Following the rule of construction
implicit in that Article, he used general language and explicit references to
Congress indiscriminately.31 The proposed location of these clauses made it
clear that, however worded, they applied only against the federal government.
But the first Congress eventually decided to put these amendments at the end
of the original Constitution. There is no evidence that this change was anything
but aesthetic. Nevertheless, the change had the unhappy effect of blurring the
implicit rule of construction at work, creating an interpretive trap for the
unwary, which Marshall gracefully avoided by keeping his eyes on Section 9.
Unlike state ratifying conventions, Madison believed that additional restric-
tions in favor of liberty should also be placed on state governments and said
29. Professor Crosskey flails mightily against this rule of construction, but without much success. 2
WILLIAM WINSLOW CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES
1049-82 (1953). Crosskey offers two constitutional counterexamples that, he claims, disprove the rule that
generally worded constitutional limitations never apply against states. Id. at 1079-80. The first claimed
counterexample, the full faith and credit clause of Article IV, explicitly uses the word "State" twice. U.S.
CONsT. art. IV, § 1. Crosskey's attempt to argue that the phrase "in each State" does not include action
by states makes a hash of the obvious interstate comity logic of the clause, confirmed by its placement in
Article IV immediately preceding other obvious comity clauses--clauses that clearly use the phrases "in
the several States," "in any State," and "in another State" to encompass action by states. U.S. CONST. art.
IV, § 2, cls. 1-2; see also id. art. VI (judges "in every State" in context clearly encompass judges of states).
Crosskey's only other example-the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court-rests on a highly
strained textual analogy to a set of words that looks very different from those of the takings clause. Unlike
the takings clause, the appellate jurisdiction clause is not a limitation on, but an empowerment of, federal
authority. Id. art. III, § 2. To the extent the clause does implicitly limit federal authority-for example, by
denying federal courts jurisdiction over nondiverse cases arising wholly under state law-these limitations
apply only against federal courts and not state courts, in perfect keeping with Barron. What's more, the
appellate jurisdiction clause must be read in the context of the language of Article ImI as a whole, which
does make plain that state courts are to be reviewed by federal tribunals. See Aichil Reed Amar, A Neo-
Federalist View of Article Ill. Separating the Two Tiers of Federal Jurisdiction, 65 B.U. L. REV. 205 (1985).
In the words of Publius, "The objects of appeal, not the tribunals from which it is to be made, are alone
contemplated." THE FEDERALIST NO. 82, at 494 (Alexander Hamilton). Such was the near universal
understanding in 1787-89. Crosskey, by contrast, fails to identify even a single 18th-century figure who
thought that the Bill of Rights applied directly against states.
30. See, e.g., 1 DEBATES ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 322-23,326-27 (Jonathan
Elliot ed., AYER Co. reprint ed. 1987) (1836) [hereinafter ELLIOT'S DEBATES] (ratifying conventions of
Massachusetts and New Hampshire); 3 id. at 659-61 (Virginia ratifying convention).
31. 1 ANNALS OP CONG. 451-52 (Joseph Gales ed., 1791) (Isted. pagination) (June 8, 1789) (speaking
of "national" government and "the Legislature" in some provisions, yet using global language elsewhere
(emphasis added)).
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so on the floor of the House;32 but even more important for our purposes, he
proposed a constitutional amendment that used explicit language to communi-
cate this idea-the very same explicit language that John Marshall seemed to
be asking for in Barron: "No State shall violate the equal rights of conscience,
or the freedom of the press, or the trial by jury in criminal cases."33 Moments
earlier, Madison had proposed that the following general language be inserted
into Section 9: "[N]or shall the full and equal rights of conscience be in any
manner, or on any pretext, infringed ... and the freedom of the press.., shall
be inviolable. '34 Had this general wording, taken alone or in juxtaposition with
references to Congress in nearby clauses, been understood to apply to states,
Madison's "No state shall" proposal would have been horribly repetitive,
eligible for inclusion in the department of redundancy department.35 What's
more, in limiting its list of rights that "No State shall" abridge to press, con-
science, and juries, Madison's wording clearly suggested under the principle
of expressio unius that states could do other things prohibited by the general
language of his proposed Section 9 insert. That general language, for example,
prohibited both establishment of religion and infringement of conscience.
Madison's "No State shall" list included the latter but pointedly omitted the
former, thus implying that states would continue to be free to establish church-
es. But if so, we are again driven to the obvious rule of construction that the
general language about establishment-like all general language-applied only
to the federal government.
Still further corroboration comes from Madison's speeches on the House
floor. Whereas he candidly admitted that his proto-Tenth Amendment "may be
considered as superfluous" and "unnecessary," he described his "No State shall"
proposal, in very different language: "[T]his [is] the most valuable amendment
in the whole list"36 -valuable because it added something obviously not im-
plicit elsewhere in general language. Yet he also noted that even this most
valuable amendment would bind states only to "those particular rights" 37 listed
in the "No State shall" clause, once again making clear that merely general
language would not limit states.38
32. Id. at 454-55 (June 8, 1789); id. at 784 (Aug. 17, 1789).
33. Id. at 452 (June 8, 1789) (emphasis added).
34. Id. at 451.
35. The redundancy here is of a different order than that embodied in Madison's proposed prototype
of the Tenth Amendment, which used words very different from anything in the original Constitution to
make textually explicit a structural idea only implicit earlier-the idea of limited federal power. And
Madison was at pains to point out that whereas his proto-Tenth Amendment added nothing new, his proto-
Fourteenth did. See infra text accompanying notes 36-38.
36. 1 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 31, at 458-59 (June 8, 1789); id. at 784 (Aug. 17, 1789).
37. Id. at 458 (June 8, 1789).
38. Even the most vociferous 20th-century critic of the Barron rule, William Winslow Crosskey,
concedes that the language of Madison's "No State shall" proposal makes it tough to argue that the other
generally worded amendments limited states. But, he argues, when the Senate voted down Madison's pet
proposal, the general amendments were automatically transformed into limitations on states. 2 CROSSKEY,
supra note 29, at 1066-76. It's a clever argument, but there's no evidence to support it. Crosskey fails to
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So far, so good for Marshall's opinion. But what makes Barron's holding
compelling is neither its technical parsing of Article I, nor its use of lawyerly
rules of construction, nor even the narrow legislative history of the Bill of
Rights in Congress. Rather, it is what Marshall near the end of his opinion
called the "universally understood" historical background of the Bill of
Rights.39 In state convention after state convention in 1787-88, Anti-Federalists
voiced loud concerns about a new, distant, aristocratic, central government that
was being called into existence.4 Many ultimately voted for the Constitution
only because Federalists like Madison promised to consider a Bill of Rights
soon after ratification. Madison of course kept his word, and knew that if he
had not, states' rightists might have called a second constitutional convention
to repudiate the basic structure of the Constitution he had labored so hard to
build.41 In short, without the good will of many moderate Anti-Federalists,
prospects for the new Constitution looked bleak in 1787-88; and a Bill of
Rights was the explicit price of that good will. But the Bill of Rights that Anti-
Federalists sought was a Bill to limit the federal government-not just for the
sake of individual liberty, but also to serve the cause of states' rights.4 2 Madi-
son and his fellow Federalists could hardly have placated their critics, or won
over their skeptics, by sneaking massive new restrictions on states into appar-
ently innocuous general language. Nor would Anti-Federalists in Congress or
in states have knowingly allowed such a trojan horse through the gates. Madi-
son did openly advocate a small number of additional restrictions on
states-clearly labeled as such in a package wrapped in the words "No State
shall"-but even that modest proposal was too much for a Senate jealously
guarding states' rights.
Barron's holding thus kept faith with both the letter and the spirit of the
original Bill of Rights. We should not be surprised, then, that the decision in
Barron was unanimous, or that the Court repeatedly and unanimously reaf-
identify a single person-in the Senate, in the House, in the states, or in the newspapers-who claimed that
the general words would bind states. Nor is it plausible prima facie to presume that the Senate-the federal
branch specially structured to safeguard state governments from federal encroachment-actually sought to
increase the number of "particular rights" binding states by rejecting Madison's pet proposal. Yet this is
exactly what Crosskey claims the Senate must have intended. Crosskey does point to other actions
simultaneously taken by the Senate behind closed doors, but these actually appear to cut just the other way,
suggesting a states' rights explanation for the difference in wording between the First Amendment and the
next seven.
As I explain in more detail in my forthcoming book, the action of the Senate and the precise language
of the First Amendments unique reference to "Congress" reflect a surprisingly widely held view
that-unlike the domains addressed in Amendments lI-VI-the areas covered by the First Amendment
simply lay beyond Congress' enumerated Article I, Section 8 powers.
39. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 250 (1833).
40. See generally Amar, supra note t.
41. See Paul Finkelman, James Madison and the Bill of Rights: A Reluctant Paternity, 1990 Sup. Cr.
REV. 301, 335.
42. See generally Amar, supra note t.
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firmed Barron's rule over the next thirty-three years in cases involving the
First, Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, and Eighth Amendments.4 3
B. The Barron Contrarians
Having worked hard to understand Barron, we now must work equally hard
to understand the contrary view, especially if we are to make full sense of the
language and logic of the Fourteenth Amendment. In the fifteen years before
Barron, a considerable number of weighty lawyers implied in passing or stated
explicitly that various provisions in the Bill did limit states. Writing for the
Court in 1819, Justice William Johnson obliquely suggested that the Seventh
Amendment's guarantee of civil juries applied to states;44 and the following
year he stated even more explicitly in a separate concurrence that the double
jeopardy clause "operates equally upon both [state and federal] govern-
ments,"45 although even here, his statement was not free from ambiguity. He
may simply have meant that the clause applied whenever either of two prosecu-
tions for the same underlying conduct was federal, even if the other was by
state officials in state court for a state law crime. That same year, however, the
New York Supreme Court stated in dictum that the double jeopardy clause
"operates upon state courts" even where both prosecutions were for state law
crimes.4 6 In 1824, this view of the double jeopardy clause was pressed in the
Massachusetts Supreme Court, yet neither the government's attorney nor the
judges appeared to challenge it-perhaps because even without the clause, the
Commonwealth recognized a common law double jeopardy right at least as
broad.47 The following year, William Rawle published a widely read treatise
on the Constitution in which he argued at length that virtually all the general
43. See Livingston v. Moore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 469, 482, 539, 551-52 (1833) (Fourth and Seventh
Amendments); Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540, 555, 582, 587 (1840) (opinions of Thompson
& Barbour, JJ.) (Fifth Amendment due process); Permoli v. New Orleans, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 589, 609 (1845)
(First Amendment free exercise); Fox v. Ohio, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 410, 434-35 (1847) (Fifth Amendment
double jeopardy); Town of East Hartford v. Hartford Bridge Co., 51 U.S. (10 How.) 511, 539 (1850) (Fifth
Amendment just compensation); Smith v. Maryland, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 71, 72, 76 (1855) (Fourth Amend-
ment); Withers v. Buckley, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 84, 89-91 (1857) (Fifth Amendment just compensation);
Pervear v. Massachusetts, 72 U.S. (5 WVall.) 475, 476, 479-80 (1866) (Eighth Amendment).
The only troubled note in this unanimous chorus was sounded by Justice McLean in a pair of double
jeopardy dissents. See Fox, 46 U.S. (5 How.) at 438-40 (McLean, J., dissenting); Moore v. Illinois, 55 U.S.
(14 How.) 13, 21-22 (1852) (McLean, J., dissenting). McLean never claimed that the Fifth Amendment
barred a state from punishing the same person twice for the same offense; but he did think that the
Amendment, in tandem with its counterpart double jeopardy clauses in the state constitutions, prevented
the federal and state governments from each punishing the same person once for the same conduct. See infra
text accompanying notes 45, 55.
44. Bank of Columbia v. Okely, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 235, 240-42 (1819). For a parsing of Johnson's
language as inconsistent with the later Barron opinion, see William Winslow Crosskey, Charles Fairman,
"Legislative History," and the Constitutional Limitations on State Authority, 22 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 127-29
(1954).
45. Houston v. Moore, 18 U.S. (5 wheat.) 1, 33-34 (1820) (separate opinion of Johnson, J.).
46. People v. Goodwin, 18 Johns. 187, 200-01 (N.Y. Sup. Ct 1820).
47. Commonwealth v. Purchase, 19 Mass. (2 Pick.) 521, 522 (1824).
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provisions of the Bill of Rights bound states 8 And as late as 1833, the year
Barron came down, we find Justice Baldwin on circuit implying that the
Second and Fourth Amendments applied against states,49 and Justice Story in
his own treatise on the Constitution taking an uncharacteristically agnostic, even
nonchalant, position on the whole matter:
It has been held in the state courts, (and the point does not seem ever
to have arisen in the courts of the United States,) that [the Eighth
Amendment] does not apply to punishments inflicted in a state court
for a crime against such state; but that the prohibition is addressed
solely to the national government, and operates, as a restriction upon
its powers.5
1. The General WordinglExpressio Unius Theory
What were these lawyers and judges thinking? Some may simply have not
given much thought to the Barron issue, especially where the case at hand was
disposed of on other grounds. And a merely casual look at, say, the double
jeopardy clause might lead a judge to assume it applied to states as well; for
as New York Chief Justice Ambrose Spencer noted, the language of the clause
was "general in its nature, and unrestricted in its terms."' Rawle gave more
attention to the matter and added an expressio unius argument that the contrast
between the First Amendment's specific reference to Congress and the general
language of various later amendments confirmed that they, unlike the First,
applied to states.52 As we have seen, Marshall refuted both of these arguments
by his careful attention to Article I, Section 9. (What's more, the framers'
reference to "Congress" in the First Amendment had nothing to do with the
Barron issue; rather, it was probably an expression of the strong states' rights
view that, unlike the areas addressed by later amendments, the First encom-
passed domains where Congress lacked enumerated power under Article I,
Section 8.)53 When forced to focus on this issue and only this issue in Barron,
and when confronted by Marshall's textual analysis and historical narrative,
Johnson and Baldwin reversed course, and Story fell into line.
Barron, however, was hardly the last word, and the contrary view continued
to find expression over the next thirty-three years. At times it appears that
lawyers, having simply never heard of Barron and its progeny, casually as-
48. WILLIAM RAWLE, A VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 120-30
(Philadelphia, H.C. Carey & I. Lea 1825).
49. Johnson v. Tompkins, 13 F. Cas. 840, 849-52 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1833) (No. 7416).
50. 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1897 (Boston,
Hilliard, Gray & Co. 1833). This language-the sum total of the Commentaries' analysis of the Barron
issue-appears to have been written before Barron, though Story did manage to include in the published
edition a footnote citation to Barron. See Crosskey, supra note 44, at 138-39.
51. People v. Goodwin, 18 Johns. 187, 200 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1820).
52. RAWLE, supra note 48, at 120.
53. I elaborate this theme in more detail in my forthcoming book.
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sumed, along with Spencer or Rawle, that the general language of various
provisions made application to states obvious. Thus in 1845, the Illinois
Supreme Court noted in passing that the Fifth Amendment's due process clause
limited state action,' and two years later Ohio Attorney General Stanberry
glibly conceded in oral argument before the U.S. Supreme Court that double
jeopardy was "forbidden, as well to the States as to the general government,
by the fifth... amendment '." 55 Like Justice Johnson thirty years earlier,
however, Stanberry may have meant to limit his concession to situations where
one of the two prosecutions was federal, and the other state. Most important
for our purposes, we must note that several capable lawyers in the Thirty-ninth
Congress, the Congress that drafted the Fourteenth Amendment, seemed
unaware of Barron until the case was brought to their attention by name by
John Bingham, the principal draftsman of Section One of the Amendment.
56
2. The Declaratory Theory
It is tempting to dismiss all these folks as dolts, but we must resist. Modem
academic law schools did not exist. Supreme Court reports were not as widely
available as nowadays. And constitutional law took a back seat to common law
in its importance to everyday legal practice. (Thus, one of the biggest constitu-
tional issues of the antebellum era was whether the vast domain of common
law was state law or federal law.) Would-be lawyers began their training with
Blackstone's Commentaries, not United States Reports.
But once we remember the centrality of Blackstone and the common law,
we can see the Barron issue in a new light. For the common law method
involved careful examination of codes, charters, statutes, and the like in an
effort to distill their animating principles-the spirit of the common law. Judges
did not simply "make up" common law; they "found" it in authoritative legal
sources, such as Magna Charta, the Petition of Right, the Habeas Corpus Act,
and so on. Thus, even if the Bill of Rights did not, strictly speaking, bind the
states of its own legislative force, was it not at least declaratory of certain
fundamental common law rights? And should not these declarations by We the
People inform a state judge's analysis?
Thus we find Rawle in 1825 going beyond his narrow expressio unius
argument by claiming that certain amendments "form parts of the declared
rights of the people. 57 Tellingly, he stressed the preamble of the Second
Amendment as "a declaration that a well regulated militia is necessary to the
security of a free state. '58 Only after discussing the preamble alone did he
54. Rhinehart v. Schuyler, 7 Ill. (2 Gilm.) 473, 522 (1845).
55. Fox v. Ohio, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 410, 420 (1847).
56. See infra text accompanying notes 189-195.
57. RAWLE, supra note 48, at 120 (emphasis added).
58. Id. at 121 (emphasis added).
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quote its "corollary" that "the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall
not be infringed," whose language, Rawle noted, was perfectly general.59
Rawle then immediately invoked the English Bill of Rights of 1689 and
Blackstone's analysis of the English common law right to bear arms.60 For
Rawle, all this suggested that the Second Amendment bound states. Nor did
the Tenth Amendment stand in the way, for Rawle read its final clauses as
acknowledging that "the people" had certain reserved rights in contradistinction
to-and against-"the states." 1
Rawle's analysis and language here were perhaps no more than suggestive,
but they sketched out lines of argument that later Barron contrarians would
develop more fully. Narrowly understood, the "declaratory" view of the Bill
of Rights could provide even state courts with principled rules of decision, both
procedural and substantive, when no state statute spoke directly to a given
issue. Such, for example, was the situation in the New York and Massachusetts
double jeopardy cases in the 1820's. More broadly, the Bill could serve as a
source of maxims, both political and judicial. Politically, a maxim like the
preamble to the Second Amendment could warn the people of any state to be
wary of any legislature, even a state legislature, that sought to disarm them.62
Judicially, maxims drawn from the Bill of Rights could generate a set of rules
of construction-what we would call today "clear statement rules"-obliging
a state legislature to speak with unmistakable clarity before trenching on a right
"declared" in the U.S. Constitution. And in the hands of a strong believer in
fundamental or natural rights, the "declaratory" view of the Bill could have
even more far-reaching consequences.
As modem day legal positivists, we tend to view the Bill as creating or
conferring legal rights. But the congressional resolution accompanying the Bill
explicitly described some of its provisions as "declaratory." 63 To a nineteenth-
century believer in natural rights, the Bill was not simply an enactment of We
the People as the Sovereign Legislature bringing new legal rights into existence,
but a declaratory judgment by We the People as the Sovereign High Court that
certain natural or fundamental rights already existed.' 4 Under this view, the
59. Id. at 122.
60. Id. at 122-23.
61. Id. at 120-21.
62. On the general role of maxims in Bill of Rights, see Amar, supra note t, at 1208-09.
63. 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 321
(Washington, Dep't of State 1894).
64. For a nice elaboration of this concept, see Jeff Rosen, Note, Was the Flag Burning Amendment
Unconstitutional?, 100 YALE L.J. 1073, 1081-82 (1991). See also JACOBUS TENBROEK, EQUAL UNDER LAW
90-91, 128 (Collier Books 1965) (1951) (early amendments seen by contrarians as "declaratory constitutional
safeguards of natural rights" and "a meeting ground of constitutional and natural rights"); Howard Jay
Graham, Our "Declaratory" Fourteenth Amendment, 7 STAN. L. REV. 3, 3-4 (1954) (noting centrality of
18th- and 19th-century conception of various constitutional provisions as "declaratory"); cf. 2 ELLIOT'S
DEBATES, supra note 30, at 433 (remarks of James Wilson at Pennsylvania ratifying convention) (describing
People as the Ultimate Supreme Court: "from their power ... there is no appeal"); WILLIAM E. NELSON,
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDmENT 59 (1988) (quoting 1867 Pennsylvania legislator describing constitutional
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First Amendment was not merely an interpretation of the positive law code of
the original Constitution, declaring that Congress lacked Article I, Section 8
enumerated power to regulate religion or suppress speech; the Amendment was
also a declaration that certain fundamental "rights" and "freedoms"-of assem-
bly, petition, speech, press, and religious exercise-preexisted the Constitution.
Why else, it might be asked, did the Amendment speak of "the" freedom of
speech, implying a preexisting entitlement?65 The Ninth and Tenth Amend-
ments did more than make explicit rules of construction for interpreting the
Constitution as a positive law code; they also declared that certain "rights" and
"powers" were retained by "the people" and "reserved" to them in contradis-
tinction to "states."
Technically speaking, perhaps the Bill did not bind state governments of
its own legislative force. But under the strong declaratory view, the result was
virtually the same. An honest state court would be bound-though the precise
nature of the obligation, legal or moral, was somewhat fuzzy-to respect
"declarations" of the High Court of We the People that certain "rights" and
"freedoms" existed.66 Unlike Rawle's expressio unius argument, demolished
by Barron, this was an argument that states might be constrained even by the
First Amendment-at least, by those clauses of the First Amendment that spoke
of "rights" or "freedoms." (The establishment clause most distinctly did not.)
The obligation here would seem at least as strong as the duty of the honest
common law judge to consider well reasoned precedents from well respected
sister courts in other jurisdictions. Or to take an example from modern day
Supreme Court case law, the obligation roughly mirrored the later rule that
federal judges should consult state constitutions and state statutes to determine
what punitive practices are violations of contemporary morality and thus "cruel
amendments as submitted to the people "sitting as a jury"--that is, a judicial body).
65. See United States v. Given, 25 F. Cas. 1324, 1325 (C.C.D. Del. 1873) (No. 15,210) (Strong, Circuit
J.).
66. Consider, for example, Massachusetts Chief Justice Lemuel Shaw's remarks in a prominent mid-
19th-century case involving a claim of right against the state: "[T]he amendments of the Constitution of
the United States, in the nature of a bill of rights, [should be regarded] as the annunciation of great and
fundamental principles, to be always held in regard, both morally and legally, by those who make and those
who administer the law [rather than as mere] precise and positive directions and rules of action .... Jones
v. Robbins, 74 Mass. (8 Gray) 329, 340 (1857); see also Bradshaw v. Rogers, 20 Johns. 103, 106 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1822). In Bradshaw, Chief Justice Spencer invoked the Fifth Amendment just compensation
clause-the same clause later at issue in Barron-against a state law. Though conceding that the clause
might lack "binding constitutional force upon the act under consideration" since the clause "related to the
powers of the national government, and was intended as a restriction on that government," Spencer went
on to argue that the clause was "declaratory of a great and fundamental principle of government; and any
law violating that principle must be a nullity." (emphasis added). For similar views, see Bonaparte v.
Camden & A.R. Co., 3 F. Cas. 821, 828 (C.C.D.NJ. 1830) (No. 1617) (Baldwin, Circuit J.) ("Though it
may wvell be doubted whether as a constitutional provision, [the Fifth Amendment takings clause] applies
to the state governments, yet it is the declaration of what in its nature is in the power of all governments,
and the rights of its citizens ....") (emphasis added); Sinnickson v. Johnsons, 17 N.J.L. 129, 145-46 (1839)
(dictum) (citing Barron yet embracing declaratory theory of just compensation clause).
1992] 1207
The Yale Law Journal
and unusual" within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment.67 More expan-
sively, it could be argued that the ratification of the Bill by the collective state
legislatures estopped these bodies from denying that certain rights and freedoms
existed. How, for example, could a state legislature disarm its people after it
had ratified a document declaring that "A well regulated Militia [is] necessary
to the security of a free State?"
But how does all this fancy theorizing deal with the obvious objection that
even if the Bill "declared" "rights" and "freedoms," it declared them only
against the federal government? How could these declarations become trans-
mogrified into limitations on states? There are really two objections here-one
jurisprudential, and one constitutional. The jurisprudential objection is best
framed by the work of the early twentieth-century legal analyst, Wesley
Hohfeld, who insisted that "rights" logically implied correlative "duties"
imposed on discrete persons or entities.68 The nature of a right is thus defined
every bit as much by the party against whom the right runs as by its substantive
sweep. The analytic truth of Hohfeld's insight is hard to quarrel with, but it
would be anachronistic to read this insight back into all rights rhetoric, especial-
ly natural rights rhetoric, in mid- to late-nineteenth-century America. Hohfeld,
after all, was responding to nineteenth-century judges and lawyers who were
using the word "right" more loosely-sloppily, Hohfeld argued.
This emphasis on the word "right" also helps answer the constitutional
objection rooted in Barron. Marshall insisted on reading the Bill of Rights with
the same rules of construction implicit in the original Constitution, especially
Article I, Section 9. This is a view deeply supportive of the vision of the Bill
that I have elsewhere elaborated-a view of the Bill as fundamentally analo-
gous to the original Constitution, intertwining structure (especially federalism)
and rights.69 But the declaratory view insisted that rights were different from
structure. Here was a powerful wedge to break the linkage Marshall sought to
forge between Article I, Section 9 and the Bill of Rights. For Section 9 never
invoked the word "rights" in either its general or specific language. (Indeed,
the only place where the word "right" appeared in the original Constitution
was-of all places!-the Article I, Section 8 copyright clause.70 ) The closest
thing Section 9 offered to a declaration of right was its affirmation of "the
67. See, e.g., Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 369-72 (1989). Compare, for example, Chancellor
James Kent's opinion in Gardner v. Trustees of Newburgh, 2 Johns. Ch. 162, 165-68 (N.Y. Ch. 1816), where
the great jurist applied the just compensation requirement to a state statute despite the absence of any express
language in the state constitution. After canvassing the "soundest authorities" of Grotius, Puffendorf, and
Blackstone, and the express language of the Pennsylvania, Delaware, and Ohio state constitutions, Kent
proclaimed: "But what is of higher authority, and is absolutely decisive of the sense of the people of this
country, [the principle] is made a part of the Constitution of the United States, 'that private property shall
not be taken for public use without just compensation'...."
68. Wesley N. Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23
YALE L.J. 16 (1913).
69. See Amar, supra note t.
70. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8 (empowering Congress to secure to "Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries").
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Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus"--and we should note that Rawle
insisted that this and only this provision of Section 9 bound states.71 The
Barron contrarians, then, denied that Section 9 was, as a general matter, truly
"in the nature of a bill of rights."72 The first ten amendments, by contrast,
were commonly described as such, and used the words "rights" and "freedoms"
over and over-in no less than six different amendments.73 Unlike Section 9,
then, the Bill truly declared rights that, according to contrarian ideology, bound
all governments.
This way of thinking would have been deeply foreign to many of the men
who had clamored for a Bill of Rights in the 1780's. The word "right" had no
talismanic natural law significance; after all, many sought a Bill to confer-or
declare-states' rights, once again revealing the original intertwining of rights
and structure.74 So too, a feudal inheritance made it quite easy for many in
the 1780's to intuit the idea Hohfeld would resurrect and refine after the heyday
of natural rights talk in the mid-nineteenth century. Particularistic customs,
charters, and the like gave distinct persons or entities distinct rights or privileg-
es against distinct entities, but not others. 75 Indeed, much of the Declaration
of Independence and its predecessor petitions can be seen as backward-looking
invocations of particularistic rules and customs.
The Barron contrarians, by contrast, emphasized the Declaration's more
sweeping and universalizing Enlightenment rhetoric of "self-evident truths" and
the "inalienable rights" of "all men." Contrarians self-consciously sought to
distill the pure essence of rights---citizen rights, not state rights-that had been
blended with structural issues in the Bill.76 As an interpretation of the original
Bill, their view had huge problems, but as a vision of the future Bill, it deserves
our careful consideration-for it was a view that would ultimately prevail in
the language and logic of the Fourteenth Amendment.77
The clearest contrarian articulations occurred in conscious reaction to
Barron itself. In the 1840 case of Holmes v. Jennison, former New Hampshire
Governor C.P. Van Ness politely but boldly attacked Barron in his oral argu-
ment before the Supreme Court: "With the utmost deference I beg leave to
71. RAWLE, supra note 48, at 113.
72. Cf. supra text accompanying notes 27-28.
73. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("freedom" of speech and of the press; "right" to assemble and petition;
"free" exercise of religion); id. amend. II ("right" to keep and bear arms); id. amend. IV ("right" against
unreasonable searches and seizures); id. amend. VI ("right" to various procedural protections in criminal
prosecutions); id. amend. VII ("right" to civil jury); id. amend. IX ("rights" retained by the people).
74. See Amar, supra note t, at 1203-04 and sources cited therein.
75. See Carol M. Rose, The Ancient Constitution vs. The Federalist Empire: Anti-Federalism From
the Attack on "Monarchism" to Modern Localism, 84 Nw. U. L. REV. 74, 75-84 (1989).
76. See TENBROEK, supra note 64, at 90-91 (contrarians "disregard[ed]" federalism in parsing the
Constitution: "Once a mention of the rights [to be protected] was found, the rest was easy." (emphasis
added)).
77. Cf. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303,307-08,310 (1880) (self-consciously inferring "rights"
and "immunities" from constitutional provisions worded as "prohibitions"); Exparte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339,
345 (1880) (similar).
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observe, that in my humble judgment, an error was committed by the
Court .... ,78 After going out of his way to remind the Justices that the
original amendments to the Constitution were "commonly called the bill of
rights," he distinguished between certain provisions that were merely "limita-
tions of power" and others that "are to be understood as declarations of
rights." 79 This latter category, argued Van Ness, encompassed "absolute rights,
inherent in the people, and of which no power can legally deprive them,"
"principles which lie at the very foundation of civil liberty, and are most
intimately connected with the dearest rights of the people[,] .... [p]rinciples
which... deserve to be diligently taught to our children, and to be written
upon the posts of the houses, and upon the gates." 80 Though not clearly devel-
oped, here lay seeds for a kind of selective incorporation based on whether a
particular clause of the Bill was a mere "limitation of power" or alternatively
a "declaration of right."
Far more elaborate were various opinions of the Supreme Court of Georgia
in the late 1840's and early 1850's, two of which were authored by Chief
Justice Joseph Henry Lumpkin. In the first, Nunn v. Georgia, Lumpkin wrote
that he was "aware" of contrary rulings (including, presumably Barron), but
nevertheless invoked the Second Amendment to void a state statute.8 1
Lumpkin began by emphasizing English common law rights that preexisted
state and federal constitutions. For him, state constitutions "confer no new
rights on the people which did not belong to them before., 8 2 So too, the
federal Bill of Rights, "in declaring that the right of the people to keep and bear
arms, should not be infringed, only reiterated a truth announced a century
before, in the [English Bill of Rights] of 1689.,, 83 Like Rawle and Van Ness
before him, Lumpkin stressed the Bill's declaratory and didactic nature. The
people, wrote Lumpkin, adopted the Bill "as beacon-lights to guide and control
the action of [state] legislatures, as well as that of Congress. If a well-regulated
militia is necessary to the security of the State of Georgia and of the United
States, is it competent for the [Georgia] General Assembly to take away this
security, by disarming the People?"'' Like Rawle, Lumpkin seemed to deny
that the Tenth Amendment was a purely state rights provision, for he read it
to imply that "the people" had certain rights in contradistinction to the "states."
And in asking the question whether arms-bearing was "a right reserved to the
78. 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540, 555 (1840).
79. Id. at 555-56.
80. Id. at 556-57. The last reference is of course Biblical, see Deuteronomy 6:6-9, and is only one of
countless examples of the strong religious emphasis among contrarians and, later, Reconstructors. It is also
a reminder that, like scripture, a bill of rights was written to be memorized and internalized by ordinary
citizens. See Amar supra note t, at 1208-09.
81. Nunn v. Georgia, 1 Ga. 243, 250 (1846).
82. Id. at 249.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 250-51 (emphasis omitted).
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States or to themselves [i.e., the people]," 5 Lumpkin found dispositive the
language of the Second Amendment declaring a "right of the people."
Lumpkin reiterated and elaborated these themes in the 1852 case of Camp-
bell v. Georgia, in which he explicitly cited Barron but once again held that
the Bill's provisions generally bound states.8 6 Though he did not "stop to
examine" Barron in detail,87 Lumpkin wisely avoided the expressio unius
argument that Marshall had demolished and tried to outflank Marshall's histori-
cal narrative by widening the time frame. Once again, he began not with the
framing of the federal Bill of Rights but with the ancient landmarks of the
common law: "Magna Charta-the Petition of Right-the [English] Bill of
Rights [of 1689-and more especially, ... the Act of Settlement, in Brit-
ain." 8 By emphasizing the common law background, Lumpkin could plausibly
portray the federal Bill of Rights as added "out of abundant caution" to clarify
preexisting legal rights.89 And this declaratory purpose, Lumpkin argued,
clearly justified application of the Bill to states, as emphasized by his own
italics: The Bill of Rights' purpose "was to declare to the world the fixed and
unalterable determination of our people, that these invaluable rights... should
never be disturbed by any government." The Bill was "our American Magna
Charta." 90
Lumpkin then began a discussion about whether unenumerated "natural
rights of man" "independently of [rights specified] in written constitutions"
could ever limit American legislatures, quoting and paraphrasing broad natural
law passages from various U.S. Supreme Court cases.91 For reasons of institu-
tional competence, Lumpkin did not "intend to put our opinion.., upon this
foundation, however solid it may be.",92 Given that "our ideas of natural justice
are vague and uncertain," perhaps a wide-open hunt for natural law would allow
judges too much discretion-freedom to make, rather than find, natural law.93
"But," Lumpkin argued, "as to questions arising under these amendments, there
is nothing indefinite. The people of the several States, by adopting these
amendments, have defined accurately and recorded permanently their opinion,
as to the great principles which they embrace .... 9' If this last argument
85. Id. at 250.
86. Campbell v. State, 11 Ga. 353 (1852).
87. Id. at 369.
88. Id. at 365. This catalogue appears to be taken directly from Blackstone. See infra text accompanying
notes 126-28.
89. 11 Ga. at 365.
90. Id. at 368.
91. Id. at 369-70 (citing, inter alia, Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810); Terrett v. Taylor,
13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 43 (1815); Green v. Biddle, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 1 (1823)).
92. 11 Ga. at 371.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 372 (emphasis added). Beyond Nunn and Campbell, the most important Georgia Supreme
Court decisions in a contrarian vein involved application of the Fifth Amendment just compensation
clause-the same clause at issue in Barron-against various Georgia laws. In Young v. McKenzie, 3 Ga.
31 (1847), the court, per Justice Hiram Warner, stated that the clause did no "more than declare a great
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looks vaguely familiar, it should. A century later another Southern judge-one
Hugo LaFayette Black-would make a strikingly similar argument on behalf
of his crusade to "incorporate" the Bill of Rights against the states.
C. The Contrarian Context
In their belief that Barron was wrongly decided, men like Van Ness and
Lumpkin found themselves in a distinct minority among antebellum lawyers;
but time was on their side. As the years wore on, changes were occurring in
America that made major premises of the original Bill of Rights-premises
faithfully followed in Barron-more and more problematic. Regardless of
whether the original Bill was intended to apply against states, it became
increasingly plausible to think that the Constitution should be amended to
overrule Barron.
1. Technology, Geography, and Ideology
Consider first the broad technological changes in the first half of the
nineteenth century. In the 1780's, Anti-Federalists had feared that national
lawmakers would literally be too far removed from their constituents for mutual
confidence to develop; congressmen would lack current information about
constituent desires, and citizens would find it difficult to monitor their federal
representatives. 95 Hence, special constitutional restrictions on Congress made
sense. But over the next eighty years, improved roads, new canals, and the
invention of the railroad and the telegraph revolutionized transportation and
communication, diminishing the feeling that national lawmakers were qualita-
tively more distant than state ones. Nor was the Congress of the mid-nineteenth
century drastically smaller, and thus more subject to cabal and intrigue, than
its state counterparts. The specter of a thirteen-man House of Representatives
that Patrick Henry had conjured up in 178896 seemed rather fanciful in 1859,
common law principle, applicable to all governments, both State and Federal, which has existed from the
time of Magna Charta." Id. at 41 (emphasis altered). See also id. at 44 (explicitly noting congressional
preamble to federal Bill of Rights describing its provisions as "declaratory and restrictive clauses" (emphasis
added by the court)). In Parham v. The Justices, 9 Ga. 341 (1851), Justice Eugenius Nisbet, on behalf of
the court, invoked Magna Charta, the common law, Blackstone, the "ablest" academic commentators,
opinions from several sister state courts, the language of several sister state constitutions, and, finally, the
language of the federal Fifth Amendment. Id. at 349-51. In support of the last item, Nisbet wrote:
The Constitution of the United States upon this point, I know, has been held to be a restraint
upon federal legislation alone, and not to apply to the States. If that be admitted, yet it is still
authority, most significant, for the application of the rule in the States. It is the declaration of
the [judicial] opinion of the American people ... [and] a solemn avowal, by the people, that
a power to take private property, without compensation, does not belong to any government."
Id. at 351 (emphasis added).
95. See Amar, supra note t, at 1137-45.
96. See 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 30, at 46; Amar, supra note t, at 1140-41.
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when the size of the lower House had swelled to over 200 members-a number
that made several state lower houses look rather small by comparison.
Geographic expansion also worked ideological inversions. In the 1780's,
state governments had distinguished pedigrees going back to their respective
colonial foundings, while the national government proposed by Madison and
his fellow Federalists was something altogether novel. 7 Prudence, if nothing
else, dictated special skepticism about the new government, and special restric-
tions on it. By contrast, in the antebellum era, the federal government was well
established, while various new states were springing to life as the nation pushed
inexorably westward (an expansion spurred on, of course, by the technological
advances we have just noted). But these new states gave rise to a puzzle: why
should a territorial legislature, as an agent of Congress, be bound by all the
restrictions of the federal Bill of Rights when state governments were not?
Indeed, did it make any sense that immediately upon admission to statehood,
a territory could ignore all sorts of salutary restraints in the Bill that had
previously applied to it? Congressman John Bingham apparently thought not,
for in considering Oregon's proposed admission to the Union in 1859, he
declared:
In my judgment, sir, this constitution, framed by the people of Oregon,
is repugnant to the Federal Constitution, and violative of the rights of
citizens of the United States. I know, sir, that some gentlemen have
a short and easy method of disposing of such objections as these, by
assuming that the people of the State, after admission, may, by chang-
ing their constitution, insert therein every objectionable feature which,
before admission, they were constrained to omit .... [But I deny] that
the States are not limited by the Constitution of the United States, in
respect of the personal or political rights of citizens of the United
States ....
... [W]henever the Constitution guaranties to its citizens a right,
either natural or conventional, such guarantee is in itself a limitation
upon the States .... 9s
As we shall see, Bingham would later write this philosophy into Section One
of the Fourteenth Amendment.
97. See, e.g., I THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 250, 338, 439 (Max Farrand
ed., rev. ed. 1937) (remarks of John Lansing and Luther Martin); THE ANTI-FEDERALISTS 93, 124, 133, 171,
185, 240-41, 251, 254 (Cecelia M. Kenyon ed., Northeastern University Press 1985) (1966) (collecting
objections to novelty of proposed Constitution from various Anti-Federalists). For Publius' attempt to blunt
this critique, see THE FEDERALIST No. 14, at 104-05 (James Madison).
98. CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 2d Sess. 982 (1859); see also CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 1640
(1862) (remarks of John Bingham, invoking the congressional "act for the admission of [Bingham's home
state of] Ohio on the condition of perpetual freedom to all law-abiding men within her limits"); Howard
Jay Graham, The "Conspiracy Theory" of the Fourteenth Amendment, 47 YALE L.J. 371, 395 n.84 (1938)
(discussing this aspect of Bingham's thought as possibly influenced by congressional statutes conditioning
admission of new states on compliance with due process and other guarantees).
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Consider next the libertarian track record of central versus local govern-
ment. The American Revolution had featured local colonies fighting an imperial
center in the name of both freedom and federalism. In light of their experience
with imperial arrogance and oppression on the one hand, and the heroic roles
played by local governments in resisting oppression on the other, many Ameri-
cans in the 1780's associated a strong central government with tyranny and a
strong state government with freedom. This association was of course strength-
ened by the events in the following decade, with the Virginia and Kentucky
legislatures leading the charge against the federal Sedition Act. But in the
ensuing decades, it would be hard to argue that the central government acted
qualitatively more repressively than local ones. Why, then, the Barron double
standard?
In some situations, the very line separating state and federal government
began to blur. We have already seen in passing the tricky double jeopardy
questions raised when both state and federal governments prosecuted a defen-
dant for the same underlying conduct; but the free press clause posed an
analogous puzzle that received far more public attention. In the 1830's, various
states sought to ban "incendiary" publications and wanted federal officials to
cooperate by closing the mails to such publications. Would such censorship
constitute federal action violative of the First Amendment or state action
beyond the Amendment's scope?99
To an increasing number of friends of free speech, this knotty question,
even if answerable, seemed to miss the point. Why should the right of citizens
to publish controversial views turn on fine legal distinctions about which
government's hands had really wielded the censor's red pen? If "incendiary"
publications dealt with national political issues, why was a state tax on national
speech any more constitutional than a state tax on the national bank?'0° And
even if publications addressed only local matters, did not the Constitution's
requirement of republican government 1" and its overarching principle of
popular sovereignty oblige state governments to allow citizens the greatest
latitude in the expression of political opinions?' 2 As to speech and press,
then, a growing number of Americans were coming to appreciate the wisdom
of Madison's failed "No State shall" amendment, which had tried to make clear
99. See WILLIAM M. WIECEK, THE SOURCES OFANTISLAVERY CONST1TUTIONAUSM IN AMERICA, 1760-
1848, at 172-82 (1977); David Yassky, Eras of the First Amendment, 91 COLuM. L. REv. 1699, 1713-17
(1991). At almost the same time, a similar blurring of the state/federal line was at work in various slave
rendition cases under Congress' Fugitive Slave Act of 1793, which involved state magistrates enforcing
federallaws and raised intricate questions of state incorporation of federal law. See, e.g., SALMON P. CHASE,
SPEECH IN THE CASE OF THE COLORED WOMAN MATILDA 23-25, 32-36 (Cincinnati, Pugh & Dodd 1837).
100. Cf. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819); CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., STRuCTURE
AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTTUTONAL LAW 33-50 (1969).
101. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4 (guaranteeing "a Republican Form of Government" to "every State in
this Union").
102. See generally ALEXANDER MEIKLEIOHN, POLMCAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTrrUTIONAL POWERS
OF THE PEOPLE (1960); Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT. REV.
245.
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that state officials should be no more free to censor than their federal counter-
parts.
Madison, of course, in both The Federalist No. 10 and in the First Congress
had argued that state governments were more likely to tyrannize minorities, 10 3
but as we saw earlier, the Senate rejected his original "No State shall" amend-
ment. Part of the reason was that in the 1780's, "liberty" was still centrally
understood as public liberty of democratic self-government-majoritarian liberty
rather than liberty against popular majorities. 104 Madison thought otherwise,
but was a man ahead of his time. By the Civil War era, the general intellectual
tide was shifting, as reflected in the publication in 1859 of John Stuart Mill's
classic tract, On Liberty-on individual liberty.
2. Slavery
But surely, to say all this about antebellum America is to rehearse Hamlet
without the Prince, for we have yet to confront the issue that shattered the
founders' Union: slavery. As important as canals, railroads, and telegraph lines
were, none of these innovations was more significant than the cotton gin, which
killed any chance that slavery might prove so unprofitable that it could be
abolished without great economic dislocation. And no issues of geographic
expansion posed by the new territories were as explosive as slavery and
race-the subjects, indeed, of Bingham's specific objections to the Oregon
Constitution. Nor did any issue place the libertarian track record of federal
versus state governments in stronger light than did slavery. And on this ques-
tion, states did not sparkle. Slavery was almost exclusively a creature of state
law. To be sure, the federal government had supported the slave system with
fugitive slave laws and other policies, including a postal system that helped
exclude abolitionist mailings from distribution in the South. (These mailings,
of course, were the main targets of the 1830's bans on "incendiary" literature.)
Yet a major platform of the Free Soil and Republican Parties in the 1840's and
1850's was that the Constitution forbade any federal involvement with slavery:
freedom was national; slavery, local-hence the popular slogan "Freedom
National," a slogan that would have sounded quite odd in the 1780's and
1790's. 1°5 Finally, of course, the abject plight of blacks dramatized the danger
to liberty posed by even majoritarian government.
103. See Amar, supra note t, at 1146-49.
104. See GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMdERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 24-25,60-61,
362 (1969).
105. See NATIONAL PARTY PLATFORMS 1840-1968, at 5 (Kirk H. Porter & Donald B. Johnson eds.,
4th ed. 1970) (Liberty Platform of 1844, §§ 10, 11); id. at 13-14 (Free Soil Platform of 1848, passim); id.
at 18 (Free Democratic Platform of 1852, §§ IV, VII); id. at 27 (Republican Platform of 1856, para. 3);
Id. at 32 (Republican Platform of 1860, §§ 5,8). See generally ERIC FONER, FREE SOIL, FREE LABOR, FREE
MEN 73-102 (1970); HAROLD M. HYMAN & WILLIAM M. WIECEK, EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER LAW 17-18,
92-93, 170 (1982).
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The structural imperatives of the peculiar institution led slave states to
violate virtually every "right" and "freedom" declared in the Bill-not just
rights and freedoms of slaves, but of free men and women too.' 6 Simply put,
slavery required repression. Speech and writing critical of slavery--even if
plainly religious or political in inspiration-was incendiary and had to be
suppressed in Southern states, lest slaves overhear and get ideas.107 Teaching
slaves to read (even The Bible) was a criminal offense punished severely in
some states. 1 8 In a society that saw itself under siege after Nat Turner's
rebellion,1' 9 access to firearms had to be strictly restricted, especially to free
blacks. 10 The problem of fugitive slaves created further pressures on civil
liberties that made life treacherous indeed for free blacks. Typically, all South-
ern blacks were legally presumed to be slaves, subject to arbitrary "seizures"
of their "persons," triable as fugitives without juries in proceedings lacking
basic rudiments of due process and, if adjudged to be escaped slaves, subject
to great cruelty as a warning to others."'
To counter this regime of repression, abolitionist and antislavery lawyers
could not simply rely on positive law, for slavery itself was deeply embedded
in positive law. Beginning in the 1830's, abolitionist lawyers developed increas-
ingly elaborate theories of natural rights, individual liberty, and higher
106. See, e.g., MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, No STATE SHALL ABRIDGE: THE FOURTEENTH AENDMENT
AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS 36 (1986); WILLIAM GOODELL, THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE IN THEORY AND
PRACtiCE 372-84 (Negro University Press 1968) (1853); HYMAN & WIEcEK, supra note 105, at 15;
TENBROEK, supra note 64, at 38-39, 125-26.
107. See CURTIS, supra note 106, at 23, 30-38; KENNETH M. STAMPP, THE PECULIAR INSTITUTION
211-12 (1956); Alfred Avins, Incorporation of the Bill ofRights: The Crosskey-Fairman Debates Revisited,
6 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 17-26 (1968).
108. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1013 (1366) (remarks of Rep. Tobias Plants); STAMPP,
supra note 107, at 208, 211; TENBROEK, supra note 64, at 124-25; Avins, supra note 107, at 17.
109. See STAMPP, supra note 107, at 132-40.
110. See STEPHEN P. HALBROOK, THAT EVERY MAN BE ARMED 96-106 (1984); Robert J. Cottrol &
Raymond T. Diamond, The Second Amendment: Towards an Afro-Americanist Reconsideration, 80 GEO.
L.. 309, 333-38 (1991).
111. See STAMPP, supra note 107, at 153, 188-91, 193-94, 212, 215-17; THOMAS D. MORRIS, FREE
MEN ALL (1974).
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law-theories far more compatible with a "declaratory" reading of the federal
Bill than with Barron's technical legalism.112
The fabric of the original Bill of Rights, interweaving freedom and federal-
ism, was unraveling under the strain of slavery. And once the Civil War came,
Barron seemed plainly anachronistic. For if the years leading up to the Revolu-
tionary War had dramatized the special danger of central tyranny, leading to
Barron's Bill, the Civil War era demonstrated that states required constitutional
restraints as well.
The abolition of slavery in the Thirteenth Amendment-the first federal
constitutional amendment to restrict state law-was obviously the place to start.
But was it enough? When the Thirty-ninth Congress convened in December
1865, various unrepentant Southern governments were in the process of resur-
recting slavery de facto through the infamous Black Codes. As with the slavery
system itself, the new codes would invariably require systematic state abridg-
ments of the core rights and freedoms in the Bill of Rights. These abridgments
would of course hit blacks the hardest, but the resurrection of a caste system
would also require repression of any whites who might question the codes or
harbor sympathy for blacks.113 In response, the Thirty-ninth Congress drafted
Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment.
112. For a nice discussion of the influence of this abolitionist theory on the Reconstruction Republicans
of the 39th Congress, see CURTIS, supra note 106, at 26-56.
In light of the deep resonance between the declaratory view of the federal Bill and abolitionism, it
is of course ironic that perhaps the leading judicial exponent of the declaratory theory in the 1840's and
1850's was the emphatically pro-slavery Georgia Supreme Court. For a concrete illustration of this irony,
see State ex reL Tucker v. Lavinia, 25 Ga. 311, 313-14 (1858) (Lumpkin, CJ.) (extending benefit of "great
principle of the common law" against double jeopardy to "slaves and free persons of color as well as to
white persons"). If free persons of color were entitled to the great common law principle of double jeopardy,
why not also to Nunn's great common law principle of the right to keep and bear arms?
Its association with a pro-slavery court made the Nunn/Campbell line of cases a far less likely source
of direct influence on Republicans in the 39th Congress than the abolitionist sources discussed by Curtis.
Nevertheless, this line of cases is extremely important in proving that the declaratory reading of the federal
Bill was not merely a fringe theory of a small group of abolitionist extremists, but rather was appealing
to many thoughtful lawyers steeped in the common law method-and in particular, to judges attentive to
issues of judicial role and self-conscious about the need to guide and constrain judicial discretion.
113. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1065 (1866) (remarks of Rep. John Bingham)
(stressing need to protect "thousands of loyal white citizens" in the South from property confiscations and
other repressive measures); Charles Fairman, Does The Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of
Rights?, 2 STAN. L. REv. 5,90 (1949) (quoting October 1866 speech of Vermont Governor Paul Dillingham
on need to ratify Fourteenth Amendment to "secure to the original Union men of the South equal rights
and impartial liberty"); The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 123 (1873) (Bradley, J.,
dissenting) ("The mischief to be remedied was not merely slavery ... [but also] that intolerance of free
speech and free discussion which often rendered life and property insecure, and led to much unequal
legislation.'); Exparte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 364-65 (1880) (Field, I., dissenting) (discussing importance
of protecting various Northerners and Unionists in South). See generally S. EXEC. DOC. No. 2,39th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1865) (report of Carl Schurz) (detailing need to protect white Unionists and Yankees in the South);
CHESTER JAMES ANTIEAu, THE ORIGINAL UNDERSTANDING OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 24-25 (1981)
(collecting similar quotations).
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II. THE EASY CASE FOR INCORPORATION
A. The Text of the Fourteenth Amendment
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privi-
leges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws.
So reads the second sentence of the Fourteenth Amendment-a sentence
around which the entire incorporation debate has swirled. For however much
they disagree about everything else, all the participants in the incorporation
debate have found common ground in the belief that the answer to the debate
lies in these words. In light of the stakes involved, and the brevity of the text,
we would do well to weigh each word with care. And when we do, we shall
see that the textual argument for incorporation--of a certain sort-is remarkably
straightforward.
1. "No State shall..
For those in the incorporation camp, the key sentence gets off to a great
start. Anyone paying the slightest attention to constitutional text would find the
same phrase in Article I, Section 10 imposing various limitations on states,
including several key rights designed principally for the benefit of in-state
residents: "No State shall... pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto Law,
or Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts, or grant any Title of Nobility."
In 1810, Chief Justice Marshall's opinion for the Court in Fletcher v. Peck
declared that the language of Article I, Section 10 "may be deemed a bill of
rights for the people of each state" 4 -a phrase repeated by the Supreme
Court in 1853 and again in 1866, the same year in which the Fourteenth
Amendment was drafted.115 Of course, the Court did not mean to suggest that
the catalogue of Section 10 rights was identical to that set out in the first ten
amendments-otherwise the entire Barron and incorporation debates would be
moot. But the language of Fletcher and its progeny does confirm the rhetorical
resonance between the phrase "No State shall" and the idea of a federally
enforceable "bill of rights" against state governments. Madison had intuited this
resonance a dozen years before Fletcher when he proposed to include in his
"Bill of Rights" an amendment that "No State shall" abridge various rights of
religion, expression, and jury trial.
114. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 138 (1810).
115. See Piqua Branch of the State Bank v. Knoop, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 369, 385, 392 (1853);
Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (5 Wall.) 277, 322, 325 (1866).
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Far more dramatic evidence of this resonance comes from Barron, where
a unanimous Supreme Court stated that, had the framers of the original Bill of
Rights meant to impose its rules on states, they would have used the Article
I, Section 10 phrase "No State shall" or some reasonable facsimile thereof. But
if the framers of the original Bill were entitled to rely on rules of construction
implicit in the Philadelphia Constitution and made explicit by Publius in The
Federalist No. 83, surely the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment were
entitled to rely on the authoritative language of Barron itself. The Supreme
Court Justices in Barron asked for "Simon Says" language, and that's exactly
what the Fourteenth Amendment gave them.
Earlier drafts of the key sentence had omitted the words "No State shall"
in favor of other formulations, but as Congressman John Bingham explained
several years after the Amendment's adoption, he rewrote Section One in
response to and in reliance upon Barron:
In reexamining that case of Barron, Mr. Speaker, after my struggle in
the House in February 1866 .... I noted and apprehended as I never
did before, certain words in that opinion of Marshall. Referring to the
first eight articles of amendments to the Constitution of the United
States, the Chief Justice said: "Had the framers of these amendments
intended them to be limitations on the powers of the State governments
they would have imitated the framers of the original Constitution, and
have expressed that intention." Barron vs. The Mayor, &c., 7 Peters,
250.
Acting upon this suggestion I did imitate the framers of the origi-
nal Constitution. As they had said "no State shall emit bills of credit,
pass any bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law impairing the
obligations of contracts;" imitating their example and imitating it to the
letter, I prepared the provision of the first section of the fourteenth
amendment as it stands in the Constitution .... 116
2. "... . make or enforce any law which shall abridge..
As the key sentence rolls on, the incorporation reading gains steam. Various
critical words of the next phrase--"make," "any," "law," and "abridge,"--call
to mind the precisely parallel language in parallel sequence of the First Amend-
ment--"make," "no," "law," and "abridging."11 7 There are only three signifi-
cant differences here.
First, the Fourteenth Amendment imposes a prohibition on states, whereas
the First explicitly limits "Congress." But this is of course exactly the point of
incorporation. And what better way to make clear that even rights and freedoms
in the original Bill of Rights that explicitly limited "Congress" should hereafter
116. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., Ist Sess. 84 app. (1871) (emphasis altered).
117. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law... abridging . .
1992] 1219
The Yale Law Journal
apply against states than by cloning the language of the First Amendment? (The
word "abridge" in the Fourteenth Amendment is especially revealing, for
nowhere outside the First Amendment had this word appeared in the Constitu-
tion before 1866.) Thus, the Fourteenth Amendment announced its intention
to go beyond the expressio unius arguments of William Rawle and John Barron,
as had Lumpkin in Campbell, where the Georgia Chief Justice explicitly
included First Amendment freedoms in his catalogue of rights binding
states.118
Second, the Fourteenth Amendment uses the word "any" where the First
uses "no," but here again, there is an obvious reason. Following the "Simon
Says" rules of Barron "to the letter," the Fourteenth uses negative phrasing
("No State shall. . .") where the First used affirmative ("Congress shall...").
The substitution of "any" for "no" simply balances out the initial inversion.
Finally, the Fourteenth Amendment speaks of law "enforce[ment]" as well
as law making. Once again, this makes perfect sense if its purpose was to
incorporate the rights and freedoms of the original Bill. Many of the Bill's
provisions, especially those in Amendments V-VIII, dealt centrally with the
enforcement of laws by executive and judicial officers. However suggestive the
tracking of the First Amendment may be, there is no suggestion thus far that
only the First Amendment is to be incorporated.
3. ". . . the privileges or immunities..."
Of course, my last sentence was a bit of a cheat; there is no suggestion
"thus far" that only the First Amendment is to be incorporated because it is not
yet clear what rights shall not be "abridge[d]" by states. The words we have
considered so far are wonderfully suggestive-exactly what one would expect
if incorporation were a goal of the Fourteenth Amendment-but hardly defini-
tive. If the Fourteenth Amendment had stated that "No State shall make any
law abridging the right to spit on sidewalks," no one could argue with a straight
face for incorporation of the federal Bill of Rights.
Happily, the final words of the first clause are very different, and once
again exactly what one would expect if incorporation of a certain sort-which
I shall soon elaborate-were intended. Consider first the words "privileges" and
"immunities." Now, these exact words do not appear in the Bill of Rights, but
the words "right[s]" and "freedom[s]" speckle the Bill.119 The plain meanings
of these four words are virtually synonymous; indeed, the Oxford English
Dictionary definition of "privilege" includes the word "right"; and of "immuni-
ty," "freedom.' 120 What could be more common today than to speak of the
118. Campbell v. State, 11 Ga. 353, 366, 373 (1852).
119. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
120. 12 OXFORD ENGLISH DICIONARY 522 (2d ed. 1989) (defining "privilege" as a "right, advantage,
or immunity"); 7 id. at 691 (defining "immunity" as "freedom from liability to taxation, jurisdiction, etc.").
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"privilege" against compelled self-incrimination, or the "immunity" from double
prosecution? Nor is modem usage here any different from that of the eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries. As Michael Kent Curtis observes in his illuminating
and powerfully researched book on incorporation, the "words rights, liberties,
privileges, and immunities, seem to have been used interchangeably."'21 To
pick only one eighteenth-century example with obvious implications for the
incorporation debate, the entitlements to civil and criminal juries, labeled in the
Sixth and Seventh Amendments as "right[s]," were described by the 1775
Declaration of the Causes and Necessity of Taking Up Arms as the "inestimable
privilege of trial by jury.' ' "2 A couple of generations later, Circuit Justice
William Johnson described a congressional bill of 1822 as "in nature of a bill
of rights, and of privileges, and immunities" of inhabitants of the Florida
territory.123 Among the rights listed in the bill were "freedom of religious
opinions;" "the benefit of the writ of habeas corpus;" and protections against
"excessive bail," "cruel and unusual punishments," and confiscation without
"just compensation"--all phrased almost identically with their federal Bill of
Rights counterparts.'2 4 Only weeks before adopting the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1866, widely seen as the statuto-
ry precursor of Section One. In draft, the Act spoke of "civil rights and immu-
nities," leading its sponsor to play the role of law dictionary: "What is an
immunity? Simply 'freedom or exemption from obligation ....
We have already noted that most American lawyers began their legal
education with Blackstone and the common law. When we turn to Blackstone,
we find the words "privileges" and "immunities" used to describe various
entitlements embodied in the landmark English "Charters of liberty" of Magna
Charta, the Petition of Right, the Habeas Corpus Act, the English Bill of Rights
of 1689, and the Act of Settlement of 1700.126 As we have seen, these Eng-
lish documents were the fountainhead of the common law, and the widely
understood source of many particular rights that later appeared in the federal
Bill, sometimes in identical language. 27 After invoking Blackstone and the
121. CURTIS, supra note 106, at 64-65; see also ANTIEAU, supra note 113, at 38 ("The American
generations that ratified the Constitution and, later, the Fourteenth Amendment used the terms, 'rights,'
'liberties,' 'privileges,' and 'immunities' as virtual synonyms.").
122. SECOND CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, DECLARATION OF THE CAUSES AND NEcEsSrrY OF TAKING
UP ARMS, para. 3 (1775), reprinted in 1 GREAT ISSUES IN AMERICAN HISTORY 46, 49 (Richard B.
Hofstadter ed., 1958).
123. American Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. (I Pet.) 511,517 (1828) (reprinting circuit opinion of Justice
Johnson).
124. An Act for the Establishment of a Territorial Government in Florida, ch. 10, 3 Stat. 654, 658
(1822).
125. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., Ist Sess. 1117 (1866) (remarks of Rep. James Wilson).
126. 1 WILuAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *127-45.
127. See, e.g., Act For Declaring the Rights and Liberties of the Subject, and Settling the Succession
of the Crown (Bill of Rights), 1689, 1 .& M., ch. 10 (Eng.) ("excessive bail ought not to be required,
nor excessive f'mes imposed; nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted"). The language of the Eighth
Amendment substitutes "shall not be" for "ought not to be" but is otherwise identical.
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above-listed landmarks, Chief Justice Lumpkin's opinion in Campbell unsurpri-
singly described various rights in the federal Bill as "privileges"--including
the right at issue in Campbell itself, the right to be confronted with witness-
es." s Lumpkin's ideas about Barron may have been unorthodox in 1852, but
his language was utterly conventional; that same decade, the Supreme Court
in Dred Scott labeled the entitlements in the federal Bill "rights and privileges
of the citizen."' 9
4. ". . . of citizens of the United States;"
But even once we recognize that various "rights" and "freedoms" in the
Bill are in every respect and for every purpose "privileges" and "immunities,"
there remains one final textual stumbling block. Can we really say that the
Bill's "rights" and "freedoms" are truly privileges and immunities of "citizens
of the United States?"
Of course we can. In ordinary, everyday language we often speak of the
United States Constitution and Bill of Rights as declaring and defining rights
of Americans as Americans. Surely our Constitution is not centrally about
declaring, say, the rights of Frenchmen qua Frenchmen, or the Chinese qua
Chinese. This ordinary, everyday understanding of the Constitution is embla-
zoned in the Preamble in words quite familiar to every generation of Americans
since the Founding: "We the People of the United States, in Order to... secure
the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish
this Constitution for the United States."
This ordinary understanding is not in the least bit damaged by the technical
objection to incorporation that Professor Louis Henkin has raised: "[T]he
provisions of the Bill of Rights are not rights of citizens only but are enjoyed
by non-citizens as well."'"3 Surely the fact that Americans may often extend
many benefits of our Bill to, for example, resident aliens-for reasons of
prudence, principle, or both-does not alter the basic fact that these rights are
paradigmatically rights of and for American citizens. Indeed, others may enjoy
certain benefits only insofar as they interact with American citizens-typically
because they either live on soil governed by American citizens or do things
with important effects on American citizens. Peripheral applications of the Bill
should not obscure its core.
In any event, Henkin's technical objection collapses under the weight of
its own anachronism. At the time of the Fourteenth Amendment, the best
128. Campbell v. State, 11 Ga. 353, 373, 374 (1852).
129. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393,449-50 (1857); see also Strauder v. West Virginia,
100 U.S. 303, 307-08, 310 (1880) (self-consciously equating "rights" and "immunities" in Fourteenth
Amendment analysis); Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 337, 345 (1880) (same).
130. Louis Henkdn, "Selective Incorporation" In the Fourteenth Amendment, 73 YALE L.J. 74,78 n.16
(1963).
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known case on the scope of the Bill of Rights was none other than Dred Scott,
which involved, among other issues, questions arising under the due process
clause of the Fifth Amendment. Dred Scott declared the rights in the Bill to
be not simply privileges, but "privileges of the citizen.,13' This passage must
be read in combination with the rest of the opinion, holding that because Dred
Scott was not a citizen of the United States, he could not enjoy the privilege
of diversity jurisdiction--or indeed, any of the "rights, and privileges, and
immunities, guarantied by [the Constitution] to the citizen., 132 The central
meaning and logic of the opinion, which took pains to stress the words of the
Preamble,133 was that the Constitution and the Bill of Rights were ordained
and established by citizens of the United States, and for their benefit only.
Surely the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment were entitled to rely on
Supreme Court interpretations in Dred Scott no less than in Barron, even as
they sought to overrule them using "Simon Says" language suggested by the
Court itself.' And once again, it is clear that they did so rely. John
Bingham, the main author of Section One, not only cited to Dred Scott in a
speech before the House in early 1866, but quoted the following key language:
"The words 'people of the United States' and 'citizens' are synonymous
terms.' 35 In the Senate debates on the Fourteenth Amendment, the most
extended and authoritative discussion of Section One came from Jacob Howard,
and he too made plain that the language chosen was in response to Dred
Scott: '3
[I]t is a fact well worthy of attention that the course of decision in our
courts and the present settled doctrine is, that all these immunities,
privileges, rights thus guarantied... or recognized by [the first eight
amendments to the Constitution] are secured to the citizen solely as a
citizen of the United States ....
Though many aspects of Dred Scott were highly offensive to members of
the Thirty-ninth Congress, there was widespread support for the idea that the
Bill of Rights was paradigmatically, even if not exclusively, a catalogue of
privileges and immunities of "citizens., 137 Nor was this locution anything new
or startling. In both Nunn and Campbell, for example, Chief Justice Lumpkin
had described the Bill of Rights as protecting "citizens.1 38
131. 60 U.S. at 449 (emphasis added).
132. Id. at 403.
133. Id. at 404, 410-11.
134. U.S. CONST. amend XIV, §1, cl. 1 ("All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.").
The first sentence of the Fourteenth Amendment consciously overruled Dred Scott's holding that blacks
could never be "citizens."
135. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 430 (1866) (quoting Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 404).
136. Id. at 2765.
137. See CURTIS, supra note 106, at 103.
138. Nunn v. Georgia, I Ga. 243, 250-51 (1846); Campbell v. State, 11 Ga. 353, 365 (1852).
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5. "... nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or proper-
ty, without due process of law;"
Henkin's technical objection to incorporation does not merely dissolve; it
boomerangs. By focusing our attention on Dred Scott and citizenship, Henkin
unwittingly destroys another more familiar technical argument against incorpo-
ration. Many commentators (Raoul Berger most stridently) have claimed that
if the privileges or immunities clause was designed to incorporate the rights
and freedoms of the Bill, the clause would incorporate the Fifth Amendment's
due process requirement and thereby render the Fourteenth Amendment's due
process clause redundant.139 Berger's claim has loomed especially large be-
cause Justice Black, the leading judicial proponent of total incorporation,
repeatedly ducked technical questions about the relationship between Section
One's privileges or immunities and due process clauses. Instead, Black clung
to the simple but vague formulation that the Fourteenth Amendment "as a
whole" effected incorporation. 140 Professor John Hart Ely, while generally
supportive of incorporation, went even further in legitimizing Berger's technical
objection by frankly conceding the redundancy point.14 1
But we can now see why Berger's technical objection collapses, like
Henkin's, and for the same reason. By incorporating the rights of the Fifth
Amendment, the privileges or immunities clause would, under the precedent
of Dred Scott, have prevented states from depriving "citizens" of due process.
Bingham, Howard, and company wanted to go even further by extending the
benefits of state due process to aliens. But for this, a special clause was needed
speaking of "persons," not "citizens." As Bingham explained his amendment
on the floor of the House:
Is it not essential to the unity of the people that the citizens of each
State shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens
[of the United States]? Is it not essential... that all persons, whether
citizens or strangers, within this land, shall have equal protection in
139. Raoul Berger, Incorporation of the Bill of Rights in the Fourteenth Amendment: A Nine-Lived
Cat, 42 OHIO ST. L.J 435, 462 (1981) [hereinafter Berger, Incorporation]; RAOUL BERGER, THE FOUR-
TEENTH AMENDmENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS 91-92 (1989) [hereinafter BERGER, FOURTEENTH AMiEND-
MENT]; see also D.O. McGovney, Privileges or Immunities Clause, Fourteenth Amendment, 4 IOWA L BULL
219,233 (1918); Stanley Morrison, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill ofRights?, 2 STAN.
L. REV. 140, 159 (1949); cf. 1 DAVID CURRIE, THE CONSTrUTION IN THE SUPREIE COURT 346 n.129
(1985) (due process clause "provides another argument against incorporation; it suggests that when the
drafters of the amendment meant to make bill of rights provisions apply to the states, they said so").
140. See Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 71-72, 74 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting); Duncan v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 166 n.1 (1968) (Black, J., concurring). Even before Black publicly announced his
incorporation theory in Betts and Adamson, Justice Frankfurter, dissenting from an earlier Black opinion,
anticipated and exploited Black's weak spot: "To say that the protection of freedom of speech of the First
Amendment is absorbed by the Fourteenth does not say enough. Which one of the various limitations upon
state power introduced by the Fourteenth Amendment absorbs the First?" Bridges v. California, 314 U.S.
252, 280-81 (1941) (Frankfurter, 3., dissenting).
141. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 27 (1980).
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every State in this Union in the rights of life and liberty and proper-
ty?14
2
A few weeks later, Bingham reiterated the point in debates over the Civil
Rights Act of 1866 when he proposed to substitute the word "inhabitant" for
"citizen": "[A]re we not committing the terrible enormity of distinguishing here
in the laws in respect to life, liberty, and property between the citizen and
stranger within your gates .... Your Constitution says 'no person,' not 'no
citizen,' 'shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property,' without due process of
law. 143
Howard's explanation to the Senate was identical. After explaining that the
privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States included "the personal
rights guarantied and secured by the first eight amendments of the Constitu-
tion"--a passage we shall return to later-he patiently elaborated that the
subsequent clauses of Section One were needed to "disable a State from
depriving not merely a citizen of the United States, but any person, whoever
he may be, of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, or from
denying to him the equal protection of the laws of the State."1 On this issue
as well, the views of Bingham and Howard were widely shared by their
Reconstruction colleagues. 145 Indeed, Section One's distinction between the
rights of citizens and those of aliens stretches back to its earliest draft in
committee: "Congress shall have power to ... secure to all citizens.., the
same political rights and privileges; and to all persons in every State equal
protection in the enjoyment of life, liberty, and property." '146
But we have yet to feel the full zing of the anti-incorporation boomerangs,
for just as Henkin's objection destroys Berger's, so Berger's emphasis on due
process undermines Henkin. It would be odd to think that the words "due
process" in the Fourteenth Amendment were intended to mean something very
different than they did in the Fifth. Thus, when Andrew Jackson Rogers asked
Section One's main architect, John Bingham, what he meant by "due process
of law," Bingham tartly replied, "courts have settled that long ago, and the
gentleman can go and read their decisions."'147 In 1866, the definitive state-
ment of the meaning of the Fifth Amendment's due process clause was the
142. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1090 (1866).
143. Id. at 1292.
144. Id. at 2765-66.
145. On the salience of the citizen/person distinction, see, e.g., id. at 505, 1115, 2560, 2768-69, 2890
(remarks of Sen. Reverdy Johnson, Rep. James Wilson, and Sens. William Morris Stewart, Benjamin Wade,
and Edgar Cowan); Ho Ah Kow v. Nunan, 12 F. Cas. 252,256 (C.C.D. Cal. 1879) (No. 6546) (Field, Circuit
3.); EARL M. MALTZ, CIVIL RIGHTS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND CONGRESS, 1863-1869, at 62-64, 97 (1990);
NELSON, supra note 64, at 52-53; 2 CROSSKEY, supra note 29, at 1100-03, 1109-10; CURTIS, supra note
106, at 107; John Harrison, Reconstructing the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 101 YALE L.J. 1385 (1992).
146. BENMIN B. KENDRICK, THE JOURNAL OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE OF FIFTEEN ON RECONSTRUC-
TION 51 (1914). On the care taken by the Committee to distinguish between the rights of persons and those
of citizens, see HORACE E. FLACK, THE ADOPTION OF THE FOURTEErH AMENDMENT 63-64 (1908).
147. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1089 (1866).
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decade-old case of Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co. In
that case, a unanimous Supreme Court said that procedural due process embod-
ied-incorporated, if you will-all the other procedural rules laid down in "the
constitution itself."' s Rawle had said much the same thing in his treatise
thirty years earlier.149 If, here too, the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment
were entitled to rely on authoritative Supreme Court pronouncements (and it
is hard to see why not), then the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment by itself embodied-incorporated-various procedural safeguards specified
in Amendments V-VIII. That leaves only six amendments in the Bill-the first
four and the last two--where the privileges or immunities clause has indepen-
dent bite.150 Of these six, five explicitly speak of the rights of "the peo-
ple"M'-a phrase that Dred Scott, John Bingham, and many other commenta-
tors understood as for many purposes synonymous with "citizens." For example,
Senate rules circa 1866 did not permit foreigners to petition that body'
52
because petition was a right "of the people." The fit between the explicit rights
of "the people" in the original Bill and those provisions where the privileges
or immunities clause has independent bite may not be perfect, but surely it is
close enough to explain why so many in 1866 would have naturally thought
of the nonprocedural provisions of the original Bill as rights of citizens. 5 3
148. 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 276-77 (1855); accord The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.)
36, 118 (1873) (Bradley, J., dissenting).
149. RAWLE, supra note 48, at 129.
150. Thus, by dint of Murray's Lessee, aliens are entitled under the Fourteenth Amendment to all the
procedural safeguards specified in the original Bill. In an otherwise thoughtful analysis of the incorporation
debate, Professor Israel overlooks this, leading him to ask "why the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment
would have desired to grant such privileges as jury trial and grand jury indictment only to citizens." Jerold
H. Israel, Selective Incorporation: Revisited, 71 GEo. L.J 253, 260 (1982). The short answer is that the
framers of the Fourteenth Amendment intended exactly the opposite. The point is an especially important
one because it was the only real "deficienc[y] in the textual support" for incorporation that Israel identified.
Id.; see also Henkin, supra note 130, at 78 (overlooking Murray's Lessee in claiming that it is "clear" that
"Court has not read 'due process of law' as a short-hand way of referring to specifics of the Bill of Rights").
151. U.S. CONST. amends. I, II, IV, IX, X
152. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 1536 (1870) (remarks of Sen. Samuel Pomeroy).
153. Some modem scholars have resisted the notion that the words of the privileges or immunities
clause mean what they say in limiting their protection to "citizens.' No less eminent a figure than John Hart
Ely has suggested that the clause could instead be read as meaning that no state shall deny to any person
the rights of citizens. Under this reading, the phrase "privileges or immunities of citizens" would "define
the class of rights rather than limit the class of beneficiaries.' ELY, supra note 141, at 25. Ely offers a false
dichotomy, for the original phrase is best read as doing both, defining the rights of Americans as Americans.
Ely's reading does more than stretch the phrase's text; it blurs the legislative history of the Amendment
and renders the due process clause an embarrassing redundancy that incorporationists must somehow explain
away. (Ely notes the redundancy, then proceeds to sidestep it. Id. at 27.)
Now John Ely, of all people, should know better-as a textualist, as a believer in attention to
legislative purpose, and as a friend of incorporation. Something else must be going on, and it's not hard
to figure out what: like Justice Black before him, Ely is obviously concerned about state mistreatment of
aliens. But the concern is largely misplaced. To begin with, aliens do enjoy against states the full benefit
of all procedural rights of the original Bill by dint of the Fourteenth Amendment due process clause and
Murray's Lessee, see supra note 150. As to other rights, equal protection principles will require states to
justify any discrimination between citizens and aliens. Finally, aliens may sometimes be able to present
themselves as third party beneficiaries of citizen rights. Just as a doctor can invoke a female patient's
abortion right, so aliens addressing American citizens about national issues should be protected by the
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6. Beyond Mechanical Incorporation
We have now come slowly, but I hope surely, to the deep truth at the core
of Hugo Black's observation that "the words 'No State" shall make or enforce
any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States' seem... an eminently reasonable way of expressing the idea
that henceforth the Bill of Rights shall apply to the States."'
1
The best objection to Black's claim is that other language could have been
used that would have expressed the purpose more clearly.' 55 This objection
does seem devastating to the particular brand of mechanical incorporation that
Black's rhetoric at times appeared to suggest: that the privileges or immunities
and due process clauses were simply terms of art referring to the first eight
amendments in every jot and tittle, and to nothing else. If the key clauses of
the Fourteenth Amendment meant Amendments I-VIII-no more, no less-why
were the amendments not invoked by name? Why, indeed, use words like
"privileges," and "immunities" which are only synonymous with, rather than
identical to, the words of the first eight amendments themselves?
Black never offered satisfying answers to these questions, perhaps because
the best answers require abandonment of mechanical incorporation. But for
Black, part of the appeal of incorporation lay in its mechanical quality-its
apparent ability to reduce judicial discretion by establishing an exact identity
between the broad language of the Fourteenth Amendment and the seemingly
more specific rules of Amendments I-VIHI. 5 6 The framers of the Fourteenth
citizens' right to a free press and freedom of speech-rights which of course go beyond freedom to print
and to speak. To me, at least, that much was decided by the court of history's judgment against the Alien
and Sedition Acts. "The essential point is not that the alien has a right to speak but that we citizens have
a right to hear him." MEiKLEAoHN, supra note 102, at 53.
Gaps between citizen and alien rights against states will remain-as some must, unless the two-tiered
language of Section One is meaningless-but these are gaps which most of us (aliens included) can probably
live with. An alternative approach would be to understand the intent of the Fourteenth Amendment at a
slightly higher level of generality. Nothing in the two-tiered language or legislative history requires that
states be more free than the federal government to abridge privileges of the Bill. These privileges were
understood in 1866 to be privileges enjoyed only by citizens because of Dred Scott. But if this aspect of
Dred Scott were later abolished vis-ii-vis the federal government for any privilege, perhaps we should read
the Fourteenth Amendment, in the spirit of dynamic conformity, to incorporate the broader understanding
of that privilege against states. As Ely rightly points out, the text can be read to include aliens; and the
legislative history shows an intent to give aliens broader rights against states than they enjoyed against
federal officials. Technical redundancy of the due process clause is also avoided because the clause would
have independent bite until judges repudiated Dred Scott on the question of alien rights vis-A-vis the federal
government. Under this approach, because of subsequent legal developments, the best reading of the original
privileges or immunities clause may have evolved into something rather similar to what Ely implies it meant
all along.
154. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 166 (1968) (Black, J., concurring).
155. Berger, Incorporation, supra note 139, at 453; Morrison, supra note 139, at 159. For a far more
sophisticated version of this critique, see ELY, supra note 141, at 28.
156. Black's critics were quick to claim that even the "ostensibly... 'specific"' rules laid down in
the original Bill were "not very specific," Henkin, supra note 130, at 83-84, 86. As Professor Bobbitt has
noted, however, incorporation did enable Black to substitute a longer set of words in the original Bill for
the shorter set in the key sentence of Section One-no small thing to a textualist. PHILIP BOBBrTr,
CONSnTUMTONAL FATE 32, 246-47 (1982).
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Amendment did not share Black's preoccupation with mechanical rules15 7 and
wrote an amendment whose faithful interpretation and implementation, alas,
cannot be mechanical.15 8 The best reading of the Amendment suggests that
it "incorporates" the Bill of Rights in a far more subtle way than Black admit-
ted, including both more and less than Amendments I-VIII.
Clearly, the privileges or immunities clause encompasses more than the
federal Bill as such. Article I, Section 9, for example, declares that "The
Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended," except in
certain limited circumstances. Though Rawle had claimed otherwise in 1825,
Barron squarely held that this clause, like all the other provisions in Section
9, bound only the federal government.'5 9 By withholding habeas from blacks
claiming to be kidnapped, antebellum Southern states had facilitated the capture
and return of alleged fugitive slaves.1 60 Though the Thirteenth Amendment
had formally abolished slavery, states attempting to resurrect slavery de facto
through Black Codes would predictably manipulate habeas to implement their
scheme. Protecting the self-described "privilege" of habeas corpus against
wayward states was thus of central concern to the framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment.' 61 In their initial pronouncements on the Fourteenth Amendment
in the Slaughter-House Cases, the Justices on the Supreme Court disagreed
sharply about quite a lot, but none denied the Great Writ was indeed a "privi-
lege of citizens of the United States" protected against state infringement by
the new Amendment. Indeed, Justice Miller's majority opinion, generally
thought today to have rendered the privileges or immunities clause utterly
meaningless, explicitly listed "the privilege of habeas corpus" in its catalogue
of Fourteenth Amendment rights.1
62
So far, Justice Black may not have been troubled, for like Amendments I-
VIII, the habeas clause is textually specified in the pre-1866 Constitution, and
thus its incorporation too is relatively mechanical. 63 Indeed, Black might
157. One partial explanation is that many congressional architects of Reconstruction envisioned not
only judicial enforcement of Section One, but also-and perhaps more centrally-congressional enforcement.
Section One was thus in part a grant of power to themselves, and they drafted it broadly.
158. For a similar analysis, see ELY, supra note 141, at 28.
159. Various later contrarians sharply disagreed. See TENBROEK, supra note 64, at 68, 72-73, 84
(discussing centrality of universal habeas right in writings of Alvan Stewart, Lysander Spooner, Joel Tiffany,
and James Birney).
160. Various Northern states responded with personal liberty laws designed to assure alleged fugitives
access to the habeas writ. See HYMAN & WvIEcEK, supra note 105, at 110, 152-53; see also id. at 107, 150-
52 (antebellum attacks on federal fugitive slave laws as violating habeas rights); CURTIS, supra note 106,
at 43, 106 (importance of habeas to abolitionists).
161. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 475, 499, 1117, 1263, 2765 (1866) (invocations of habeas
by Sens. Lyman Trumbull and Edgar Cowan, Reps. James Wilson and John Broomall, and Sen. Jacob
Howard); CURTIS, supra note 106, at 144 (noting remarks of Rep. William Lawrence in 1866 election listing
habeas as paradigmatic of 14th Amendment privileges or immunities).
162. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 79 (1873). This concession was, however, ambiguous, see infra text
accompanying notes 281-85.
163. See Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 91 (1947) (Black, I., dissenting) (contrasting "particular
standards enumerated in the Bill of Rights and other parts of the Constitution" with "'natural law' ...
undefined by the Constitution" (emphasis added)).
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have used Miller's concession to undermine the rest of Miller's argument,
which seemed to resist, if not reject, total incorporation of the first eight
amendments. Under what theory does the privileges or immunities clause
incorporate the Great Writ specified in Article I, but not all the Great Rights
specified after Article VII? It would be silly to argue that the difference is that
the habeas clause used the magic word "privilege" whereas later clauses in the
Bill only used synonyms like "right" or "freedom." (Interestingly, Justice
Bradley's dissent in Slaughter-House not only argued for incorporation of all
the "personal privileges and immunities.., specified in the original Constitu-
tion, or in the early amendments of it"; it also included in the catalogue "the
right of habeas corpus."'")
The habeas clause, however, presents hidden problems for Black as well,
for its use of the word "privilege" calls attention to the word and naturally
directs our gaze to the only other clause of the pre-1866 Constitution to use
the word-the so-called comity clause of Article IV: "The Citizens of each
State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several
States." These. words clearly have some sort of connection to those of the
Fourteenth Amendment-the pattern of the words "citizens," "privileges," and
"immunities" in tight formation in both places calls for explanation. Black gave
none. In the abstract, these words may not seem devastating to his mechanical
view--especially in light of the widely held Republican view that these words
in Article IV incorporated by reference the rights, freedoms, privileges, and
immunities later specified in the federal Bill.165 But in 1866, those Article
IV words also came packaged with an influential judicial gloss. And just as we
cannot fully understand the words "No State shall" without reading Barron; or
the words "citizens of the United States" without reckoning with Dred Scott;
or the meaning of "due process" without confronting Murray's Lessee; so here,
we must consider the leading comity clause case on the books in 1866: Justice
Bushrod Washington's 1823 Circuit Court opinion in Corfield v. Coryell.
In Corfield, Washington identified "privileges and immunities" as those
which
are, in their nature, fundamental; which belong, of right, to the citizens
of all free governments; and which have, at all times, been enjoyed by
the citizens of the several states which compose this Union ... [includ-
ing] the following general heads: Protection by the government; the
enjoyment of life and liberty, with the right to acquire and possess
164. 83 U.S. (16 vall.) at 118 (Bradley, J., dissenting) (emphasis altered); see also id. at 115 ("Another
of these rights was that of habeas corpus .... ) (emphasis altered).
165. On the Republican connection between the comity clause and the federal Bill, see Crosskey, supra
note 44,passim; CuRTIs, supra note 106, at 43-44, 47-48, 62-91, 149-51; TENBROEK, supra note 64, at 96
n.3, 110.
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property of every kind, and to pursue and obtain happiness and safe-
ty.1 
6
Justice Washington went on to add to his nonexhaustive list "the benefit of the
writ of habeas corpus" and the rights to "maintain actions of any kind in the
courts" and to "take, hold and dispose of property, either real or personal."'167
Though he did not cite Blackstone by name, Washington seemed to be follow-
ing a quintessentially common law approach in deducing "fundamental" rights.
We have seen this kind of thinking before in the common law approach
ofBarron contrarians such as Rawle and Lumpkin: fundamental rights deriving
from a variety of sources-typically, nature and history-preexisted their textual
specification in legislative codes. Where We the People had given Our judicial
imprimatur to a right by including it in the federal Bill, such a right was
virtually by definition "fundamental." Indeed, Lumpkin described the Bill as
"a legal decalogue for every civilized society, in all time to come," declaring
"fundamental truths ... at the foundation of our free, republican institutions"
and encompassing rights "at the bottom of every free govern-
ment''168-formulations strikingly reminiscent of Corfield's ode to "fundamen-
tal" rights belonging to "the citizens of all free governments; and which have,
at all times, been enjoyed by the citizens of America."
As we have seen, Lumpkin also suggested that for institutional reasons,
rooted in fear of judicial discretion, perhaps judges should not invalidate
statutes in the name of fundamental rights that had not yet received the People's
imprimatur. But when read through the lens of the Article IV comity clause,
as glossed by Corfield's ode, the language of Section One opens up broader
possibilities. Corfield's nonexhaustive list of fundamental rights radiated well
beyond those enumerated in the federal Bill; and this open-ended list received
considerable attention in the Thirty-ninth Congress. Thus, Senator Lyman
Trumbull and Representative James Wilson both quoted Washington's ode,
Blackstone, and other broad common law and natural rights language in support
of their 1866 Civil Rights Act, whose provisions were generally understood to
be subsumed within the privileges or immunities clause of the subsequent
Fourteenth Amendment.69 Corfield was again read broadly by Jacob Howard
in his influential speech on Section One, which invoked both Washington's ode
and the Bill of Rights as exemplifying "privileges and immunities of citizens
of the United States."'7 Justice Black, however, stressed the Bill and shunned
the ode.171 For Black, Justice Washington's words conjured up the specter
166. 6 F. Cas. 546, 551-52 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3230).
167. Id. at 552.
168. Campbell v. State, 11 Ga. 353, 373 (1852); Nunn v. Georgia, I Ga. 243, 250-51 (1846).
169. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 474-75, 1117-19 (1866).
170. Id. at 2765-66.
171. Thus in his celebrated Adamson dissent, Black offered no account of or quotation to Corfield,
editing out Howard's extended quotation of the case, and passing over in silence Bingham's later allusion
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of judges invalidating statutes by invoking nontextually specified fundamental
rights and by giving common law rights, such as freedom of contract, constitu-
tional status. The specter haunting Justice Black has a name. Its name is
Lochner.17
2
Understanding that the privileges or immunities clause applied to various
common law rights may not necessarily lead us to Lochner, however. For
example, John Harrison has suggested that where a privilege or immunity
derives not from the federal Constitution or Bill of Rights, but from common
law or state law, the privileges or immunities clause prohibits only irrational
discrimination in defining and enforcing these rights. 73 Detailed analysis of
his thoughtful and intricate arguments would take us rather far afield; for our
purposes it is enough to note that Section One is not limited to privileges and
immunities specified in the pre-1866 Constitution. Other common law rights
were also included, though there remain questions about the precise kind of
protection intended. For these nonconstitutional rights, perhaps only antidis-
crimination ("equal") protection should be accorded, rather than fundamental
rights ("full") protection.' 74 Questions also remain about judicial competence
to find unspecified rights; 17  but those fundamental rights that had already
been specified and "declared" by We the People were easy cases for full
judicial protection, and thus at the core of the Fourteenth Amendment.
So much then for Section One's penumbral radiations beyond Amendments
I-VIII, for this is only half the story. Section One means not just more than
to "that decision in the fourth of Washington's Circuit Court Reports." Adamson v. California, 332 U.S.
46, 105, 115 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting).
172. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). Lochner was cited with disapproval in Black's
Adamson dissent. 332 U.S. at 83 n.12.
173. Harrison, supra note 145. For similar views, see 1 CURRIE, supra note 139, at 347-50; NELSON,
supra note 64, at 115-24.
174. The language of the 1866 Civil Rights Act, widely seen as a precursor of Section One, speaks
of the "full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of person and property." Act of
Apr. 9, 1866, ch, 31, §1, 14 Stat. 27 (emphasis added). For a reading of this Act as encompassing a
fundamental rights core and an equal rights outer layer, see TENBRoEK, supra note 64, at 189-90. See also
Earl M. Maltz, Fourteenth Amendment Concepts in the Antebellum Era, 32 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 305, 323
(1988) (similar analysis of two-tiered full and equal protection philosophy in antebellum jurisprudence).
The language of the privileges or immunities clause can be understood as similarly two-tiered. Harrison's
central textual argument is that the word "abridge" can be read to prohibit mere discrimination in the
allocation of state-created rights-as in the Fourteenth Amendment Section Two's rules on "abridge[ment]"
of the (state-law-created) "right to vote." Harrison, supra note 145. Where only state-law-created rights are
at stake, this is a plausible-perhaps the most plausible-reading of the word "abridge." But where rights
specified and declared by We the People in Our Constitution are at stake, the best understanding of the word
"abridge" in Section One surely comes from its fundamental rights counterpart in the First Amendment,
whose language Section One so carefully tracks. See supra text accompanying notes 117-18; see also Live-
stock Dealers & Butchers' Ass'n v. Crescent City Live-stock Landing & Slaughter-House Co., 15 F. Cas.
649, 652-53 (C.C.D. La. 1870) (No. 8408) (Bradley, Circuit J.) (14th Amendment "not merely requires
equality of privileges; but it demands that the privileges and immunities of all citizens shall be absolutely
unabridged, unimpaired," and protects "privileges and immunities of an absolute and not merely of a relative
character"). Plainly, the Amendment's framers meant to prevent a state from abridging speech critical of
the Black Codes, even where the state "evenhandedly" abridged the rights of all speakers, white and black,
Southern and Northern.
175. See supra text accompanying notes 91-94.
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mechanical incorporation but also less. 176 Once again, the habeas clause of
Article I, Section 9 helps illustrate the point. Why does the Fourteenth Amend-
ment incorporate this self-proclaimed privilege, but not, for example, its Section
9 companion clause, "No Capitation, or other direct, Tax shall be laid, unless
in Proportion to the Census or Enumeration herein before directed to be taken"?
The answer goes beyond the fact that the capitation clause does not talk like
a privilege; it doesn't walk or act like a private right either. Rather, it sounds
in federalism, guaranteeing a fair distribution of the federal tax burden among
states. As a state right of sorts, the capitation clause resists easy incorporation
against states.
Yet as I have argued elsewhere, the same holds true for various provisions
of the original Bill of Rights.177 Justice Black himself saw the obvious diffi-
culties of incorporating the Ninth and Tenth Amendments, which he read as
pure federalism provisions. Thus, Black argued only for incorporation of the
first eight amendments. But federalism insinuated itself throughout the original
Bill of Rights: separating out citizen rights and state rights calls for a scalpel,
not a meat cleaver. For example, is the establishment clause more like the
habeas and free speech clauses (and thus an easy candidate for incorporation)
or like the capitation clause and the Tenth Amendment (and thus rather awk-
ward to incorporate)? Or is it, perhaps, some sort of sui generis hybrid that calls
for "partial" incorporation? 171
Mechanical incorporation, then, rests on an optical illusion that the Consti-
tution defines government structure, and the Bill declares citizen rights (redefin-
ing "the Bill" of course, as the first eight, or perhaps nine, amendments). The
reality is, alas, more complicated.179 The original Constitution also declares
rights (witness the habeas clause); the Bill also embodies structure (witness the
Tenth Amendment); and both Constitution and Bill intertwine rights and
structure.
The wording of the Fourteenth Amendment is remarkably sensitive to this
more complicated reality. Section One requires us to ask whether a given
provision of the Constitution or Bill really does declare a "privilege or immuni-
ty of citizens" rather than, for example, a right of states. The answer will often
be anything but mechanical, requiring considerable judgment and hard choices.
But this is exactly what the words of Section One demand. They avoid speaking
of the "first eight amendments" or the "Bill of Rights" not just because these
176. It is at this point that my conclusions differ most from those of commentators who, in effect, adopt
a "Bill of Rights plus" test for the Fourteenth Amendment, embracing both mechanical incorporation and
fundamental fairness as independent principles of inclusion. See, e.g., Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46,
123-25 (1947) (Murphy & Rutledge, JJ., dissenting); CURTIS, supra note 106, at 125. Overall, my interpre-
tive approach and conclusions are perhaps closest to those of John Hart Ely's. See ELY, supra note 141,
at 22-30.
177. See Amar, supra note t.
178. For a preliminary analysis, see id. at 1157-60.
179. See TENBROEK, supra note 64, at 83.
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words would have meant too little, but also because they would have meant
too much. If "refined incorporation" of the sort I shall elaborate in Part I was
indeed intended, it would have been hard to draft better language than the
words of Section One.
B. Glosses on the Text
1. The Thirty-ninth Congress
a. The Easy Case Made Easier
The easy case for (nonmechanical) incorporation, then, rests on the plain
meaning of the words of Section One circa 1866. Is there anything in the
legislative history of these words that contradicts this straightforward reading?
On the contrary.
Begin with Section One's principal draftsman, John Bingham. As we have
seen, Bingham had argued before the House as early as 1859 that "whenever
the Constitution guaranties to its citizens a right, either natural or conventional,
such guarantee is in itself a limitation upon the States." '  Over the next few
minutes, he made clear that such "guarantees" that "no State may rightfully...
impair" included the due process and just compensation mandates of "the fifth
article of amendments," the "trial by jury," and "the right to know; to argue
and to utter, according to conscience"--guarantees he described as "privileges
and immunities of citizens of the United States." '181 "Citizens" here meant just
that, as Bingham illustrated by quoting Dred Scott and other commentary.182
But Bingham also said that Dred Scott had gone too far, limiting certain rights,
such as due process, that under both natural law and constitutional text extended
to all persons, whether citizens or not.18 3 In a nutshell, Bingham's position
was that no state could violate the Constitution's "wise and beneficent guaran-
180. CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 2d Sess. 982 (1859).
181. Id. at 983-85.
182. Id. at 983.
183. Said Bingham:
[Niatural or inherent rights, which belong to all men irrespective of all conventional regulations,
are by this constitution guarantied by the broad and comprehensive word "person," as contradis-
tinguished from the limited term citizen-as in the fifth article of amendments ... that "no
person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property but by due process of law, nor shall private
property be taken without just compensation."
Id. at 983; see also CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 1638 (1862) (remarks of John Bingham) (similar).
Bingham's inclusion of the takings clause in this category explains a passing proposal he made seven years
later in the Joint Reconstruction Committee, a proposal that Charles Fairman and Raoul Berger tried to use
against Bingham and incorporation. See Fairman, supra note 113, at 41-42; RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT
BY JUDIcIARY 142 (1977). For other criticism of Fairman and Berger on this point, see CURTIS, supra note
106, at 83-84.
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tees of political fights to the citizens of the United States, as such, and of
natural rights to all persons, whether citizens or strangers."' 84
Now these views, expressed in 1859, track almost perfectly the natural
meaning of the words Bingham drafted in 1866 as Section One of the Four-
teenth Amendment. Thus, we find Bingham in 1866 repeating in speeches
before the House arguments he had made seven years earlier. As we have
already noted, Bingham once again quoted from Dred Scott on constitutional
rights of "citizens" as "citizens," yet repeated his claim that Dred Scott was too
stingy in refusing certain due process protections to "persons, whether citizens
or strangers."'85 In another nutshell, no state should be allowed to violate "the
privileges and immunities of all the citizens of the Republic and the inborn
rights of every person within its jurisdiction.' '186 The privileges or immunities
clause would protect citizen rights, and the due process and equal protection
principles (which Bingham saw as linked, if not synonymous 87) would pro-
tect the wider category of persons.
But what, precisely, were the "privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States"? In 1859, Bingham offered no comprehensive summary, but
strongly implied that all rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution
were included. Though he did not use the magic words "Bill of Rights," he
either quoted or paraphrased the rights to speech, press, religion, due process,
just compensation, and jury trial. In 1866, Bingham spoke to the issue at much
greater length and made himself about as clear as one could ever hope for. Over
and over he described the privileges or immunities clause as encompassing "the
bill of rights"--a phrase he used in a key speech on February 28th no less than
a dozen times. 88 In that speech, he also explained why a constitutional
amendment was necessary, citing by name and quoting from the Supreme
Court's opinions in Barron and one of its progeny, Livingston v. Moore. 89
The day before, a colleague of Bingham's, Robert Hale, had suggested that
states were already bound by the Bill, 9° but Bingham set Hale and others
straight with the following quotation from Livingston: "As to the amendments
of the Constitution of the United States, they must be put out of the case, since
it is now settled that those amendments do not extend to the States . ,,"191
Six weeks later Bingham again held forth on the need for his amendment,
invoking "the bill of rights" six times in a single speech and again reminding
his colleagues that it "has been solemnly ruled by the Supreme Court of the
184. CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 2d Sess. 983 (1859).
185. Quoted supra text accompanying notes 135, 142.
186. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2542 (1866).
187. See CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 1638 (1862) (remarks of John Bingham); Crosskey, supra
note 44, at 16, 25, 69; Graham, supra note 98, at 396-97 & n.87.
188. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1088-94 (1866).
189. Id. at 1089-90.
190. Id. at 1064.
191. Id. at 1090 (quoting Livingston v. Moore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 469, 551-52 (1833)).
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United States," that "the bill of rights ... does not limit the powers of
States. '192 In 1871, several years after the Fourteenth Amendment's ratifica-
tion, Bingham was once more called upon to parse its words. He yet again cited
by name and quoted from Barron,t93 and here too he immediately linked "the
privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States" with the Bill of
Rights:
[T]he privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States, as
contradistinguished from citizens of a State, are chiefly defined in the
first eight amendments to the Constitution of the United States. Those
eight amendments are as follows. [Bingham then proceeded to read the
first eight amendments word for word.] These eight articles I have
shown never were limitations upon the power of the States, until made
so by the fourteenth amendment.194
In light of all this, it is frankly astonishing that some scholars, most notably
Charles Fairman and Raoul Berger, have suggested that when Bingham invoked
"the bill of rights," he didn't mean what he said.195
Two years before Bingham introduced his amendment, Representative
James Wilson had made clear that he too understood the "privileges and
immunities of citizens of the United States" to include the guarantees of the
192. Id. at 1291-93.
193. Quoted supra text accompanying note 116.
194. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 84 app. (1871).
195. Fairman, supra note 113, at 26, 33-34, 134, 136; BERGER, supra note 183, at 141-42; Berger,
Incorporation, supra note 139, at 463. If the issue is whether references to the "bill of rights" in 1866
naturally called to mind the first nine or ten rather than eight amendments-a point to which we shall return
later-the observation about the ambiguity of the phrase is fair enough. But Fairman and Berger meant
something quite different: that when Bingham said the "bill of rights" in 1866, perhaps he did not even mean
the first eight amendments. Yet as we have seen, Bingham painstakingly cited Barron, quoted the language
from Livingston on "the amendments to the Constitution of the United States," and later paraphrased these
cases as holdings on "the bill of rights." Indeed, in the very same breath in which he first invoked Barron,
Bingham spoke of "the bill of rights under the articles of amendment." CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess.
1089 (1866) (emphasis added). Over the course of 1866, Bingham had occasion to refer specifically to
"freedom of speech," the right to "teach" religion, "freedom of conscience," "due process," the right to "just
compensation" and protection against "confiscation," and the right against "cruel and unusual punishments."
Id. at 158, 1065, 1094, 2542; KENRICK, supra note 146, at 85; Fairman, supra note 113, at 76 (quoting
CINCINNATI COM., Aug. 27, 1866, at 1). If all that weren't enough to make clear Bingham was using the
words "the bill of rights" in their ordinary sense, his speeches both before and after 1866 offer powerful
confirmation. For example, his 1871 speech declared: "Jefferson well said of the first eight articles of
amendments to the Constitution of the United States, they constitute the American Bill of Rights." CONG.
GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 84 app. (1871); see also CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 1638 (1862)
(remarks of John Bingham) (discussing due process and just compensation clauses of "the bill of rights").
More important, of course, everyone else in the 39th Congress understood Bingham's references to
"the bill of rights" as meaning just that. On February 27th, the day after Bingham first introduced his
amendment in the House as a proposai to enforce "this immortal bill of rights," CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong.,
1st Sess. 1034 (1866), Robert Hale responded with his own ode to "the bill of rights," which he unambigu-
ously defined in passing as "these amendments to the Constitution, numbered from one to ten." Id. at 1064.
Immediately following yet another Bingham paean to "the bill of rights," id. at 1291-93, James Wilson
invoked the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment, which "I find in the bill of rights which [Mr.
Bingham] desires to have enforced by an amendment." Id. at 1294.
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amendments. His words also show that he deemed all rights and freedoms in
the Bill-even those declared only against "Congress"--to be binding on state
governments:
Freedom of religious opinion, freedom of speech and press, and the
right of assemblage for the purpose of petition belong to every Ameri-
can citizen .... With these rights no State may interfere ....
Sir, I might enumerate many other constitutional rights of the
citizen which slavery has disregarded and practically destroyed, but I
have [said] enough to illustrate my proposition: that slavery ... denies
to the citizens of each State the privileges and immunities of citi-
zens ....
... The people of the free States should insist on ample protec-
tion to their rights, privileges and immunities, which are none other
than those which the Constitution was designed to secure to all citizens
alike .... 
196
Plainly, then, Wilson and Bingham both read that Bill through contrarian
lenses, though Bingham was far more conscious that the Supreme Court had
rejected this reading. And both leaders understood that the plain meaning of
Section One was that henceforth, the federal government would have explicit
power to compel state compliance with all the "privileges" and "immunities"
of "citizens" set out in the Bill. Shortly before the Amendment came before
the House for final approval, political leader Thaddeus Stevens delivered a
speech describing its provisions. Here are his opening words on Section One:
I can hardly believe that any person can be found who will not admit
that every one of these provisions is just. They are all asserted, in some
form or other, in our DECLARATION or [of?] organic law. But the
Constitution limits only the action of Congress, and is not a limitation
on the States. This amendment supplies that defect .... 197
In the Senate, Jacob Howard offered the most comprehensive analysis of
Section One:
196. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1202-03 (1864).
Hale echoed these sentiments on February 27, 1866:
[T]hese amendments to the Constitution, numbered from one to ten, ... constitute the bill of
rights, a bill of rights for the protection of the citizen, and defining and limiting the power of
Federal and State legislation.
... [T]here has been from first to last, a violation of the provisions in this bill of rights by the
very existence of slavery itself.
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1064-65 (1866).
197. Id. at 2459. If, as my bracketed question suggests, Stevens' statement was inaccurately transcribed
and he in fact said "of' not "or," the word DECLARATION refers not to Jefferson's document of July 4,
1776, but instead to a declaratory theory of the Constitution and Bill of Rights-whose wording does indeed
track that of Section One far more than does the wording of Jefferson's Declaration of Independence.
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[I]ts first clause, [which] I regard as very important... relates to the
privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States as such, and
as distinguished from all other persons ... . [Here is what a] very
learned and excellent judge says about these privileges and immunities
of the citizens of each State in the several States [in] the case of
Corfield vs. Coryell. [Howard then quoted Corfield at length.]
Such is the character of the privileges and immunities spoken of
in [Article IV]. To these privileges and immunities, whatever they may
be-for they are not and cannot be fully defined in their entire extent
and precise nature-to these should be added the personal rights
guarantied and secured by the first eight amendments of the Constitu-
tion; such as the freedom of speech and of the press; the right of the
people peaceably to assemble and petition the Government for a
redress of grievances, a right appertaining to each and all of the people;
the right to keep and bear arms; the right to be exempted from the
quartering of soldiers in a house without the consent of the owner; the
right to be exempt from unreasonable searches and seizures, and from
any search or seizure except by virtue of a warrant issued upon a
formal oath or affidavit; the right of an accused person to be informed
of the nature of the accusation against him, and his right to be tried
by an impartial jury of the vicinage; and also the right to be secure
against excessive bail and against cruel and unusual punishments.
... [T]he course of decision of our courts and the present settled
doctrine is, that all these immunities, privileges, rights, thus guarantied
by the Constitution or recognized by it ... do not operate in the
slightest degree as a restraint or prohibition upon State legislation ....
[I]t has been repeatedly held that the restriction contained in the Con-
stitution against the taking of private property for public use without
just compensation is not a restriction upon State legislation, but applies
only to the legislation of Congress.
... [T]hese guarantees... stand simply as a bill of rights in the
Constitution ... [and] States are not restrained from violating the
principles embraced in them .... The great object of the first section
of this amendment is, therefore, to restrain the power of the States and
compel them at all times to respect these great fundamental guaran-
tees.
There is much more legislative history to confirm the material we have
canvassed so far-the leading scholarly work counts no fewer than thirty
Republican statements in the Thirty-eighth and Thirty-ninth Congresses voicing
contrarian sentiments, and not one supporting Barron.199 As a lover of mercy,
however, I shall resist the temptation to present all the evidence that anti-
incorporationists have overlooked or distorted. For what we have seen thus far
virtually clinches the case for some sort of incorporation.
Consider first the sources. John Bingham was the author of Section One.
Thaddeus Stevens was not only the political leader of the House, but also head
198. Id. at 2765-66.
199. CURTIS, supra note 106, at 112.
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of the House delegation of the all-important Committee on Reconstruction that
officially reported the Fourteenth Amendment. Jacob Howard was Stevens'
acting Joint Committee counterpart in the Senate. James Wilson was Chair of
the House Judiciary Committee and sponsor of the Civil Rights Act of 1866,
whose provisions Section One was consciously designed and widely understood
to embrace.
Consider next the context. Bingham's audience knew he was the author and
thus paid particular attention to his expositions.' Stevens delivered a written
speech (a rarity for him, as the New York Herald noted the next day)201 in
his formal capacity as House Chairman of the Joint Committee. Howard too
purported to speak on behalf of the committee, addressing a packed gallery in
a speech whose passage on the Bill of Rights was reprinted in full in both the
New York Times and the Herald.2 (The popular press had also covered
Bingham's earlier statements.203) And not a single person in either house
spoke up to deny these men's interpretation of Section One. Surely, if the
words of Section One meant something different, here was the time to stand
up and say so.
Consider, finally, that all these men offered glosses that mesh perfectly with
each other and-most importantly-with the plain meaning of the words of
Section One.
b. Incorporating Anti-Incorporation Insights
If the key sentence of Section One does not in some way or another
incorporate the Bill of Rights, then just what does it do? The two most promi-
nent critics of incorporation, Charles Fairman and Raoul Berger, have suggested
two radically different alternatives. Each has something going for it-something
that does tend to undermine Black's brand of mechanical incorporation-but
something that in fact supports a refined model of incorporation.
(i) Fairman
Professor Charles Fairman spent so much energy attacking Justice Black
that he failed to offer any sustained narrative in support of an alternative
reading of the Fourteenth Amendment. After about 130 pages of Black-bashing,
200. Even Senators knew of Bingham's authorship and views. Senator James Doolittle, for example,
reminded his colleagues that Section One had been prepared by "Mr. Bingham" who, Doolittle twitted, had
also argued that the Civil Rights Act was unconstitutional under extant case law and required a constitutional
amendment (namely Bingham's) to validate it. Doolittle went on to praise Bingham's "very able speech"
in the House which argued that only an amendment would suffice to "declare the civil rights of all persons"
(Doolittle's paraphrase)-a speech in which Bingham invoked "the bill of rights" a half dozen times. CONG.
GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2896 (1866).
201. See JOSEPH B. JAMES, THE FRAMING OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 125 (1956).
202. Id. at 135-36; Fairman, supra note 113, at 68-69; Crosskey, supra note 44, at 102-03.
203. CURTIS, supra note 106, at 128.
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Fairman concluded that "pretty clearly there never was any such clear concep-
tion" of precisely what would be included in and excluded from Section One's
commands.204 Nevertheless, Fairman cast his lot with Frankfurter, suggesting
that principles of fundamental fairness and ordered liberty were probably better
touchstones than anything else. And "surely," Fairman emphasized, "the federal
requirements as to juries were not included. ' '20s
Fairman was half right. Nothing in the words or history of Section One
yields a precise principle of exclusion. Had its framers intended to limit its
scope to only privileges, rights, and freedoms declared in the pre-1866 Constitu-
tion, better words could have been found. But nothing in Fairman's account
of the legislative history of the Thirty-ninth Congress shows that jury trial
rights, or any other provisions of the federal Bill, were not seen as fundamental.
Howard, for example, plainly said that all the privileges and immunities of
Amendments I-VIII were included, but he also simultaneously described them
as "these great fundamental guarantees." Wilson's words in the Thirty-ninth
Congress were almost identical, referring to "the great fundamental rights
embraced in the bill of rights," which he had moments earlier described as "the
great fundamental rights belonging to the citizen."2° Wilson's Senate cospon-
sor of the Civil Rights Act was Lyman Trumbull, and he, too, equated constitu-
tional rights with fundamental rights: "Each State, so [long as] it does not
abridge the great fundamental rights belonging, under the Constitution, to all
citizens, may grant or withhold such civil rights as it pleases. 208
Thus, we find repeated claims that all privileges and immunities guaranteed
in the Bill are indeed fundamental and worthy of Fourteenth Amendment
protection. In light of these emphatic claims, did anyone argue that jury provi-
sions-or any other rights-in the Bill were not fundamental, and should not
be imposed on states? Fairman presents no one. He instead tries to make hay
out of speeches talking fundamental rights talk without explicitly mentioning
"the Bill of Rights." Typical of this dubious strategy is his treatment of Senator
John B. Henderson who, several days after Howard's speech, said "it will be
a loss of time to discuss the remaining provisions of the section, for they
merely secure the rights that attach to citizenship in all free Governments." 20 9
Fairman commented: "Unless the first eight Amendments enumerate 'rights that
attach to citizenship in all free governments,' Henderson's understanding is to
204. Fairman, supra note 113, at 138. 1 use the word "bashing" advisedly. Though his work has drawn
much praise, in my view Professor Fairman was a rather un-Fair-man in assessing the evidence for
incorporation.
205. Id. at 139.
206. Quoted supra text accompanying note 198.
207. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., Ist Sess. 1294 (1866); see also id. at 1118 (remarks of Wilson)
(referring to "the great fundamental civil rights" of "citizens of the United States, as such" protected by
"the American Constitution").
208. Id. at 1760; see also id. at 1151-53 (remarks ofRep. Russell Thayer) (equating constitutional rights
of the citizen with "fundamental" rights).
209. Id. at 3031.
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be counted as opposed to that of Howard."2'0 But Fairman's "unless" swal-
lows up the rest. Howard not only said plainly and at length that the rights in
Amendments I-VIII were encompassed by Section One (which Henderson
nowhere denied); and Howard not only simultaneously defined these rights as
"fundamental" (again, not a peep from Henderson); but moments later Howard
appeared to equate, rather than distinguish between, "the privileges and immuni-
ties... secured by the first eight amendments of the Constitution" and "those
fundamental rights lying at the basis of all society and without which a people
cannot exist except as slaves."2 ' Henderson's passing comment seems more
an echo than a refutation of Howard's elaborate remarks.
We have seen rhetoric like Howard's before. In his oral argument in
Holmes v. Jennison, Van Ness had described the rights in the Bill as "principles
which lie at the very foundation of civil liberty"; and in two cases decided
years apart, Lumpkin had variously described the Bill-explicitly including jury
trial provisions-as declaring "fundamental truths... at the foundation of our
free, republican institutions," and rights "at the bottom of every free govern-
ment."212 As we have already noted, the idea that rights declared in the Bill
were ipso facto fundamental had deep jurisprudential roots in the methodology
of the common law and in the fear of unfettered judicial discretion.
The Civil War experience provided powerful ideological, almost religious,
reinforcement. The war had of course taken a terrible toll in lives and limbs,
and even victory tasted bittersweet. Republicans in 1866 needed to convince
their constituents that all had not been in vain, that the noble goals of the
Union-preservation of nation and (later) freedom-had been worth the fight
and had been won. The Bill was a perfect symbol of both goals, even better
in some ways than the Declaration of Independence and the original Constitu-
tion. The Declaration had arguably preceded nationhood and featured language
of "free and independent states," a phrase repeatedly invoked on behalf of
213 Teoiisecession. The original Constitution had been tainted by its open compro-
mises with slavery, and it, too, could be seen as the product of independent
state conventions, none of whom could bind any other (again, points repeatedly
emphasized by secessionists). -4 The Bill, by contrast, clearly derived from
America as a nation, and proclaimed freedom, not slavery. What better embodi-
ment of the slogan, "Freedom National"--especially once the Bill's states'
rights features were filtered out by the phrase "privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States"?
210. Fairman, supra note 113, at 63.
211. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2765-66 (1866).
212. Quoted supra text accompanying notes 80, 168.
213. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 32 (U.S. 1776); 1 JEFFERSON DAVIS, THE RISE AND
FALL OF THE CONFEDERATE GOVERNMENT 86 (1958) (T. Yoseloff 188 1) (authored by President of so-called
Confederate States of America.)
214. See 1 DAVIS, supra note 213, at 99-120. But see Amar, supra note 21, at 1444-66 (rejecting
secessionist interpretation of Founding).
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It has become commonplace to remark upon Lincoln's blending of religious
and constitutional rhetoric-in his Inaugural and Gettysburg Addresses, for
example-but Bingham's imagery also bears notice. For him the Bill was not
simply "immortal,""21 as he preached in his maiden sermon in support of his
Amendment, but "sacred," a word that punctuates his most extended meditation
on the Bill:
As a further security for the enforcement of the Constitution, and
especially of this sacred bill of rights, to all the citizens and all the
people of the United States, it is further provided that the members of
the several State Legislatures and all executive and judicial officers,
both of the United States and of the several States, shall be bound by
oath or affirmation to support this Constitution. The oath, the most
solemn compact which man can make with his Maker, was to bind the
State Legislatures, executive officers, and judges to sacredly respect
the Constitution and all the rights secured by it... [The Bill of Rights
encompasses] all the sacred rights of person-those rights dear to
freemen and formidable only to tyrants-and of which the fathers of
the Republic spoke, after God had given them the victory ...216
Bingham waxed on at length proclaiming the need for "fidelity to the sacred
cause of the Constitution," describing the Founders' Bill as "essential provisions
of your Constitution, divine in their justice, sublime in their humanity," invok-
ing "God" countless times, and in fact closing with a reference to "the imper-
ishable attribute of the God of nations." '217 Given all this iconography, the
suggestion that some provisions of the Founders' Decalogue were dispensable
would be as jarring (heretical is the le mot juste) as the claim that some of the
Ten Commandments really were not, well, fundamental.
Fairman was remarkably insensitive to all of this and indeed, quite anachro-
nistic. Because he, in 1949, deemed various parts of the Bill to be optional or
outdated, he tended to attribute similar views to the 1866 Congress: When
Bingham said "bill of rights" he couldn't have meant it; his rhetoric showed
sloppy thinking rather than a worldview to be taken seriously; silence on the
other side must have meant that Bingham and company had not been under-
stood; for surely some sane lawyer would otherwise have clearly spoken out
against such silliness; and so on. Hugo Black, not Charles Fairman, proved the
more faithful historian, for he understood-because he shared-the almost
mystical attachment to the Bill of Rights exemplified by John Bingham. The
title of Black's Carpentier Lectures on incorporation (among other things) says
it all, and quite self-consciously: "A Constitutional Faith."2 8
215. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1034 (1866).
216. Id. at 1090.
217. Id. at 1090-94; cf. id. at 1034 (remarks of Bingham on "immortal" bill of rights).
218. BLACK, supra note 4.
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Bingham's constitutional faith was not simply a private affair, for he wove
it into the very fabric of the key sentence of Section One. How else to account
for the sentence's pious blending of phraseology from no less than four sections
of the pre-1866 Constitution (Article I, Section 10; Article IV; and Amend-
ments I and V) and its paraphrase of a fifth (substituting "citizens" for the
Preamble's "We the People")?
Of course, not all of Bingham's colleagues shared his faith, but they too
had obvious reasons to value virtually every privilege and immunity in the Bill.
Even if not sacred because given from above (from The Fathers, The People,
or The Almighty) the Bill had proved its secular value-if only by its unavail-
ability-in the trenches of the antebellum crusade against slavery. As we have
seen, slavery led to state repudiation of virtually every one of the Bill's rights
and freedoms, most definitely including the Bill's "inestimable privilege" of
juries-grand, petit, and civil-in cases involving liberty."9 As it had for
Anti-Federalists in the 1780's, the Bill encompassed for Republicans in the
1860's an armory of indispensable weapons against a tyranny that people had
seen with their own eyes. The difference, of course, was that unlike the tyranny
of George III, the tyranny of slavery could not be blamed on a distant and
dictatorial center, but instead had been perpetrated by local democracies. Just
as the price of peace and union in 1789 was a Bill of Rights against the center,
so the price of peace and (re)union in 1866 was a Bill of Rights against the
periphery.
The Bill thus stood as a handy pledge of the good faith of the South,
enforceable by congressional refusal to readmit states that continued to violate
its provisions. On the very day Bingham preached his most extended sermon
on the Bill in the House, Senator James Nye proclaimed that Congress had "no
power to invade" privileges of the Bill such as "freedom of speech," "freedom
of the press," "freedom in the exercise of religion," and the "security of per-
son," but that Congress did have power to "restrain the respective States from
infracting them" by continuing to exclude as unrepublican any state violating
these "personal rights." Representative Roswell Hart agreed several weeks
later, defining a "republican" government as one where:
"citizens shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of other
citizens;" where "no law shall be made prohibiting the free exercise
of religion;" where "the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall
not be infringed;" where "the right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated," and where "no person shall be deprived
of life, liberty, or property without due process of law."'
219. Though technically civil, suits involving alleged fugitive slaves implicated bodily liberty more
dramatically than most criminal cases.
220. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1072 (1866).
221. Id. at 1629.
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In a similar vein, Congressman Samuel Moulton argued against readmittance
of various Southern states because "there is neither freedom of speech, of the
press, or protection to life, liberty, or property," and Representative Sidney
Clarke opposed restoration of Mississippi to Congress because its constitutional
provision disarming blacks violated the Second Amendment command that "the
right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed." 2t
In all of these roles-as a declaratory landmark for judges trying to find
higher law, as a postwar symbol of "Freedom National," as a sacred gift from
above, as a time-tested arsenal against tyranny, as a readymade pledge of states'
good faith, as a justiciable definition of republican government, and as a
prudent bar against hasty readmission of the South-the Bill as a whole was
more than the sum of its parts. Thus, Fairman failed to find Republicans in the
Thirty-ninth Congress picking the Bill apart, saying this right is fundamental
but that right is not.
Despite its flaws, Fairman's analysis does yield two important insights that
any sensitive theory of incorporation must accommodate. First, Fairman rightly
saw that the Bill of Rights was invoked in 1866 at a rather high level of
generality. Virtually no one in Congress or in the states carefully considered
clause by clause exactly how the Bill could be sensibly incorporated. Second,
Fairman understood the Bill of 1789 as a creature of its time, and intuited that
some of its features might not fit well with the basic purposes of the Fourteenth
Amendment, had these features been carefully considered in 1866. Fairman's
precise formulation of this intuition-that "surely the federal requirements as
to juries were not" part of Section One-is dubious; but we shall see that
various aspects of the original Bill, including its jury centerpieces, do not
mechanically incorporate jot for jot. Perhaps we should recast Fairman's
formulation as follows: "surely the federal[ism-based] requirements" in the
original Bill should not be unthinkingly imposed on states.
(ii) Berger
Whereas Fairman argued for a more open-ended alternative to mechanical
incorporation, Raoul Berger followed Hugo Black by suggesting that Section
One had a precisely determinate meaning. But while Black read Section One
as a term of art meaning "No State shall abridge the Bill of Rights," Berger
read the section as a very different term of art. Berger's argument proceeded
in two steps. First, he insisted that Section One's commands were identical in
meaning to those of the Civil Rights Act of 1866.2 Second, he read that Act
222. Id. at 1617, 1838-39.
223. Fairman, supra note 113, at 139.
224. BERGER, FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT, supra note 139, at 22; cf. Fairman, supra note 113, at 44
(suggesting "correspondence" and "essential[] identifty]" between Act and Section One).
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narrowly, denying that the Act itself in any way incorporated the Bill of
Rights.? Although each step in isolation is problematic enough, the biggest
question is how Berger can conjoin them, for each step in fact undoes the other.
The Civil Rights Act presents a great many interpretive riddles of its own,
which would take us far afield; but it is enough to note here that its intricate
phrasings have almost no textual overlap with the wording of the key sentence
of Section One.' If the two were supposed to be not merely complementary
but identical, why did the same Congress use radically different words? At the
very least, why did Section One not explicitly refer to the Act? Does Berger
believe that the key sentence applied in the territories, as the Civil Rights Act
plainly did?
Of course, Section One did not explicitly refer to "the Bill of Rights"
either, but as we saw earlier, any such simplistic reference would have been
both over and underinclusive. Berger, by contrast, claims that the Act and
Section One were identical, despite the lack of textual overlap or cross-refer-
ence. Berger places great weight on various statements made in Congress, but
only the text of the Fourteenth Amendment was presented to the American
people for their ratification. And nothing in the text of the key sentence would
lead an average reader to understand it to mean no more and no less than the
rather obscure and highly intricate words of a recent congressional statute,
however important the statute might be. By contrast, ordinary Americans
familiar since childhood with the Bill of Rights were likely to understand its
"rights" and "freedoms" as paradigmatic, even if not exhaustive, of their
"privileges" and "immunities" as "citizens of the United States." (Recall that
the Bill was in fact worded so that, like scripture, it might be easily memorized
and internalized by ordinary Americans.227) What's more, Section One's self-
conscious blending of phrases from the pre-1866 Constitution would cue a
careful reader to look to the Constitution first for (nonexhaustive) definitions
of the rights and privileges of Americans.
In any event, the legislative history fails to establish the precise identity
Berger claims, but rather illustrates only that the broad language of Section One
was consciously designed and widely understood to encompass-that is, to be
at least as broad as-the commands of the Civil Rights Act. But as its language
225. BERGER, FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT, supra note 139, at 115-19.
226. In relevant part, the Act provided:
[C]itizens of the United States... of every race and color, without regard to any previous
condition of slavery or involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party
shall have been duly convicted, shall have the same right, in every State and Territory in the
United States, to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence, to inherit,
purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property, and to full and equal benefit
of all laws and proceedings for the security of person and property, as is enjoyed by white
citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, and penalties, and to none other, any
law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, to the contrary notwithstanding.
Act of Apr. 9, 1866, ch. 31, §1, 14 Stat. 27 (1866).
227. See Amar, supra note t, at 1208-09; cf. supra note 80 and accompanying text.
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and its proponents made clear, and no one denied, Section One was also
consciously designed to encompass the guarantees of the Bill of Rights. This
is actually less confusing than it might sound; for the best reading of the Civil
Rights Act suggests that it, too, was understood to incorporate the citizen rights
and freedoms of the Bill of Rights. Berger tries to argue that the Act prohibited
only racial discrimination, but if so, the first step of his argument collapses. For
if Section One and the Act were indeed identical in their substantive scope, as
he insists, then the Act must go beyond nondiscrimination to require states to
provide all persons with due process. The Act does contain language that can
be read to incorporate due process requirements; but as Michael Kent Curtis
has shown, that very same language must also then be read to incorporate all
the other rights and privileges of the Bill of Rights.
Berger's argument thus self-destructs. To save his first step, we must read
the Act to go beyond nondiscrimination (for due process has bite against even
nondiscriminatory laws); but in so doing, we undermine Berger's second step,
which tries to neuter the incorporationist language of the Act. To put the point
another way, the more we insist on the linkage between the Act and Section
One, the more relevant the language and legislative history of the Amendment
become in clarifying the intricate wording of the Act. And as we have seen,
228. CURTIS, supra note 106, at 71-83. Though inartfully drafted, the Act's last clause speaks of the
"full... benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of person and property." The rights and
freedoms of the federal Bill had long been understood as precisely fitting this description. For example,
Blackstone catalogued various common law antecedents of the Bill of Rights as encompassing "the right
of personal security, the right of personal liberty, and the right of private property;" and Lumpkin in
Campbell had described the federal Bill as providing "security for personal liberty and private property."
1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 126, at *127-45; Campbell v. State, 11 Ga. 353, 372 (1853); see also JOEL
TIFFANY, A TREATISE ON THE UNCONSTITUTIONALrIY OF AMERICAN SLAVERY 97 (Cleveland, J. Calyer
1849) (leading antebellum antislavery tract describing Bill of Rights as "guarantys ... for personal security,
personal liberty and private property"); CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1833 (1866) (remarks of Rep.
William Lawrence) (linking language of civil rights bill with due process clause of "the bill of rights to
the national Constitution"). In the Thirty-ninth Congress, Senator Lyman Trumbull introduced the Civil
Rights Act by saying it would protect the rights to teach, preach, and possess firearms-rights of course
declared in the first two federal amendments. Id. at 474-75; see also id. at 478, 1266 (remarks of Sen.
Willard Saulsbury and Rep. Henry Raymond) (noting that Act encompassed right to bear arms). Trumbull's
House counterpart, James Wiison, spoke even more expansively, declaring that the Act would protect "the
great fundamental rights embraced in the bill of rights." Id. at 1294. The most dramatic evidence, however,
comes from the Civil Rights Act's Siamese twin, the Freedman's Bureau Act. Initially introduced as a single
act, the two bills were later split, but were understood as in pari materia. As finally adopted, the Freedman's
Bureau Act spoke of the "full... benefit of all laws and proceedings concerning personal liberty, personal
security, and [property,] including the constitutional right to bear arms." 14 Stat. 173, 176 (1866) (emphasis
added). This last clause was understood as declaratory, simply clarifying what was already implicit. FLACK,
supra note 146, at 17. All of this thus suggests that the Second Amendment right to bear arms-and presum-
ably all other rights and freedoms in the Bill of Rights-were encompassed by both the Freedman's Bureau
Act and its companion Civil Rights Act. (Of course, adoption of both Acts presupposed congressional power
to impose the general requirements of the Bill of Rights on states. Bingham, relying on Barron, denied that
Congress had such power, and therefore argued that a constitutional amendment was required to validate
the Civil Rights Act. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., Ist Sess. 1291-93 (1866).)
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the Amendment's language and legislative history do indeed cross-reference
the rights and freedoms of the Bill of RightsY 9
Berger's emphasis on the Civil Rights Act is nevertheless instructive. Much
of the language and legislative history of the Act stressed the importance of
fundamental, Blackstonian common law rights. As we shall see, Blackstone and
the common law tradition may help us separate out those aspects of the pre-
1866 Constitution that are indeed privileges or immunities of citizens from
other aspects that may not sensibly incorporate.
2. Ratification: The Sounds of Silence
The Thirty-ninth Congress, of course, had only the power to propose. Yet
both the text of Section One and the public gloss Congress placed on that text
made clear that what Congress was proposing was r othing less than a transfor-
mation of the original Bill of Rights. Fairman argues that virtually no one
during the ratification debates explicitly reaffirmed incorporation, but Michael
Kent Curtis has shown that here, too, Fairman overlooks a great deal of affir-
mative evidence for incorporation.23o Moreover, the evidence we have can-
vassed thus far warrants shifting the burden, at least of production, onto those
who would claim that Section One somehow changed its meaning during the
ratification process. Yet Fairman presents not a single soul who explicitly
denied that the text meant what it said: that no state shall abridge the rights and
freedoms of Americans, most obviously those declared in the Bill of Rights.
a. Ratification Silence and the Incorporation Debate
Fairman argues that if we listen carefully, we can hear a roaring silence
that overwhelms incorporation. Rather than stuffing words into Fairman's
mouth, I shall let him speak for himself, with my italics added:
If it was understood, in the legislatures that considered the proposed
Amendment, that its adoption would impose upon the state govern-
ments the provisions of the federal Bill of Rights, then almost certainly
each legislature would take note of what the effect would be upon the
constitutional law and practice of its own state. If, for instance, the
state permitted one charged with "a capital or otherwise infamous
crime" to be tried upon information rather than "on a presentment or
indictment of a Grand Jury" (Amend. V) ... presumably its legislature
229. Berger's misstatements, distortions, and nonsequiturs are legion, but two especially egregious
claims merit special response: (1) "No reference to the Bill of Rights is to be found in the history of the
Civil Rights Bill .... "(2) "The [Civil Rights] Bill made no provision for a right to 'assemble or bear arms'
nor did any spokesman for it read these terms into the bill." BERGER, FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT, supra
note 139, at 24 n.21, 73. The speeches quoted or cited in the preceding footnote alone suffice to establish
the gross error of such claims.
230. Compare Fairman, supra note 113, at 81-132 with CURTIS, supra note 106, at 131-53.
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would not knowingly ratify such an Amendment without giving some
thought to the implications.... [W]here the imposition of Amend-
ments I to VIII would put a stop to some established practice, such as
the mode of trial in civil or criminal cases, then surely-if the Amend-
ment was really supposed to incorporate the Bill of Rights--one would
expectto find a marked reaction.... Conversely, if we found disparity
coupled with complete inaction, it would be very hard to believe the
Fourteenth Amendment was understood to have that effect?23'
As I hope my italics indicate, Fairman builds his argument on the assump-
tion that the implications of Section One's key sentence were carefully consid-
ered during the ratification period. To twentieth-century readers, this seems an
obviously sensible assumption. Isn't the key sentence the centerpiece of the
Fourteenth Amendment? Yet as Fairman's own evidence shows, his assumption
is false. His argument, built on silence, is an argument built on sand.
Fairman's most dramatic evidence concerns the grand jury. In nine or ten
states, state constitutional provisions already on the books in 1866 or state
constitutional amendments seriously considered in close proximity to 1866 had
less stringent grand jury rules than those prescribed by the Fifth Amendment.
Yet these gaps were never discussed, leading Fairman to argue that incorpora-
tion could not have been intended. 2 Once again, I shall give the man some
rope:
[A]n episode [from the illinois constitutional convention of 1869-70]
argues very persuasively that there was no contemporary understanding
that the Fourteenth Amendment had incorporated the Bill of
Rights .... [R]esolutions were offered looking to the abolition of the
grand jury ... [leading Orville H. Browning] to urge the retention of
the grand jury, "to which our ancestors had been accustomed" even
before the foundation of our nation. Evidently he put all his strength
into the speech. But he never so much as suggested that the Fourteenth
Amendment incorporated the federal Bill of Rights and thus had
fastened the grand jury upon the several states.
Another delegate, James McCoy, spoke with deep feeling of this
"bulwark," this "wall of defense," this "sheet-anchor of our liberties"
[yet failed to argue explicitly that the Fourteenth Amendment incorpo-
rated the Fifth] ....
... If there was any idea among informed men in Michigan that
the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated the Fifth, surely counsel
would raise the point in appealing some conviction.... [T]his is more
significant than a strong decision, since in criminal cases even the most
forlorn hope would have been pursued. 3
231. Fairman, supra note 113, at 82-83.
232. Id. at 84-85 (Connecticut), 97 (Ohio), 98-100 (Blinois), 101 (Kansas), 103 (Missouri), 106
(Indiana), 110-11 (Wisconsin), 115-16 (Michigan), 123 (Nebraska), 125 (California).
233. Id. at 98-100, 116 (citation omitted).
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All this seems to be very impressive anti-incorporation evidence in-
deed-until, that is, one gives the matter the slightest thought. If Fairman's
claim was that Section One was utterly meaningless, imposing no obligations
whatsoever on states, these data points would indeed fit the hypothesis. Of
course, Fairman wisely avoided this outlandish claim, arguing instead that
Section One simply required fundamental fairness and ordered liberty. But if
the debate is between incorporation and fundamental fairness-between Black
and Frankfurter-the silence Fairman trumpets becomes background noise with
no resolving power whatsoever. If Orville Browning and James McCoy failed
to argue that the Fourteenth Amendment "incorporated" the Fifth, they equally
failed to argue that it required ordered liberty and fundamental fairness. Yet
such an argument would have buttressed their claims that the grand jury should
be retained because the institution was fundamental---"a wall of defense" "to
which our ancestors had been accustomed," a "bulwark," a "sheet-anchor of
our liberties." Clearly an institution as venerable and widespread as the grand
jury, with roots in the mythic "ancient constitution" of England and in force
in 1866 in all but a handful of states, could be plausibly claimed to be implicit
in ordered liberty. Even if such an argument was not a knock-down winner,
it was more than a "forlorn hope." Yet Fairman's vaunted "informed men in
Michigan" did not raise this argument either. They simply did not speak to the
Fourteenth Amendment at all, and thus their silence, interesting as it may be,
has no legal resolving power between Black and Frankfurter.
Fairman's anachronistic hostility to grand juries23 led him to dismiss the
possibility that these bodies might have been seen as "fundamental" in the mid-
nineteenth century; but consider the words of Massachusetts Chief Justice
Lemuel Shaw in a leading state court opinion authored less than a decade
before the Fourteenth Amendment. The grand jury, said Shaw, was a "funda-
mental principle[] of free government"--one of the "ancient immunities and
privileges of English liberty.' 'as Shaw also argued that the placement of a
given right in "a bill of rights," state or federal, was itself evidence of its
"fundamental" nature = -an argument which, if taken seriously, causes
Fairman's approach to collapse into incorporation.
But Fairman's problems are only beginning. Forget about the privileges or
immunities clause for a moment. Whatever else it does or does not require,
Section One undeniably mandates that states follow "due process of law." Now
this phrase had a rich tradition, going back to Sir Edward Coke's famous
commentaries on Magna Charta, where the great Lord Chief Justice defined the
core meaning of the phrase as "indictment or presentment of good and lawfull
men"--i.e., a grand jury.3 7 American lawyers were intimately familiar with
234. Id. at 82-83, 111, 137.
235. Jones v. Robbins, 74 Mass. (8 Gray) 329, 343-44 (1857) (emphasis added).
236. Id. at 340.
237. EDWARD COKE, THE SECOND PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *50-51.
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Coke's definition. Many citations could be drawn from seventeenth- and
eighteenth-century sources, including Penn, Adams, and Hamilton,238 but for
our purposes the major nineteenth-century legal authorities are even more
significant. Here is what Joseph Story wrote in his influential Commentaries
on the Constitution:
Lord Coke says, that [the words by the law of the land] mean by due
process of law, that is, without due presentment or indictment, and
being brought in to answer thereto by due process of the common law.
So that this clause [i.e., the due process clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment] in effect affirms the right of trial according to the process and
proceedings of the common law.239
Early editions of Chancellor Kent's Commentaries on American Law are even
more emphatic: "The words by the law of the land, as used in magna char-
ta... are understood to mean due process of law, that is, by indictment or
presentment of good and lawful men; and this, says Lord Coke, is the true
sense and exposition of those words."'m4
In perhaps the most famous abolitionist opinion of the antebellum era, the
1854 case of In re Booth,24' the Wisconsin Supreme Court quoted this excerpt
from Kent verbatim in a key passage holding that Congress' Fugitive Slave Act
was unconstitutional (a holding decisively reversed by the Taney Court when
the case finally reached it under the name of Ableman v. Booth4 2).
So too, in the 1857 case of Jones v. Robbins, Lemuel Shaw not only cited
Kent and Story, but went on to hold that the words of the Massachusetts
Constitution, echoing Magna Charta, required grand juries in all cases involving
infamous punishment: "Lord Coke himself explains his own meaning by saying,
'the law of the land,' as expressed in Magna Charta, was intended due process
of law, that is, by indictment or presentment of good and lawful men."'243
Consider also the language of Alvan Stewart in one of the leading anti-slavery
tracts of the antebellum era, an 1837 essay that Professor tenBroek has identi-
fied as a major source of Republican thought in the 1860's:
238. See 3 PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 485 (Harold C. Syrett & Jacob E. Cooke eds., 1962)
(1784 "Letter from Phocion"), quoted in Amar, supra note t, at 1190 n.262; A.E. DIcK HOWARD, THE ROAD
FROM RUNNYMEDE 158-59, 422 (1968).
239. 3 STORY, supra note 50, § 1783 (citations omitted).
240. 2 JAMES KENT, COMMARIES ON AMERIcAN LAw 13 (New York, Clayton & Van Norden, 2d
ed. 1832) (citations omitted).
241. In re Booth, 3 Wis. 1, 66 (1854).
242. Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506, 526 (1858).
243. Jones v. Robbins, 74 Mass. (8 Gray) 329, 343, 346 (1857). For similar discussions linking due
process with grand jury indictment, see State v. Keeran, 5 R.I. 497, 505-06 (1858); State v. Paul, 5 R.I.
185, 197 (1858); Greene v. Briggs, 10 F. Cas. 1135, 1140 (C.C.D.R.I. 1852) (No. 5764) (Curtis, Circuit
J.); Taylor v. Porter, 4 Hill 140, 146 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1843).
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[N]o lawyer in this country or England, who is worthy of the appella-
tion, will deny that the true and only meaning of the phrase, "due
process of law," is an indictment or presentment by a grand jury, of
not less than twelve, nor more than twenty-three men; a trial by a petit
jury of twelve men, and a judgment pronounced on the finding of the
jury, by a court.244
It need not be argued that due process in 1866 meant only grand ju-
ries-Story and Stewart seemed to think otherwise; later editions of Kent
followed suit; and, of course, Murray's Lessee also suggested a broader under-
standing. (There are also questions about redundancy if we assume that the
Fifth Amendment's due process clause merely replicated its grand jury clause.)
We need not even say that due process in 1866 necessarily included a grand
jury requirement;' s it is enough to say that the argument was a very strong
one indeed, supported by eminent legal authorities on both sides of the Atlan-
tic.Y6 Yet Fairman's "informed men in Michigan," Illinois, and elsewhere
did not apparently even pause to consider even this eminently plausible reading
of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
What does this prove? Not that the words "due process" never meant grand
juries; for we have seen far too much contrary evidence. Not even that the
meaning of "due process" miraculously changed in 1866, for it would take more
than uninformed and unreflective silence to prove this. Rather, Fairman's own
data clearly show that, contrary to his workhorse assumptions, many informed
men simply were not thinking carefully about the words of Section One at
all.247 And the upshot of course is that silence alone is adubious key to un-
locking the meaning of Section One."4
Nor can it be argued that silence in fact demonstrates that Section One
meant nothing (the outlandish position Fairman wisely eschewed). Much of the
silence Fairman finds crucial came not from state legislatures ratifying the
Amendment, but from subsequent state conventions and the like. And even
244. ALVAN STEWART, A CONSTITUTIONALARGUMENT ON THE SUBJECT OF SLAVERY (1837), reprinted
in TENBROEK, supra note 64, at 281, 283.
245. Cf. Rowan v. State, 30 WIs. 129 (1872) (rejecting claim that "due process" requires grand juries
in unique context of state constitutional amendment eliminating specific reference to grand jury while
substituting general due process language).
246. Justice Frankfurter once claimed that the due process clause would be an "extraordinarily strange"
way of requiring grand juries. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 63 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
What seems even stranger, however, is Frankfurter's apparent ignorance of the history of the phrase given
all his breastbeating about Anglo-American legal traditions.
247. For a possible explanation, see infra note 270.
248. In light of Fairman's pointed emphasis on Orville Browning's failure to invoke the Fourteenth
Amendment in 1869-70, perhaps some additional details that Fairman omitted should be noted. In 1866,
while the Amendment was still pending, Browning, as President Johnson's Secretary of Interior, led the
Administration's charge against ratification. In a widely influential document, Browning argued that the
Amendment's due process clause would "subordinate the State judiciaries to Federal supervision" and
"totally annihilate the independence and sovereignty of State judiciaries in the administration of State laws."
CURTIS, supra note 106, at 151-52. These facts put Browning's later conduct in a rather different light from
that offered by Professor Fairman.
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during the ratification process, silence about a provision did not magically erase
it from the text. If it did, we would have to blot out many key provisions of
the original Constitution, not to mention the original Bill of Rights.
b. Ratification Silence More Generally
But even if the silence Fairman trumpeted has little power to resolve the
incorporation debate, we should stop to consider what this silence tells us about
both the Fourteenth Amendment and the Bill of Rights. Let us begin by taking
seriously the analogy between the original Constitution and the Fourteenth
Amendment. Many key provisions of the original document received relatively
little attention during ratification simply because there were so many other
important things to talk about. The same was true of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. The point is not simply quantitative-the five sections of the Fourteenth
Amendment contain about as many words as the first ten amendments put
together-but qualitative. The Fourteenth Amendment proposed nothing less
than a comprehensive blueprint for the Reconstruction-the Re-Constitution--of
a nation torn asunder by the Civil War. 9 (Hence the Amendment's gestation
in the Joint Committee on Reconstruction.)
Though twentieth-century readers rarely look past the key sentence of
Section One, politicians of the day who did the proposing and ratifying saw
other provisions as more important. Section Two laid down new rules for
representation in Congress, and Section Three determined which Southern
leaders would be eligible to hold elective office, state or federal. Taken togeth-
er, these two provisions could profoundly shape the configuration of political
power in America. Thus, even in the Fourteenth Amendment, structural issues
predominated. Though Thaddeus Stevens opened his formal exposition of the
Amendment by briefly noting that Section One would reverse the Barron
rule," he devoted far more attention to later sections that sought to determine
who would control the country in the critical years ahead: "The second section
I consider the most important in the article." 1 A few days later when a draft
of Section Three came under fire, Stevens responded:
Without that, [the Amendment] amounts to nothing. I do not care the
snap of my finger whether it be passed or not if that be stricken out.
Before another Congress shall have assembled here, and before [the
rest of the Amendment] can be carried into full effect, there will be
no friends of the Union left on this side of the House to carry it out
249. See, e.g., MALTZ, supra note 145, at 79-81. Various Democrats in Congress objected unsuccessful-
ly to this Republican bundling of separable issues. See JAMES, supra note 201, at 148-49.
250. Quoted supra text accompanying note 197.
251. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2459 (1866).
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.... [T]he House will be filled with yelling secessionists and hissing
copperheads. Give us the third section or give us nothing.52
The ratification debates confirm Stevens' views about the importance of
Sections Two and Three, though of course Americans disagreed sharply about
whether these provisions commended or condemned the Amendment.2 3
In addition, the Amendment gave rise to fierce debates over issues not
presented on the face of the document, but inextricably intertwined with it: the
legitimacy of the rump Congress that had proposed the Amendment; the legality
of various efforts to condition Southern readmission to Congress on the Amend-
ment's ratification; the exclusion of Democrats from key caucuses discussing
the Amendment; and the Congress' failure to "present" the Amendment to
President Andrew Johnson.?5
All this brings us to a second similarity between the original Constitution
and the Fourteenth Amendment: partisan feeling ran high in both ratification
periods. In 1787 and 1788, partisanship led Federalists to vote quickly and
quietly in those state conventions where they had the votes, leaving relatively
little record of their formal deliberations. But in the state conventions of
Virginia, Massachusetts, New York, and North Carolina, Anti-Federalists and
fencesitters constituted an initial majority of the delegates, obliging Federalists
to do much more explaining. In 1866, the Thirty-ninth Congress followed the
Philadelphia Convention model by shrouding early deliberations in the secrecy
of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction. Just as Americans in 1787 had
waited with increasing apprehension for the word from Philadelphia, people in
1866 impatiently looked for white smoke to emerge from the mysterious Joint
Committee conclave. When official proposals did finally issue, their public
exposition by leading architects like Bingham, Howard, and Stevens received
special attention. But as in the 1780's, partisanship impoverished deliberation.
Many of the key discussions in Washington "were carried on not in the legal
Senate of the United States, but in a party meeting"5 5 from which Democrats
were excluded. And during the ratification debates, many Republicans again
kept silent in public deliberations, content that they had the votes to pass the
Amendment and fearful that any statement might provide Democrats with
political ammunition. 6
252. Id. at 2544. Section Three was later amended. Id. at 2869; JAMES, supra note 201, at 142.
253. CURTIS, supra note 106, at 13-15, 131; FLACK, supra note 146, at 208-09; KENDRICK, supra note
146, at 348-52; MALTZ, supra note 145, at 93; Avins, supra note 107, at 9; Crosskey, supra note 44, at
112; see also ALAN P. GRIMES, DEMOCRACY AND THE AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION 44-47 (1987)
(noting centrality of Sections Two and Three in House and Senate debates). In retrospect, because of
underenforcement, evasion, and amnesty, these provisions ended up playing a much smaller role than
originally anticipated.
254. See NELSON, supra note 64, at 93-96; JOSEPH B. JAMES, THE RATIFICATION OF THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT (1984).
255. JAMES, supra note 201, at 150; see also FLACK, supra note 146, at 121.
256. CURTIS, supra note 106, at 6.
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So much then for what Fairman's silence tells us about the Fourteenth
Amendment. What does it say about the Bill of Rights? Mainly that the Bill
was relatively uncontroversial in 1866. As Michael Kent Curtis and William
Winslow Crosskey have painstakingly proved, the vast majority of Republican
leaders in 1866 were contrarians.17 Some, like Bingham, were highly con-
scious of Barron, while others had apparently never heard of the case. Yet all
could agree that Bingham's Section One was simply declaratory of preexisting
rights and freedoms of citizens, many of which had already been declared by
the Fathers.258 The biggest Section One debate among Republicans was not
what the words meant, but whether the words were necessary, given that the
rights they protected already existed. Thus, a committee of the Massachusetts
legislature opposed the Fourteenth Amendment because existing Amendments,
including the First (which of course spoke explicitly of Congress), already
"cover[ed] the whole ground" of Section One259 Given that most Republicans
viewed Section One as declaratory, it received considerably less attention during
ratification than the more radical changes proposed by later sections.
Democratic critics of the Amendment also had much easier targets than
Section One. Who wants to campaign against the Bill of Rights? With a few
exceptions, most notably the grand jury rules we have already considered, the
substance of the federal Bill's rights and freedoms did not greatly diverge from
rights already formally protected under state laws and state constitutions. Now
as we have seen, the slavery experience led many states to betray their own
constitutional safeguards of speech, press, personal security, and the like, but
the principles themselves were deeply etched in both the popular and the legal
mind. Given this, one would expect that opposition to Section One would find
expression in the idiom of federalism: responsibility for preservation of citizen
rights, freedoms, privileges, and immunities should not be handed over to
Congress and federal courts, but should remain with the states. And this is
exactly the kind of rhetoric that one does find during ratification.260
Finally, we must remember that the Bill of Rights had yet to prove itself
in the courtroom as a powerful brake on runaway government. The antebellum
crusaders against slavery had sorely felt the lack of a federally enforceable Bill
of Rights against states, but no one had seen exactly how much protection such
257. See generally id., passim; Crosskey, supra note 44.
258. In addition to the various sources quoted earlier, see, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess.
2468 (1866) (remarks of Rep. William Kelley) ("if [provisions of Section One] are not already" in the
Constitution, they should be); id. at 2539 (remarks of Rep. John Farnsworth) (privileges or immunity and
due process clauses of Section One are "reaffirmation" and "surplusage"); id. at 256 app. (remarks of Rep.
Jehu Baker) (Section One is "more valuable for clearing away bad interpretations.., of the Constitu-
tion... than for any positive grant of new power"); id. at 340 (remarks of Sen. Edgar Cowan) (suggesting
Fifth Amendment due process restricts states); id. at 1833 (remarks of Rep. William Lawrence) (similar);
id. at 1151-52 (remarks of Rep. Russell Thayer) (similar).
259. H.R. Doc. NO. 149, Mass. Gen. Ct. 1-4 (1867).
260. See, e.g., ANTIEAU, supra note 113, at 62-70; CURTIS, supra note 106, at 149-52; MALTZ, supra
note 145, at 116; NELSON, supra note 64, at 104-09. On the possibly broad power of Congress to enforce
Section One, see ANTEAu, supra note 113, at 40-42, 55-56.
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a Bill would in fact afford. Judicial review of Congress, though trumpeted in
Marbury v. Madison,2'1 had little bite before 1866: the only successful invo-
cation of the Bill of Rights against Congress in the Supreme Court was Dred
Scott's malodorous dictum that exclusion of slavery from the territories violated
due process. 2 The truly important exercises of judicial review in the antebel-
lum era had come at the expense of state governments, not Congressm3-and
Barron of course had made clear that the founders' Bill of Rights was inappli-
cable in state cases. Though the transformative possibilities of incorporation
should have been obvious to anyone who had seen what the Marshall Court
had done with the sparse words of Article I, Section 10 in cases like Fletcher
v. Peck and Dartmouth College, a well-developed Supreme Court jurisprudence
of the Bill of Rights had yet to emerge. Indeed, the eventual emergence of this
jurisprudence in the twentieth century owes far more to the Fourteenth Amend-
ment than to anything in the original Bill.'
3. Early Interpretations: In Search of Reasons
Post-ratification discussions of the Fourteenth Amendment cannot change
its meaning, but can cast light backwards. In examining early interpretations,
we must not simply count noses, but weigh reasons: do any of the early
interpretations of the Amendment deepen our understanding of the evidence we
have seen thus far?
Here too, silence alone will prove relatively unhelpful. Consider, for
example, the 1869 case of Twitchell v. Pennsylvania, where the Supreme Court
brusquely dismissed claims that the state had violated various provisions of the
Fifth and Sixth Amendments.25 Though neither counsel nor the Court even
mentioned the newly ratified Fourteenth Amendment, various critics of Justice
Black have argued that the silence alone is devasting to the incorporation thesis.
Thus, Felix Frankfurter wrote in his parting memorandum in the Harvard Law
Review:
[Twitchell indicates that no one] even thought of proposing that these
amendments had been newly brought to bear on the States by the
Fourteenth. Yet the Fourteenth's formulation and adoption had been
a subject of great interest, especially to lawyers and judges, only
261. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
262. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 450-52 (1857).
263. See, e.g., Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810); Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (I
Wheat.) 304 (1816); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819); Dartmouth College v.
Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824); Osbom v. Bank
of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824); Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842).
264. I develop this theme in more detail in my forthcoming book.
265. Twitchell v. Pennsylvania, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 321 (1869).
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months prior to the decision of these cases. The significance of this
contemporaneous understanding need not be labored. 6
Raoul Berger agreed: "Oversight will not account for the omission; the Amend-
ment had been widely discussed; bench and bar are alert to every new and
relevant enactment; they would not be oblivious to the revolution worked by
the alleged incorporation of the Bill of Rights."' 7 Fairman too thought
Twitchell quite impressive evidence:
[I]t did not occur to counsel for the petitioner to suggest that the
Fourteenth Amendment, adopted less than a year before, had worked
any change in the law applicable to the case.... Even though counsel
for the petitioner had failed to invoke the Fourteenth Amendment, one
supposes that the Court, had it been stirred by the least uncertainty,
would have suggested the question and heard argument before dispos-
ing of the petition of one sentenced to death.2
But had Fairman, Frankfurter, or Berger paused to examine their supposed
trump card before playing it with such flourish, they might have realized that
Tivitchell is in fact an embarrassing joker. Counsel explicitly argued, among
other things, that Pennsylvania had violated "due process of law," but invoked
only the Fifth Amendment-a (literally) fatal mistake, for the Court simply
rejected the claim with a quick citation to Barron.29 But again, what does
this prove? If Twitchell's silence is evidence that the Fourteenth Amendment
does not incorporate earlier amendments, it is equally strong evidence that the
Fourteenth does not require state due process. But in light of the plain words
of the Fourteenth Amendment, this latter claim is absurd. Twitchell's silence
thus proves too much-and therefore nothing at all. Or more precisely, it proves
that, contrary to Berger and Fairman's glib assumptions, only "oversight will
0 account for the omission;" "bench and bar are [not] alert to every new and
relevant enactment" and the Court did not pay careful attention "before dispos-
ing of the petition of one sentenced to death."270 Frankfurter notwithstanding,
Twitchell's embarrassing silence shows no "contemporaneous understanding"
and has no "significance" to the incorporation debate.
266. Frankf1rter, supra note 3, at 750.
267. BERGER, supra note 183, at 153.
268. Fairman, supra note 113, at 132-33; see also Wallace Mendelson, Mr. Justice Black's Fourteenth
Amendment, 53 MINN. L. REV. 711, 721 (1969).
269. 74 U.S. (7 Nval.) at 321, 323-26.
270. Twitchell is perhaps explicable as an unthinking reflection of the notion that Section One would
have its main application in Southern states. See Fairman, supra note 113, at 112; BERGER, supra note 183,
at 150-55; BERGER, FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT, supra note 139, at 38-39. But surely the Amendment as
written applies to all states, North and South, as later (more self-conscious) courts have made undeniably
clear. Thus to understand and explain Twitchell is not to justify it, much less use it as a springboard for
serious Fourteenth Amendment analysis, as Frankfurter and company appear to.
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When we turn instead to what important decisionmakers actually did say
when they focused on the relationship between the Fourteenth Amendment and
the Bill, we find powerful confirmation of incorporation. Over and over in the
years between 1868 and 1873, various members of Congress, both Democrat
and Republican, suggested that the Bill of Rights defined paradigmatic privileg-
es and immunities of Americans that no state could abridge and that Congress
could protect by legislation under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment.
This was no idle chatter, for Congress in fact legislated on the basis of this
understanding. 1
Perhaps the most illuminating case arising under this congressional legisla-
tion was the 1871 circuit court case, United States v. Hall. In the course of
deciding whether Congress had power to legislate under Section Five, Judge
(later Justice) William Woods had to confront the words of Section One. His
conclusion plainly supported incorporation: "We think, therefore, that the...
rights enumerated in the first eight articles of amendment to the constitution
of the United States are the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United
States."272 But it is Woods' reasoning that is most illuminating. Like Rawle,
Lumpkin, Shaw, Howard, Wilson, and many others, Woods treated rights
declared in the Constitution as ipso facto fundamental, following the classic
methodology of finding the common law:
What are the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States
here referred to [in Section One]? They are undoubtedly those which
may be denominated fundamental; which belong of right to the citizens
of all free states, and which have at all times been enjoyed by citizens
of the several states which compose this Union .... Corfield v.
Coryell. Among these we are safe in including those which in the
constitution are expressly secured to the people, either as against the
action of the federal or state governments.273
271. See generally CURTIs, supra note 106, at 154-70. Professor Fairman tried to point to various
congressional decisions between 1866 and 1870 that he claimed were implicitly inconsistent with incorpora-
tion. Fairman, supra note 113, at 122-32. In admitting or readmitting states, Congress (claimed Fairman)
appeared to approve without comment various state constitutions that did not perfectly comport with the
federal Bill of Rights. Once again, Fairman's chief evidence focused on silence about grand juries. As we
have already seen, this argument proves nothing more than the silliness of Fairman's method in drawing
strong inference from mere silence. What's more, the alleged inconsistencies Fairman points to are truly
de minimis in light of the basic facial consistency of these state constitutions with the privileges and
immunities of the federal Bill of Rights. Given this basic consistency and the centrality of many other factors
in the (re)admission process, it is unsurprising that little attention was paid to microscopic details about the
precise incidents and triggers of grand juries.
272. United States v. Hall, 26 F. Cas. 79, 82 (C.C.S.D. Ala. 1871) (No. 15,282).
273. Id. at 81. Several early federal prosecutors seemed to follow Wood's approach. See ROBERT J.
KACZOROWSIa, THE PoLrics OF JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION- THE FEDERAL COURTS, DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE, AND CIvIL RIOHTs, 1866-1870, at 125-30 (1985); see also State ex rel. The St. Joseph & Denver
City R.R. v. Commissioners of Nemaha County, 7 Kan. 542,555 (1871) (Brewer, J., dissenting) (describing
bill of rights as "those essential truths, those axioms of civil and political liberty upon which all free
governments are founded"); State ex rel. Liversey v. Judge of Civil Dist. Court, 34 La. Ann. 741,743 (1882)
(bill of rights "declaratory of the general principles of republican government, and of the fundamental rights
of the citizen").
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Several months before Hall, Woods had held Circuit Court with Justice
Joseph Bradley in New Orleans, where they heard the Crescent City Live-stock
Case. In this case, the two judges had avoided a comprehensive definition of
"the essential privileges which belong to a citizen of the United States, as
such," but had equated them with "fundamental principles of free govern-
ment."274 No specific mention was made of the Bill of Rights, but Bradley's
1871 correspondence with Woods showed that the Justice endorsed Hall's
methodology and result.275
Bradley's position became public in 1873, when he got a second crack at
the Crescent City case, then on appeal as one of the famous Slaughter-House
Cases.276 The cases provided the Supreme Court its first opportunity to care-
fully reflect and opine on the Fourteenth Amendment, and Bradley in dissent
offered the most comprehensive analysis of the issue that most concerns us:
the relationship between the new Amendment and the rights recognized in the
pre-1866 Constitution. Wrote Bradley:
The people of this country brought with them to its shores the rights
of Englishmen .... [Bradley then cited and discussed "fundamental
rights" found in, among other places, Magna Charta, Blackstone's
Commentaries, and Justice Washington's catalogue of common law
rights in Corfield.] But we are not bound to resort to implication, or
to the constitutional history of England, to find an authoritative decla-
ration of some of the most important privileges and immunities of
citizens of the United States. It is in the Constitution itself.277
Bradley proceeded to offer a representative sample of the "privileges and
immunities of citizens of the United States" declared in the pre-1866 Constitu-
tion, including the ban against bills of attainder and ex post facto laws, and the
rights to habeas corpus, trial by jury, free exercise, free speech, free press, free
assembly, and security against unreasonable searches. 278 Bradley then resumed
his analysis of unwritten fundamental law, but later returned to the Constitution,
concluding as follows:
Admitting... that formerly the States were not prohibited from
infringing any of the fundamental privileges and immunities of citizens
of the United States, except in a few specified cases, that cannot be
274. Live-stock Dealers & Butchers' Ass'n v. Crescent City Live-stock Landing & Slaughter-House
Co., 15 F. Cas. 649, 652 (C.C.D. La. 1870) (No. 8408).
275. KACOROWSKI, supra note 273, at 16 ("[P]ortions of [Woods' opinion in Hall] were verbatim
copies of Justice Bradley's letter.").
276. See also Blylew v. United States, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 581, 596 (1871) (Bradley, J., dissenting)
(Civil Rights Bill of 1866 designed to protect blacks in "having firearms.... exercising the functions of
a minister of the gospel.... [in] being taught to read and write," and against "laws which subjected them
to cruel and ignominious punishments not imposed upon white persons").
277. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 114-18 (1873) (Bradley, I., dissenting) (emphasis added).
278. Id. at 118.
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said now, since the adoption of the fourteenth amendment. In my
judgment, it was the intention of the people of this country in adopting
the amendment to provide National security against violation by the
States of the fundamental rights of the citizen.
Like Woods, Bradley apparently understood all rights and privileges in the
Bill of Rights as ipso facto fundamental, but Bradley went beyond Woods by
adding to the list various privileges and immunities declared in the original
Constitution. In the process, Bradley hinted at a more refined version of
incorporation, apparently based on whether a given provision of the pre-1866
Constitution had roots as a common law privilege or immunity. Thus, Bradley
included both the habeas clause from Article I and the jury rights in Article I
on his list, yet appeared pointedly to exclude nonestablishment when listing
First Amendment rights. We shall return to this hint later.
Justice Bradley's opinion was joined by Justice Swayne, but Swayne went
on to add some rather confusing remarks of his own. Justices Field and Miller
also wrote opinions in Slaughter-House, but neither provided a careful analysis
of incorporation. Field's discussion of privileges and immunities simply stressed
Corfield, the common law, and fundamental rights without mentioning the Bill,
probably because none of its provisions was directly implicated by the facts
at hand.' 0 Bradley at least saw no contradiction between Field's approach
and his own, for he joined Field's opinion. Justice Miller's opinion for the
Court did not squarely address Bradley's incorporation analysis, offering only
the following cryptic remark: "The right to peaceably assemble and petition for
redress of grievances, the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, are rights of
the citizen guaranteed by the Federal Constitution."' Read for all it might
be worth, this passage could imply that all the rights and freedoms declared in
the pre-1866 Constitution were "privileges and immunities of citizens of the
United States," that no state could thereafter abridge. 2 The conventional
reading, however, is far more narrow: Miller had in mind only state interference
with efforts to assemble and petition the federal government, and to secure
habeas relief on the basis of federal laws in federal courts. 3
The conventional reading of course falls far short of incorporation, but if
we are looking for reasons rather than counting noses, Miller's opinion has
nothing to offer. Miller's one-liner never explains why other rights and free-
doms of the pre-1866 Constitution are somehow not privileges and immunities
of citizens of the United States at the center of Section One's letter and spirit.
What's more, the conventional reading has the effect of rendering the privileges
279. Id. at 121-22.
280. Id. at 96-111 (Field, J., dissenting).
281. Id. at 79.
282. Cf. ELY, supra note 141, at 196 n.59 (suggesting broad incorporationist reading of Miller's
language).
283. See 2 CRossKEY, supra note 29, at 1128-30.
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or immunities clause wholly unnecessary--"a vain and idle enactment," 284
in the famous words of Justice Field. Clearly the supremacy clause standing
alone, or as glossed by McCulloch,' would have sufficed to prohibit state
interference with federal petitions and federal writs. Like Twitchell, then,
Slaughter-House is no trump card for anti-incorporationists. If read convention-
ally, the majority opinion rejects not just Black's incorporation, but
Frankfurter's and Fairman's ordered liberty, Berger's terms of art, and indeed
every theory of Section One that gives Bingham's key clause any independent
bite.
We must nevertheless keep Miller's opinion in mind, for it helps to explain
the impoverishment of Fourteenth Amendment discourse in the Supreme Court
over the next several generations. By strangling the privileges or immunities
clause in its crib, Slaughter-House forced contrarian-minded litigants to argue
that the original Bill applied against states either directly of its own force, or
via the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause. The Court continued to
dismiss the former argument with a quick invocation of Barron and also
regularly rebuffed the latter. If we are simply counting noses, there are lots of
Justices involved, 6 though a fair count would require toting up the probably
larger number of incorporation-minded Congressmen in the years immediately
after ratification. But once again, if we are looking for reasons-for analysis
of the letter and spirit of the privileges or immunities clause-we find next to
nothing in the High Court between Slaughter-House and Hugo Black's heroic
re-examination and resurrection of the clause in his famous 1947 dissent in
Adamson v. California. In the vast wasteland between Bradley and Black, only
four Supreme Court landmarks stand out: John Randolph Tucker's celebrated
oral argument in Spies v. Illinois in 1887; Justice Field's eventual decision
(joined by the first Justice Harlan and Justice Brewer) to embrace Tucker's
analysis in the 1892 case, O'Neil v. Vermont; and Justice Harlan's subsequent
284. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 96 (Field, L, dissenting).
285. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819) (striking down state interference with
federal bank).
286. See, for example, the list of cases compiled in Frankfurter, supra note 3. Upon close inspection,
the list is less impressive than it looks. Many of the cited passages simply reject the claim that a provision
of the original Bill applied of its own force against states-technically, a quite different claim from one
based on incorporation (or what have you) via the Fourteenth Amendment. This is no mere pedantic quibble,
for the Court took this pleading technicality quite seriously for many years, as illustrated by both Twitchell,
74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 321 (1869) (discussed supra text accompanying notes 265-270), and Palmer v. Ohio, 248
U.S. 32, 34 (1918) (dismissing Fifth Amendment just compensation claim against state as "palpably
groundless" even though Court had earlier incorporated "just compensation" principle into Fourteenth
Amendment, see Chicago, B & Q R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897)). Indeed, in the most important
case Frankfurter himself cites, the Court, after quickly dismissing the Barron argument, treats the same basic
claim, repackaged as a Fourteenth Amendment argument, with much greater attention. Spies v. Illinois, 123
U.S. 131, 165-67 (1887).
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reaffirmations of this approach in Maxwell v. Dow and in Twining v. New
Jersey in 1900 and 1908 respectively2 7
Justice Black in Adamson relied on each of these landmarks, apparently
believing that they supported his brand of mechanical incorporation.28 8 Yet
the words of Bradley, Tucker, Field, and Harlan in fact support a considerably
more refined version of incorporation-a version that synthesizes the strengths
of the three modem positions on incorporation that have dominated legal
discourse since Adamson: Hugo Black's total incorporation model, William
Brennan's selective incorporation approach, and Felix Frankfurter's anti-incor-
porationist emphasis on fundamental fairness.
It is now time, with the help of Bradley, Tucker, Field, and Harlan, to
elaborate this synthesis.
I1. THE HARD PART OF INCORPORATION
A. The Problem: Fitting the Constitution's Pegs into Reconstruction Holes
The easy case for incorporation cannot be easily rebutted as a matter of
either text or legislative history. Nevertheless, incorporation raises many more
difficulties than Black admitted. The major problem is structural: the original
Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment feature very different constitu-
tional architectures. Sensibly fitting the two together requires far more judicial
artisanship-far more judgment-than Black's rhetoric suggested.
As I have tried to show elsewhere, the 1789 Bill tightly knit together
citizen rights and state rights;H9 but the 1866 Amendment unraveled this
fabric, vesting citizens with rights against states. The original Bill also focused
centrally on empowering the people collectively against government agents
following their own agenda.29° The Fourteenth Amendment, by contrast, fo-
cused on protecting minorities against even responsive, representative, majori-
tarian government. Over and over, the 1789 Bill proclaimed "the right[s]" and
"the powers" of "the people" 29-- phrases conjuring up civic republicanism,
collective political action, public rights, and positive liberty. The complementary
phrase in the 1866 Amendment--"privileges or immunities of citizens"--indi-
287. Spies, 123 U.S. at 150-52 (oral argument of John Randolph Tucker); O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S.
323, 360-64 (1892) (Field, I., dissenting); Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581, 605-17 (1900) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting); Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 114-27 (1908) (Harlan, J., dissenting). The foregoing
passages are identified as "landmarks" not because they support my analysis (although they do), but because
they constitute virtually the only extended discussion in the United States Reports between Slaughter-House
and Adamson of the relationship (or lack thereof) between the federal Bill and the privileges or immunities
clause.
288. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 120-23 (1947).
289. Amar, supra note t.
290. See id.
291. See id. at 1210 (noting that no phrase appears in more of first 10 amendments than the phrase,
"the people"); supra note 151 (listing references to "the people" in the Bill).
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cates a subtle but real shift of emphasis, reflecting a vision more liberal than
republican, more individualistic than collectivist, more private than public, more
negative than affirmative.
Or at least, so I shall argue in detail in a forthcoming book on the Bill of
Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment. For now, a single example suffices to
illustrate the analytic difficulties posed by incorporation: the right to keep and
bear arms. The 1789 instantiation of this right was intimately connected with
federalism concerns about a federally controlled standing army that might seek
to overawe state-organized militias.292 By contrast, in 1866, John Bingham,
Jacob Howard, Thaddeus Stevens, and company were hardly in the mood to
rail against a federal standing army; these men, after all, wanted to use precise-
ly such an army to reconstruct recalcitrant Southern states. How then, to square
their understanding of "the right.., to keep and bear arms" with the rather
different vision of the Second Amendment's Anti-Federalist architects, George
Mason and Elbridge Gerry?
The Second Amendment also focused on arms bearing as a political right
akin to voting. Thus, a strong argument could be made that the original Amend-
ment protected only adult male citizens. These men, of course, constituted the
"militia" of the Amendment's preamble, and we can sensibly read the phrase
"the people" in the Amendment's main clause as synonymous with "the mili-
tia," thereby eliminating the grammatical and analytic tension that would
otherwise exist between the two clauses.293 Such a reading also draws support
from the original Constitution's use of the phrase "the people" to connote
"voters"--the same adult male citizens who, roughly speaking, constituted "the
militia."294 By contrast, the privileges or immunities clause spoke of all citi-
zens, pointedly including women and children, as made clear by the words
immediately preceding Bingham's key sentence defining citizens to include
"[a]ll persons born or naturalized in the United States." Time and again Recon-
structors in 1866 declared that Section One and its companion Civil Rights Act
focused on "civil rights," not "political rights" like voting and militia ser-
292. See Amar, supra note t, at 1162-73.
293. Indeed, before undergoing stylistic surgery in the Senate, the Amendment as passed by the House
in 1789 read as follows: "A well regulated militia, composed of the body of the People, being the best
security of a free state, the right of the People to keep and bear arms, shall not be infringed." See EDWARD
DUMBAULD, THE BILL OF RIGHTS AND WHAT IT MEANS TODAY 214 (1957).
294. See Amar, supra note t, at 1164-67 (lnkting reference to "the people" in Second Amendment to
references to "the people"---paradigmatically, voters--in Preamble and Article I, Section 2).
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vice.295 But how to fit that vision together with the original Second Amend-
ment?
Put another way, the Second Amendment fused together arms-bearing,
militia service, and (implicitly) political participation, yet the overall architec-
ture of the Fourteenth Amendment seems to pull them apart, with civil rights
at the core of Section One, and political rights featured separately in Section
Two. (We should note that Section Two appeared to preserve the linkage
between the militia and voting. Though the word "militia" went unspoken, the
section defined a state's presumptive electorate as "male citizens twenty-one
years of age" or older.) What changes, if any, must "the right.., to keep and
bear arms" undergo if it is to be redefined as an essentially "civil" right?
B. The Solution: Refined Incorporation
Thus far, the Supreme Court has avoided these puzzles by refusing to
review cases involving the possible incorporation of the Second Amend-
ment,296 but analogous questions can be raised about other provisions of the
original Bill. Finding sensible answers will require nothing less than a new
model of incorporation. To see why, we need only briefly review the two self-
proclaimed incorporation models that have emerged on the modem Court.
1. Total and Selective Incorporation Revisited
Begin with Hugo Black's insight that all the "privileges" and "immunities"
of "citizens" in the original Bill should be protected against state action. Yet,
the words of Section One are not limited to the Bill; they must also encompass
all the privileges and immunities of the original Constitution-most obviously,
the privilege of habeas corpus. Of course, not all of the original Constitution's
295. See, e.g.,Report ofthe Joint Committee on Reconstruction, 39th Cong., lst Sess. 7, 12, 15(1866)
(distinguishing between "civil" and "political" rights, and linking Section One with "civil rights and
privileges") (emphasis added); CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., lstSess. 476,599, 606, 1117, 1151, 1159, 1162,
1757, 1832, 1836, 3035 (1866) (remarks of Sen. Lyman Trumbull, Reps. James Wilson, Russell Thayer,
William Windom, and Wlliam Lawrence, and Sen. John Henderson) (Civil Rights Bill does not encompass
political rights like voting); id. at 2542, 2766 (remarks of John Bingham and Jacob Howard) (clearly stating
that Section One did not encompass right of suffrage); JAMES, supra note 201, at 163 (quoting 1866
campaign speech of Thaddeus Stevens conceding that Section One "does not touch... political rights');
PHILADELPHIA N. AM. & U.S. GAZETrE, Sept. 28, 1866, at 2, quoted in ANTIEAu, supra note 113, at 50-51
("In making all native born and naturalized persons citizens, this section does not make them voters, for
if it did, then would all women and minors have the right of suffrage, since they are just as much per-
sons .... The fact that this section does not give the colored man the right of suffrage constitutes the main
reason why the extreme advocates of Negro suffrage oppose the Amendment."); see also Minor v.
Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wail.) 162 (1874) (right of suffrage not a Section One privilege or immunity); H.R.
REP. NO. 22,41st Cong., 3d Sess. 1-4 (1871), reprinted in THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS' DEBATES
466-67 (Alfred Avins ed., 1967) (Victoria Woodhull petition report authored by John Bingham) (similar);
CURTIS, supra note 106, at 149; MALTZ, supra note 145, at 118-20.
296. See, e.g., Burton v. Sills, 248 A.2d 921 (N.J. 1968), appeal dismissed, 394 U.S. 812 (1969);
Quilici v. Village of Morton Grove, 695 F.2d 261 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 863 (1983).
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restrictions on federal power are pure citizen rights; some-like the habeas
clause's next door neighbor, the capitation clause-are more concerned with
state rights and thus awkward to incorporate against states. The original Bill
of Rights mirrored the Constitution in this respect, including both state rights
and citizen rights. And state rights are not obviously limited to the Ninth and
Tenth Amendments--consider for example the establishment clause97--so
Black's quick redefinition of the Bill of Rights as meaning only Amendments
I-VIII will not do the trick.
More promising here is Justice Brennan's invitation to consider incorpora-
tion clause by clause, an invitation that of course needs to be extended beyond
the Bill to encompass the original Constitution as well. After individualized
consideration we may well decide that virtually every provision of the first
eight amendments is appropriately incorporated, but Black's approach simply
prejudges the issue by deciding wholesale tough questions that are best handled
clause by clause. Thus, even if we decide that it does make sense to incorporate
the establishment clause we must honestly confront the special problems
here 98 rather than sweeping them under the rug of total incorporation.
Black's total approach, however, had an obvious advantage over Brennan's
selective model. Black kept faith with Section One's text and history, embrac-
ing all the Bill's privileges and immunities. In contrast, Brennan's approach
seemed to countenance refusal to incorporate a right or privilege if the Justices
did not deem that right "fundamental"--notwithstanding We the People's
declaratory judgment that the right was so fundamental as to warrant inclusion
in the Bill. While admiring the pragmatic flexibility Brennan's approach
allowed,299 critics condemned selective incorporation as unprincipled. Thus,
Louis Henkin wrote that "[s]elective incorporation finds no support in the
language of the amendment, or in the history of its adoption," and Judge
Friendly went so far as to remark that "[w]hatever one's views about the
historical support for Mr. Justice Black's wholesale incorporation theory, it
appears undisputed that the selective incorporation theory has none. ' °
To the extent selective incorporation was simply Brennan's polite way of
achieving total incorporation by indirection, clause by clause, without having
to overrule pre-Warren Court precedent repudiating Black, the practical differ-
ence between the two models of incorporation diminishes. And in the cases they
decided, Justice Brennan and his brethren never met a right in the Bill they
didn't like or deem fundamental enough to warrant incorporation. But four
rights in Amendments I-VIn have remained outside the selective fold: the right
297. See Amar, supra note t, at 1157-60.
298. See id.
299. Henkin, supra note 130, at76; LOUIS LUSKY, BY WHAT RIGHT? 163 (1975); see also Israel, supra
note 150, at 272 & n.138.
300. Henkin, supra note 130, at 77-78; Friendly, supra note 1, at 934 (citation omitted); see also
CURTIS, supra note 106, at 112 ("lIt is difficult to see a logical basis for eliminating some guarantees but
not others."); LusKY, supra note 299, at 163 (selective incorporation has "no conceivable historical basis").
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to keep and bear arms, the right against quartering soldiers, and the rights to
grand and civil juries. For the Third Amendment, a plausible explanation for
failure to incorporate is that a proper case never materialized: the right rarely
arises in modem litigation. Yet as to the other three rights, the modem Court
has let stand lower court decisions rejecting incorporation.30 1 By refusing to
discuss openly why these three rights somehow were not fundamental enough
to justify incorporation, the Justices have seemed to plead no contest to the
critics' charge that selective incorporation was unprincipled. And indeed, as to
grand juries, it does seem hard to see why this "ancient immunity and privi-
lege" of English liberty is not embraced--doubly-by the privileges or immuni-
ties and due process clauses.
The Second Amendment poses somewhat different complications. Perhaps
the Supreme Court has assumed that the Second is a purely federalism-based
right of organized state militias and thus inappropriate for incorporation against
states. If so, the Court's assumption rests on a dubious reading of the word
"militia" and inattention to the grammar and syntax of the Amendment, which
speaks of a right of "the people," not "the states." 3°2 Even more embarrassing,
whatever the reasons for reading the Second Amendment as a states' rights
provision analogous to the Tenth Amendment, there are more powerful reasons
for so reading the establishment clause,303 which has already been incorporat-
ed304
2. A New Synthesis
But the focus on the Second Amendment suggests a different filter that
leads to a new, refined model of incorporation. Instead of asking whether a
given provision is fundamental or not, as Brennan suggests, we must ask
whether it is a personal privilege-that is, a private right-of individual citi-
zens, rather than a right of states or the public at large.
This question responds to the structural difficulty of incorporation yet keeps
faith with Section One's letter and spirit. This question, or something like it,
is obviously the filter we need once we remember that Section One incorporates
"the privileges or immunities of citizens" declared in the original Constitution
as well as the Bill of Rights. For how else could we filter out those Article I
301. In addition to the Second Amendment cases cited supra note 296, see, e.g., Gyuro v. Connecticut,
242 A.2d 734 (Conn.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 937 (1968) (grand jury); Melancon v. McKeithen, 345 F. Supp.
1025 (E.D. La. 1972), aff'd sub nom. Mayes v. Ellis, 409 U.S. 943 (1972) (over dissent of Douglas, 3.),
aff'd sub nom. Davis v. Edwards, 409 U.S. 1098 (1972) (civil jury); see also Beck v. Washington, 369 U.S.
541, 545 (1962) (opinion of the Court, including Justice Brennan, endorsing longstanding Supreme Court
case law that states may "dispens[e] entirely" with grand juries).
302. See Amar, supra note t, at 1166-67.
303. See id. at 1157-60.
304. No one recognized the special awkwardness of incorporating the establishment clause better than
Brennan, as shown by his special concurrence in Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 254-
58 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring).
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limitations that should be incorporated, like habeas, and separate them from
those that should not, like capitation (a state right) or even bicameralism (a
right of the public at large)? The same filter works for the Bill of Rights, and
for the same reasons. Indeed, the filter nicely combines the respective strengths
of Black's and Brennan's models of incorporation. With this filter, we can
preserve the textual and historical support for Black's insistence that all the
Bill's privileges or immunities are indeed incorporated while accommodating
Brennan's intuition that perhaps not every provision of Amendments I-VII
sensibly incorporates. This synthesis offers a principled substitute to the seem-
ing ad hocery of seiective incorporation as now practiced.
Of course, to view an entitlement as a private right is not to deny that it
may have public or political significance, but only to recognize that it is a right
vested in discrete individuals. For example, a publisher has a private right-a
privilege-to print newspaper editorials even (indeed, especially) if the editori-
als take a stand on public or political matters. (Seen from another angle, the
publisher's privilege is rooted in, even if not exhausted by, her private rights
to her bodily liberty and her property-rights that would be violated by jails
or fines.).
The Second Amendment, however, illustrates that states' rights and individ-
ual rights, "private" rights of discrete citizens and "public" rights of the citizen-
ry generally, were sometimes marbled together into a single clause. A truly
sensible and sensitive incorporation must go beyond a binary "all in" or "all
out" approach to individual clauses. At times, judges must mine and refine out
citizen rights from the mixed ore in which they are embedded in the 1789 Bill.
And it is exactly at this point that elements of Frankfurter's analysis enter our
new synthesis, for he recognized the distortions introduced by mechanical jot
for jot incorporation.
Black's insistence on jot for jot state compliance followed naturally from
his commitment to total incorporation (but only of Amendments I-VIII), his
disdain for judicial discretion, and his belief in enforcing absolute rights in all
their strictness. Harder to understand was Brennan's insistence "that once a
provision of the Federal Bill was deemed incorporated, it applied identically
in state and federal proceedings." 305 If judges had discretion to decide which
clauses were "fundamental" and which were not, why didn't they have equal
discretion to decide which doctrinal subrules of a given clause were fundamen-
tal? 306
Of course, we have seen that the right question is not whether a clause is
fundamental, but whether it is truly a private right of the citizen rather than a
right of states or the public generally. So too, Frankfurter's instinct must be
analogously recast. Various rules and subdoctrines associated with the original
305. Brennan 1I, supra note 5, at 545.
306. Friendly, supra note 1, at 936; Henkin, supra note 130, at 82.
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Bill may not incorporate jot for jot-indeed, the very metaphor of incorporation
may mislead. But the reason is not that these rules and subdoctrines are not
fundamental; rather, it is that they may reflect federalism and other structural
concerns unique to the central government. For example, to the extent the First
Amendment freedom of speech is read as an absolute, not as a matter of free
speech doctrine, but for reasons of federalism rooted in a lack of enumerated
congressional power in Article I, Section 8307-to that extent, the clause does
not sensibly incorporate jot for jot. An argument can also be made that major
aspects of current Seventh Amendment doctrine may be driven by federalism
concerns that should not be imposed on states.08 If so, refined incorporation
can offer a more principled basis for retaining one of the widely hailed3°9
pragmatic virtues of Brennan's approach: namely, the refusal to require state
courts in the late twentieth century to follow English civil jury rules circa 1791.
Indeed, as the Second Amendment illustrates, the very same words "the
right.., to keep and bear arms" take on a different coloration and nuance
when they are relabeled "privileges or immunities of citizens" rather than "the
right of the people," and when they are severed from their association with a
well-regulated militia. To recast the textual point as an historical one, the core
applications and central meanings of the right to keep and bear arms and other
key rights were very different in 1866 than in 1789. Mechanical incorporation
obscured all this and, indeed, made it easy to forget that when we."apply" the
Bill of Rights against the states today, we must first and foremost reflect on
the meaning and the spirit of the Amendment of 1866, not the Bill of 1789.
3. A Founding Analogy
Thus, in the very process of being absorbed into the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, various rights and freedoms of the original Bill may be subtly but
importantly transformed in much the same way the Bill of Rights transformed
language it had absorbed from still earlier sources. Consider, for example, the
freedom of the press. Historian Leonard Levy has piled up mounds of evidence
that the phrase "freedom of the press" at common law in England and in the
colonies meant only freedom from prior restraint. Since the framers of the First
Amendment used the same phrase with little extended discussion, Levy suggests
they must have meant to incorporate the common law doctrine jot for jot. 310
307. See supra note 38 and text accompanying note 53; infra text accompanying notes 343-45.
308. I develop this theme in my forthcoming book.
309. See, e.g., LUSKY, supra note 299, at 162-63; Henkin, supra note 130, at 76; Israel, supra note
150, at 272 & n.138; see also BLACK, supra note 4, at 36 ("[m]ost of those who object to complete
incorporation of the Bill of Rights point to the Seventh Amendment" as "objectionable"); Adamson v.
California, 332 U.S. 46, 63-65 (1947) (Frankfurter, 3., concurring) (jaundiced view of civil juries); Fairman,
supra note 113, at 82-83, 137 (similar); Griswold, supra note 15, at 166 (similar).
310. LEONARD W. LEVY, EMERGENCE OF A FREE PRESS 281 (1985).
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The argument shows more historical doggedness than legal sensitivity. In
England, Parliament was sovereign. Legal rights in such a system sensibly ran
only against executive and judicial officials, like licensers appointed by the
Crown, rather than against Parliament itself. But in a document self-consciously
based on popular sovereignty, as proudly proclaimed in the opening words of
the Preamble, is it sensible to mechanically incorporate rules based on an utterly
contrary premise? Don't We the Sovereign People of America necessarily have
the same inherent rights of free political expression enjoyed by members of the
Sovereign Parliament in England? If so, "freedom of the press" in the First
Amendment necessarily means more than mere freedom from prior restraint
The prior restraint ban may indeed be part of our First Amendment, but surely
that ban does not exhaust the constitutional meaning of "freedom of the press."
To put the structural point textually, the old phrase "freedom of the press"
takes on new meaning when conjoined-as it never was in England or the
colonies, and virtually never was in the states-with "the freedom of
speech."3n Surely the two rights in the federal Bill are in pari materia; each
must be construed in relation to the other, and it would be curious if freedom
of the printed word were drastically more truncated than freedom of oral
expression. Yet the idea that "freedom of speech" means only freedom from
prior restraint is utterly outlandish-wholly lacking in historical support and
difficult even to imagine in practice. (Licensing the few printing presses that
existed in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries is one thing; but what would
it mean to purport to license speakers and require official preclearance before
one could open one's mouth?12) Rather, "freedom of speech" had a rich
tradition, in England and in the states, of guaranteeing absolute freedom of
speech and debate within the Sovereign legislature.3  And thus, the extension
of this right to ordinary citizens in the First Amendment is indeed simply a
textual recognition of the structural truth of American popular sovereignty.
Not all of this was spelled out in elaborate detail in 1789, though Madison
did briefly remark on the differences between the British system and the
American theory of popular sovereignty on the very day he introduced the Bill
of Rights. 14 Nevertheless, most twentieth-century lawyers would have little
311. Of the original 13 colonies, only Pennsylvania explicitly guaranteed "freedom of speech" for
citizens in its constitution, in a provision also declaring that "freedom of the press ought not to be re-
strained." PA. CONST. of 1776 (Declaration of Rights), art. XII; LEVY, supra note 310, at 5. The federal
Bill, of course, changed "ought" to "shall." See IRVING BRANT, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 37-42 (1965).
312. For a similar analysis, see William T. Mayton, Seditious Libel and the Lost Guarantee of a
Freedom of Expression, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 91, 120 n.154 (1984); Richard A. Posner, Free Speech in an
Economic Perspective, 20 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1, 4 (1986).
313. See Amar, supra note t, at 1151 & n.96 and sources noted therein.
314. 1 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 31, at 453-54 (June 8, 1789). Madison returned to this theme
in much greater detail a decade later in his careful exposition of the unconstitutionality of the Sedition Act.
See James Madison, Report on the Virginia Resolutions (Jan. 1800), reprinted in 4 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra
note 30, at 546, 569-71; see also 4 ANNALS OF CONG. 934 (1794) (remarks of James Madison) ("If we
advert to the nature of Republican Government, we shall find that the censorial power is in the people over
the Government, and not in the Government over the people.").
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trouble admitting that various common law principles may have changed shape
in subtle but important ways when absorbed into the Constitution and Bill of
Rights. The common law, after all, is famous for its ability to adapt itself to
new situations, remolding its contours to accommodate a new legal landscape.
Most lawyers today, however, have failed to reflect seriously on the
analogous dynamic raised by Reconstruction's absorption of the Bill of Rights.
Disciples of Black and Brennan posit an essentially mechanical process that
denies the need to reshape 1789 doctrines to fit the 1866 vision; and followers
of Frankfurter insist that, strictly speaking, there is no logical relationship at
all between the Bill and Fourteenth Amendment. What is called for, then, is
a new way of thinking about this relationship that is neither mechanical (like
Black and Brennan) nor autistic (like Frankfurter)-an approach that tries to
remold the provisions of the original Bill into "privileges" and "immunities"
of "citizens" to fit the spirit and the architecture of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Ironically, English common law may be of great help here, for it featured
expositions of many privileges and immunities with counterparts in the Bill of
Rights, but without the Bill's federalism, majoritarian, and public rights glosses.
To be sure, we must be wary of Blackstonian rules to the extent they are
inconsistent with popular sovereignty theory-for this feature of the American
Constitution was not repudiated by the Fourteenth Amendment. Nevertheless,
English common law offers a crude but helpful test to sort out which aspects
of the pre-1866 Constitution were indeed privileges of individuals (e.g., habeas)
and which were instead structural provisions unique to the federal government
and inappropriate for imposition on states (e.g., capitation and bicameralism).
4. The Old Roots of the New Synthesis
Though the model of refined incorporation will no doubt strike most
twentieth-century lawyers as novel, it has deep historical roots. Recall, for
example, that even before the Fourteenth Amendment, C.P. Van Ness argued
in 1840 that certain aspects of the founders' Bill should apply to states. Van
Ness pointedly eschewed total incorporation: "Each article, therefore, if not
each clause, should be construed simply according to its own nature, and the
terms in which it may be expressed." 315 And in considering the "nature" of
each clause, Van Ness proposed that courts distinguish between mere "limita-
tions of governmental power," the prototype of which, he thought, was the
Tenth Amendment, and "declarations of rights" inherent in the individual, like
the right to due process.316 The former did not sensibly apply against the
states, but the latter did, argued Van Ness. Though Van Ness did not elaborate
this distinction in great detail, later commentators would.
315. Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540, 555 (1840) (oral argument).
316. Id. at 555-57.
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Consider, for example, John Bingham's remarks in 1859: "'privileges and
immunities of citizens in the several States' [do not include] rights and immuni-
ties of the several States."3 17 When Bingham later framed his proposed
amendment, he used words that spoke of rights of citizens in contradistinction
to rights of the several states; of private rights (for that is what the word
"privileges" quite literally means) like habeas in contradistinction to public rules
of government structure like bicameralism. And although it would be a mistake
to read too much into the subtle vagaries of expression in the Thirty-ninth
Congress, virtually no one spoke of mechanically incorporating the Bill of
Rights as such. Formulations speaking of "the great fundamental rights"
possessed "by the citizen" and "embraced in the bill of rights"318 were typical.
Indeed, both Bingham and Howard seemed to redefine "the Bill of Rights" as
encompassing only the first eight rather than ten amendments, presumably
because they saw the Ninth and Tenth Amendments as federalism provi-
sions.3 9 But even after slicing off Amendments IX and X, Bingham and
Howard, unlike Black, avoided the language of jot for jot incorporation,
speaking instead of "the privileges and immunities of citizens.., defined in,"
and "the personal rights guarantied and secured by," the "first eight amend-
ments." 320 Even more significant, members of the Thirty-ninth Congress regu-
larly linked the Bill of Rights with the classic common law rights of individuals
exemplified in Blackstone, Corfield, and the Civil Rights Act of 1866.321
Bradley's Slaughter-House opinion also invoked Blackstone, Corfield, and
the common law alongside the Bill of Rights. Let us examine more carefully
his nonexhaustive catalogue of "privileges or immunities of citizens" derived
from the pre-1866 Constitution:
the right of habeas corpus, the right of trial by jury, of free exercise
of religious worship, the right of free speech and a free press, the right
peaceably to assemble for the discussion of public measures, the right
to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures, and above all,
and including almost all the rest, the right of not being deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law.
The order of this list shows that Bradley is tracking the order in which
various privileges and immunities are mentioned in the pre-1866 Constitution.
Habeas comes first (from Article I, Section 9), and then jury trial-not from
the Sixth Amendment, but from Article I-followed by a paraphrase of the
317. CoNG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 2d Sess. 984 (1859) (emphasis added).
318. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1294 (1866) (remarks of Rep. James Wilson) (emphasis
added).
319. Quoted supra note 195 and text accompanying notes 116, 194, 198.
320. Quoted supra text accompanying note 198 (emphasis added).
321. See supra text accompanying notes 229-30.
322. The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 118 (1873) (Bradley, J., dissenting) (emphasis
omitted).
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First Amendment absent the establishment clause. Though Bradley does not
explicate his implicit filter, it seems that he is influenced by common law
categories of personal liberty and security. Such a filter would explain why,
for example, jury trial is taken from Article I, but bicameralism is not taken
from Article I. This implicit filter might also explain the omission of the
establishment clause, which, unlike its First Amendment companions, does not
so obviously resonate with common law rights of personal property, personal
security, and bodily liberty.
Further support for this reading of Bradley comes from an adjoining
passage where he summarized "the personal privileges and immunities of
citizens" that were explicitly protected against state action by the original
Constitution: "The States were merely prohibited from passing bills of attainder,
ex post facto laws, laws impairing the obligation of contracts, and perhaps one
or two more."3' Left out of Bradley's filtered version of Article I, Section
10 were the prohibitions that "No state shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance,
or Confederation; grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal; coin Money; emit Bills
of Credit; make any Thing but gold and silver Coin a Tender in Payment of
Debts; ... or grant any Title of Nobility." Once again, the items Bradley
explicitly included seem much more closely connected with classic common
law rights of the individual to liberty and property than the items he excluded.
What common law right would be violated by a state's granting of a title of
nobility?
Far more direct was John Randolph Tucker's famous oral argument in the
1887 Chicago anarchist case, Spies v. Illinois. Here for the first time, an
attorney before the Court clearly argued for incorporation on the basis of the
privileges or immunities clause. But Tucker's brand of incorporation was
distinctly more refined than Black's. Like Bradley, Tucker included in his
catalogue of privileges and immunities those rights "declare[d]" in the original
Constitution, as well as the Bill, including "the security for habeas corpus [and]
the limits imposed on Federal power in the Amendments and in the original
Constitution as to trial by jury, &c." 32 When he turned his eye to the Bill
proper (which he labeled "the Declaration of Rights"), he made explicit the
common law filter that Bradley had only implied:
Though originally the first ten Amendments were adopted as limita-
tions on Federal power, yet in so far as they secure and recognize
fundamental rights-common law rights--of the man, they make them
privileges and immunities of the man as citizen of the United States,
and [those privileges] cannot now be abridged by a State under the
Fourteenth Amendment. In other words, while the ten Amendments,
as limitations on power, only apply to the Federal government, and not
323. Id. (emphasis altered).
324. Spies v. Illinois, 123 U.S. 131, 151 (1887) (oral argument).
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to the States, yet in so far as they declare or recognize rights of
persons, these rights are theirs, as citizens of the United States, and the
Fourteenth Amendment as to such rights limits state power .... 325
Tucker strained-rather unconvincingly-to introduce further modifications of
his basic model to accommodate post Slaughter-House precedent,326 but his
general approach was both revealing and helpful.
The Court disposed of Spies without reaching the issues raised by Tucker.
Five years later, Justice Field, joined by Justices Harlan and Brewer, ranged
far beyond the narrow pleadings in the case before him to embrace Tucker's
argument: "[A]fter much reflection I think the definition given at one time
before this court by a distinguished advocate-Mr. John Randolph Tucker, of
Virginia-is correct." 327 Field went on to distinguish between those aspects
of the Bill that were mere "limitations on power" and those that instead "de-
clare or recognize the rights of persons."328 Some of Field's hinted applica-
tions of this distinction appear doubtful--once again, it seems, the result of an
awkward effort to accommodate post-Slaughter-House precedents on grand and
civil juries.329 But we are concerned here not with individual applications,
but with a basic model for incorporation; and the Van Ness/Tucker/Field
distinction, or something like it, is what we need to sort out those aspects of
the pre-1866 Constitution that sensibly incorporate from those that do not.
By 1900, Justice Field had left the Court, but Justice Harlan continued to
carry on the crusade to breathe life back into the privileges or immunities
clause. His first extended analysis of the clause came in Maxwell v. Dow, where
he vigorously argued that all the personal rights, freedoms, privileges, and
immunities in the "National Bill of Rights" applied against states by dint of the
Fourteenth Amendment.30 Yet once again, if we examine the evidence close-
ly, we see a more refined approach than Black would later offer. Thus, in
canvassing the rights and freedoms of the First Amendment, Harlan quoted or
paraphrased each of its clauses except establishment.33 Moments later, he
offered the following hypothetical:
Suppose the State of Utah should amend its constitution and make the
Mormon religion the established religion of the State, to be supported
by taxation on all the people of Utah.... If such an amendment were
alleged to be invalid under the National Constitution, could not [to-
day's opinion] be cited as showing that the right to the free exercise
325. Id. (emphasis added).
326. Id. at 152 (attempting to distinguish Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884), and Walker v.
Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90 (1875), which had rejected Fourteenth Amendment incorporation of the Bill's grand
jury and civil jury requirements against states).
327. O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 361 (1892) (Field, L, dissenting).
328. Id. at 363.
329. Id. at 362.
330. Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581, 614-15 (1900) (Harlan, L, dissenting).
331. Id. at 615.
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of religion was not a privilege of a "citizen of the United States"
within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment?332
Harlan's decision to characterize this hypothetical fact pattern as violating free
exercise rather than nonestablishment principles is subtle but significant. To
infringe upon the free exercise of religion is necessarily to invade individual
rights of property and bodily liberty, but perhaps not all establishments would
do so. Would a simple legislative declaration that "Utah is a Mormon State"
infringe classic common law rights of liberty and property any more than a
granting of a title of nobility? Harlan instead pointedly chose a hypothetical
involving state taxation depriving individual taxpayers of their property and
indirectly compelling them to affirm religious beliefs contrary to their own.
Though he offered less elaboration than Tucker, he too seemed to be using an
implicit common law filter. Indeed, without some such filter, Harlan's approach
would be hard to fathom, for like Tucker and Field, but unlike Black, Harlan
spoke again and again of "the first ten" rather than eight amendments.33
Harlan returned to the privileges or immunities clause eight years later in
his celebrated dissent in Twining v. New Jersey, a case raising the question
whether a state could compel a citizen to incriminate himself. Though tipping
his hat to Barron, Harlan described the privilege against compelled self-incrimi-
nation as an English common law privilege preexisting the federal Constitu-
tion.3 In language reminiscent of Corfield's ode, Harlan wrote that "real,
genuine freedom could not exist in any country" that abridged this freedom,
which ranked "among the essential, fundamental principles of English law. 335
For Harlan, rights declared in "the name of the people" by the original Bill of
Rights became applicable against the states via the Fourteenth Amendment; but
once again, Harlan filtered the Bill through the common law, stressing "privi-
leges and immunities mentioned in the original Amendments, and universally
regarded as our heritage of liberty from the common law. 336
Nineteenth-century lawyers and judges who took incorporation seriously
thus point us toward a considerably more refined brand of incorporation than
Justice Black-or any other twentieth-century figure, for that matter-served
up.
C. "Refined Ineorporation" Applied: The Rights of Expression
What would acceptance of the refined incorporation model mean in prac-
tice? A full demonstration of the model's application to each and every clause
332. Id. at 615-16 (emphasis added).
333. Id. at 607, 608, 612, 617; see also Spies v. Illinois, 123 U.S. 131, 151 (1887) (Tucker's oral
argument); O'Neil, 144 U.S. at 361-63 (Field, ., dissenting).
334. Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 117-18 (1908) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
335. Id. at 118.
336. Id. at 122.
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of the original Bill must await another day;337 but the speech, press, petition,
and assembly clauses of the First Amendment provide a handy testing ground,
illustrating the analytic virtues of the refined model, and the kinds of insights
made possible by it.
"Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of speech, or of
the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the
Government for a redress of grievances." Textually, the argument for applying
these rights against states via the Fourteenth Amendment is wonderfully
straightforward. The First Amendment explicitly speaks of "right[s]" and
"freedom[s]" (entitlements also known as "privileges" and "immunities"), and
the Amendment's words that these rights "shall" not be "abridg[ed]" by "law"
perfectly harmonize with their echoes in the key sentence of Section One.335
Nor can it be argued that these "rights" and "freedoms" are somehow not
private rights of individual citizens. Though narrower in scope than their
American counterparts, the freedoms of press, petition, and peaceable assembly
were, according to Blackstone, core common law rights "of persons" and of
"every freeman. '339 As we have seen, these rights were broadened in the
1780's by American popular sovereignty theory, which also extended to
ordinary citizens the freedom of speech previously enjoyed only by legisla-
tors.y0
Of course, federalism played an important role in the original First Amend-
ment, but not in a way that impedes incorporation of its explicit rights and
freedoms. Even if we assume that freedom of speech in state legislatures
enjoyed special First Amendment status above and beyond the freedom of
ordinary citizens,'341 nothing about incorporation takes away state legislatures'
freedom of speech; incorporation simply limits their freedom to use state law
to silence ordinary citizens, and that freedom is not in any way protected by
the First Amendment. For example, the Amendment nowhere forbids Congress
to "make any law protecting freedom of speech" and so on against repressive
state action. On the contrary, a strong argument can be made that Congress was
empowered and perhaps required to pass precisely these sorts of laws to
vindicate the Article PV guarantee that each state would have a republican
government. Could such a government ever punish citizens for speaking,
writing, peaceably assembling, or petitioning against it?
Many Barron contrarians in the antebellum era thought not. Today, we
might at first wonder how faithful interpreters of the First Amendment could
earnestly argue, even before 1866, that its protections of free expression could
bind states; but few modems have any problems seeing a Presidential censor-
337. A more complete presentation shall appear in my forthcoming book.
338. See supra text accompanying notes 117-18.
339. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 126, at *143 (petition and assembly); 4 id. at *152 (press).
340. See supra text accompanying notes 311-14.
341. See Amar, supra note t, at 1151-52.
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ship edict, or a judicial contempt order imprisoning a reporter critical of the
court, as raising "First Amendment" concerns. 42 To be sure, the Amendment
speaks only of "Congress"; but any automatic expressio unius inference that
citizens therefore lack analogous rights against the President or federal judg-
es--or states-flies in the face of the Ninth Amendment. Thus, when supporters
of the Fourteenth Amendment described its provisions as "declaratory" of the
existing Constitution, properly construed, we must not assume that they neces-
sarily meant to include only those generally worded provisions of the Bill of
Rights and to exclude those clauses explicitly linked to Congress.
Thus, neither the First Amendment's arguably special protection of state
legislative speech, nor its use of the word "Congress" presents any stumbling
block to incorporation. But a third federalism component of the original
Amendment does raise an interesting incorporation question. The particularly
absolutist phrasing of the First Amendment--"Congress shall make no
law"--may well have reflected a widespread understanding in 1789 that
Congress simply lacked enumerated power to suppress speech, etc.34 To this
extent, the First Amendment resembled the Tenth, specifying not a private right
of citizens based on personal liberty, but a state right rooted in federalism. And
under the model of refined incorporation, the federalism aspect of First Amend-
ment absolutism does not sensibly incorporate against states. But then, we are
left with a seeming paradox: the First Amendment might constrain Congress
more strictly than the Fourteenth constrains states even though both Amend-
ments seem to speak with one voice, that the freedom of speech, etc., "shall"
not be "abridg[ed]" by "law."
The paradox is more apparent than real. As a practical matter, we must of
course remember that the federalism-based argument for First Amendment
absolutism has never been taken seriously by federal courts and is unlikely to
be revived in the modem era. But if the theory ever were taken seriously, it
could indeed permit differential treatment of state and federal governments.344
Even if couched as an interpretation of the First Amendment, federalism-based
absolutism is ultimately rooted elsewhere-in a strict interpretation of Article
I, Section 8 claiming that Congress lacks enumerated power to censor. But
nothing in the text, history, or logic of the Fourteenth Amendment suggests that
the federal system of enumerated powers should be overlaid on-incorporated
against-states. Put another way, if we take federalism seriously, even before
we reach the question whether federal power is trumped by the First Amend-
ment in a given area, we must ask an analytically prior question: does the
342. In discussing the "reflex character" of the First Amendment as declaratory of principles applicable
against states, the first Justice Harlan also noted that the Amendment's principles bound not just Congress,
but federal courts. See Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 464 (1907) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
343. See supra note 38 and text accompanying note 53; see also Mayton, supra note 312, at 117-19;
Willian W. Van Astyne, Congressional Power and Free Speech: Levy's Legacy Revisited, 99 HARV. L.
REV. 1089, 1095-96 (1986) (book review).
344. See WILLIAM W. VAN ALSTYNE, INTERPRETATIONS oF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 43-46 (1984).
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Constitution in fact grant the federal government power here? And if the answer
is no, we must not assume that state governments also necessarily lack pow-
er-for perhaps Congress is denied a particular power precisely because the
Constitution meant to leave it to the states.
At first, the federalism-based reading of the First Amendment might seem
tailor-made for Hugo Black, who championed First Amendment absolutism,
preached fidelity to the Founders' "original intent," and also proved willing to
invalidate acts of Congress on federalism grounds.' 5 Yet Black never relied
on federalism to bolster his First Amendment absolutism, and with good reason.
Such a move would have driven an analytic wedge between the First and
Fourteenth Amendments, thereby destroying Black's own theory of mechanical
incorporation. This wedge would not necessarily require abandonment of
absolutism in free speech cases involving states: Black could well have defend-
ed First Amendment absolutism on grounds of both federalism and freedom,
and the latter set of arguments clearly would apply equally against states. But
if Black had ever admitted that any of the provisions of Amendments I-VI
had any federalism component whatsoever, he would have been forced to admit
the analytical possibility that perhaps not all of his (redefined) Bill of Rights
sensibly incorporated jot for jot. The entire analytic structure of total incorpora-
tion would have crumbled.
But even if Black's precise analytic path to incorporation of speech, press,
petition, and assembly cut a few comers, he ended up in the right place: as a
matter of constitutional text and structure, these clauses are indeed easy cases
for full application against states via the Fourteenth Amendment. An ounce of
history here provides powerful confirmation. From the 1830's on, the abolition-
ist crusaders had understood that freedom of speech for all men and women
went hand in hand with freedom of bodily liberty for slaves. The Slave Power
posed a threat to Freedom-of all kinds-and could support itself only through
suppression of opposition speech, with gag rules on antislavery petitions, bans
on "incendiary" publications, intrusions on the right of peaceable assembly, and
so on.34 This global theory of Freedom was not limited to a few lawyers or
theorists spearheading the crusade, but was quite literally the popular platform
345. See, e.g., Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970).
346. See generally CLEMENT EATON, THE FREEDOM-OF-THOUGHT STRUGGLE IN THE OLD SOUTH
(1964); RUSSEL B. NYE, FETTERED FREEDOM (1963); WILLIAM S. SAVAGE, THE CONTROVERSY OVER THE
DISTRIBUTION OF ABOLrITON LlTERATURE 1830-1860 (1938); FONER, supra note 105, at 100-01, 122-23;
HYMAN & WIECEK, supra note 105, at 118-19; NELSON, supra note 64, at 42-43; WIEcE,, supra note 99,
at 172-82; Howard Jay Graham, The Early Antislavery Backgrounds of the Fourteenth Amendment, 1950
VIS. L REV. 479, 610, 632-47; William F. Nelson, The Impact of the Antislavery Movement Upon Styles
of Judicial Reasoning in Nineteenth Century America, 87 HARV. L. REV. 513, 533-37 (1974); see also
sources cited supra note 107.
Perhaps the most dramatic incident occurred in 1856 on the floor of the U.S. Senate, where South
Carolina Congressman Preston Brooks attacked the defenseless Massachusetts Senator Charles Sumner with
a cane and beat him into bloody unconsciousness in retaliation for an antislavery speech Sumner had made
on the floor of the Senate a few days earlier. Many Northerners were shocked, but many Southern citizens
and governments applauded Brook's action, sending him complimentary canes and bullwhips.
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of the antislavery movement, perhaps best exemplified by an 1856 Republican
Party campaign slogan: "Free Speech, Free Press, Free Men, Free Labor, Free
Territory, and Frdmont."347
During the Thirty-eighth and Thirty-ninth Congresses, Republicans invoked
speech, press, petition, and assembly rights over and over-more frequently
than any other right, with the possible exception of due process. 348 These
invocations occurred in a variety of overlapping contexts: as glosses on the
"civil rights" to be protected by the Civil Rights and Freedman's Bureau Acts;
as part of the definition of republican government (whose violation justified
continued Southern exclusion from the national legislature); as "fundamental
rights" of all citizens; and as paradigmatic "privileges or immunities" of
national citizenship and/or interstate comity.
Once again, the centrality of these rights was not an idea limited to a few
leading lawyers or theorists, but was widely understood by the polity. Various
petitions from ordinary constituents to Congress in 1866 stressed the importance
of the rights of "speech," "press," and "assembly" (while of course embodying
the interrelated right of petition); 49 the New York Evening Post noted that
the freedoms of speech and of the press were guaranteed by the Civil Rights
Act (even though the Act did not explicitly speak of those freedoms) and later
read Section One of the proposed Amendment as covering the same
ground;350 the Philadelphia North American and United States Gazette in
September 1866 listed freedoms of speech, press, and assembly as paradigmatic
"privileges and immunities" of citizenship within the meaning of the then-
pending Amendment;351 various prominent Congressmen on the campaign trail
in 1866 (including Bingham, Wilson, and Speaker of the House Schuyler
Colfax) emphasized the Amendment's protection of freedom of speech;352
state politicians in leading Northern states-Wisconsin, Pennsylvania, Ohio,
Massachusetts, New York, and so on-linked the Amendment to freedom of
discussion; 353 and various popular 1866 conventions, both Northern and
Southern, not only embodied the right to peaceably assemble, but used these
347. CURTIS, supra note 106, at 32, see also NATIONAL PARTY PLATFORMS 1840-1968, supra note
105, at 7 (Liberty Platform of 1844 condemning "all rules, regulations and laws, in derogation" of "freedom
of speech and of the press, and the right of petition," rights labeled "sacred and inviolable").
348. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1202, 1313, 1439, 2615, 2990 (1864) (remarks
of Rep. James Wilson, Sens. Lyman Trumbull and James Harlan, and Reps. Daniel Morris and Ebon
Ingersoll); CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 138, 193, 237 (1864) (remarks of Reps. James Ashley, John
Kasson, and Green Smith); CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 474-75, 1066, 1072, 1263, 1617 (1866)
(remarks of Sen. Lyman Trumbull, Rep. Hiram Price, Sen. James Nye, and Reps. John Broomall and Samuel
Moulton).
349. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 337, 436,494 (1866) (petitions presented by Sens. Charles
Sumner, Lyman Trumbull, and Jacob Howard).
350. FLACK, supra note 146, at 42, 143.
351. ANTIEAU, supra note 113, at 32.
352. Id. at 24 (Bingham and Rep. Columbus Delano); CuRTs, supra note 106, at 138-39, 144-45
(Bingham, Wilson, Delano, Reps. William D. Kelly and William Boyd Allison, and Sen. Richard Yates);
FLACK, supra note 146, at 149 (Colfax).
353. ANTIEAU, supra note 113, at 24-25, 30-33; CURTIS, supra note 106, at 140, 145-53.
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occasions to reaffirm the importance of speech, press, petition, and assembly
rights.354
Thus far, the refined incorporation model and Black's total incorporation
approach appear to converge. But refined incorporation can help us to see what
Black's approach obscured: how the very meaning of freedom of speech, press,
petition, and assembly was subtly redefined in the process of being incorporat-
ed. In the eighteenth century the paradigmatic speaker was someone like John
Peter Zenger or James Callender,355 a relatively popular publisher saying
relatively popular things critical of less popular government officials. In the
mid-nineteenth century the paradigm shifted to the Unionist, the abolitionist,
and the freedman: to speakers like Samuel Hoar, Harriet Beecher Stowe, and
Frederick Douglass. Hoar was a Massachusetts lawyer who in 1844 went to
South Carolina with his daughter to defend the rights of free blacks, only to
be literally ridden out of town on a rail by an enraged populace after the South
Carolina legislature passed an act of attainder and banishment.356 A generation
later, Hoar's cause c6l bre still burned brightly in the memories of members
of Congress who repeatedly cited the incident357 Stowe, of course, authored
the "incendiary" bestseller Uncle Tom's Cabin in the 1850's-a novel that
outraged the pro-slavery South and inspired the anti-slavery North, leading
Lincoln to describe her as "the little woman who wrote the book that made this
great war."358 Frederick Douglass escaped from slavery in Maryland in 1838,
published a daring autobiography in 1845, founded and edited a leading aboli-
tionist newspaper over the next two decades, and became a preeminent orator
on behalf of civil rights and suffrage for both women and freedmen.
The shift from Zenger and Callender to Hoar, Stowe, and Douglass was
subtle but significant. All can be seen as "outsiders," but with an important
difference. As representatives of the Fourth Estate, Zenger and Callender were
"outside" the government that sought to censor them, but Hoar, Stowe, and
Douglass were outsiders in a much deeper sense. Vis-A-vis the Southern society
trying to suppress their speech, Hoar, Stowe, and Douglass were geographic,
cultural, and ethnic outsiders who were critical of dominant social institutions
and opinions. Put another way, this shift directs us away from Madison's first
354. See, e.g., CURTIs, supra note 106, at 135 (quoting appeal from convention of Southern loyalists
denouncing slave state violations of"constitutional guarantees of the right to peaceably assemble and petition
for redress of grievances" and of "constitutional guarantees of freedom and free speech and a free press").
355. On Callender, see Amar, supra note t, at 1191.
356. For an account, see 1 HENRY WILSON, HISTORY OF THE RISE AND FALL OF THE SLAVE POWER
IN AMERICA 578-82 (1875).
357. See CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 2984 (1864) (remarks of Rep. William Kelley); CONG.
GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 193, 237 (1865) (remarks of Reps. John Kasson and Green Smith); CONG.
GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 41, 157, 475 (1865-66) (remarks of Sen. John Sherman, Rep. John Bingham
and Sen. Lyman Trumbull); id. at 142 app. (remarks of Sen. Henry Wilson); see aiso ANrIEAU, supra note
113, at 24 (quoting 1866 remarks of Rep. Columbus Delano); Fairman, supra note 113, at 22 (Samuel Hoar
episode was "stock example" in Reconstruction Congress).
358. CHARLEs E. STOWE & LYMAN B. STOWE, HARRIET BEECHER STOWE: THE STORY OF HER LIFE
202-03 (1911).
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concern in The Federalist No. 51 (the "agency" problem of protecting the
people against unrepresentative government), toward his second concern
(protecting minorities from "factional" majority tyranny).359 The new
First/Fourteenth Amendment tradition is less majoritarian and more libertari-
an.360 To recast this point in a temporal frame, the abolitionist experience
dramatized why even majoritarians should logically support strong First Amend-
ment protections for offensive and provocative speech of fringe groups. For if
allowed to freely preach their gospel, a zealous fringe group in one era (like
proponents of abolition, equality, and black suffrage in 1830) could conceivably
convert enough souls to their crusade to become a respectable or even dominant
political force over the next generation (like the Republican Party of the
1860's).
My language here--"preach," "gospel," "zealous," "convert," "souls," and
"crusade"--reflects the religious inspiration of many abolitionists.3 61 For
example, Stowe's husband, father, and many brothers were famous New
England clergymen. The well publicized martyrdom of Elijah Lovejoy also
dramatized the centrality of religious speech. Lovejoy, a Presbyterian minister,
used his church weekly to condemn slavery. His writings cost him his life in
1837 when he was murdered by an angry mob bent on silencing his press.
Republicans naturally understood the religious roots of abolitionism, and
often stressed the need to protect religious speech. We have already noted
Bingham's 1859 speech proclaiming the centrality of the right to "utter accord-
ing to conscience; 362 and on the campaign trail in 1866 he reminded his
audience that men had been imprisoned in Georgia for teaching the Bible, and
made clear that the Fourteenth Amendment would put an end to such state
action, a theme to which he returned in a key speech on the Amendment before
the House in 1871 .31 In early 1866, Lyman Trumbull introduced his Civil
Rights Bill by stressing the need to protect the freedom "to teach" and "to
preach," citing a Mississippi Black Code punishing any "free negroes and
mulattoes" who dared to "exercis[e] the functions of a minister of the Gos-
pel."364 Similarly, in 1865, Representative James M. Ashley linked religion
to freedom of speech in the following way: "[The Slave Power] has silenced
359. The distinction between these two concerns is a major theme of my earlier work on the Bill of
Rights, see Amar, supra note t.
360. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., Ist Sess. 380 (1871) (remarks of Rep. John Hawley) (on need
to protect "freedom of speech" contrary to "dominant" opinion).
361. See generally Graham, supra note 346.
362. See supra text accompanying note 181.
363. ANTIEAU, supra note 113, at 24; CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 84 app. (1871).
364. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 474-75 (1866); see also TENBROEK, supra note 64, at 124-25
(discussing centrality in abolitionist theory of right to "teach or be taught the Gospel" to nourish the
"immortal mind").
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every free pulpit within its control... and made free speech and a free press
impossible within its domain .... ,36 5
In 1789, the freedoms of speech and press had been yoked with religious
freedoms largely for reasons of federalism: both religious regulation and press
censorship were seen as beyond Congress' enumerated powers. 6 This feder-
alism-based reading of the original First Amendment draws support from the
dramatic fact that no previous state constitution had linked these two sets of
rights in a single provision. But once yoked together in the federal Bill, these
clauses helped reinforce a libertarian theory of freedom of all expres-
sion-political, religious, and even artistic (Uncle Tom's Cabin was of course
all three). By the 1860's, libertarianism had displaced federalism and majoritari-
anism as the dominant, unifying theme of the First Amendment's freedoms.
The centrality of religious speech in the 1860's proved especially significant
for women. Though excluded from exercising the formal political rights of
voting, holding public office, and serving on juries or militias, women could
and did play leading roles in religious organizations. Moreover, these organiza-
tions engaged in moral crusades with obvious political overtones: temperance,
abolition, and (eventually) suffrage. As a result, the voice of women was much
harder to ignore in the 1860's than it had been in the 1790's. In the debates
over the Constitution and Bill of Rights, only one woman-Mercy Otis War-
ren-had participated prominently, and even then under a pseudonym. (Indeed,
her most important pamphlet during the ratification debates was long ascribed
to Elbridge Gerry, and was not credited to her until 1932.).67 In 1866, how-
ever, the most widely read condemnation of slavery had been authored by a
woman (Stowe); and in a campaign orchestrated by Susan B. Anthony and
Elizabeth Cady Stanton, thousands and thousands of women flooded the Thirty-
ninth Congress with petitions on the issue of women's suffrage, which had been
largely a nonissue for the Founding Fathers.36' At least five petitions from
women on the suffrage issue were presented on the floor of Congress in the
first two months of 1866 alone.369 Women were therefore central exercisers
of First Amendment freedoms in the Reconstruction era in a way they had not
been at the Founding-yet another example of the rising importance of "outsid-
er" speech. Interestingly, in discussing the Hoar affair before the Thirty-eighth
Congress, Representative William D. Kelley pointedly spoke of not only
Samuel Hoar, but also his "beautiful and accomplished daughter.'3 70 So, too,
365. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 138 (1865); see also CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess.
2615 (1864) (remarks of Congressman Daniel Morris) (discussing incarceration of "Christian men and
women for teaching the alphabet" (emphasis added)).
366. My book shall present more documentation and analysis of this claim.
367. See Charles WVarren, Elbridge Gerry, James Warren, Mercy Warren and the Ratification of the
Federal Constitution in Massachusetts, 64 MASs. HIST. Soc'Y PRoc. 143 (1932).
368. See Nina Morals, Note, SexDiscrimination and the Fourteenth Amendment: LostHistory, 97 YALE
L.J. 1153, 1155-56 (1988).
369. Id. at 1156.
370. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 2984 (1864).
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Representative John Kasson noted that "innocent ladies, cultivated, intelligent,
Christian women, have been driven from the cities and States of the South...
because they had dared to say something offensive to this intolerant spirit of
slavery," and Representative Morris reminded his audience that Southern states
had "incarcerated Christian men and women for teaching the alphabet. 3 71
Just as the centrality of religious speech helped bring women into the core
of the First Amendment, it also helped blacks. As with women, the exclusion
of blacks from formal political rights like voting underscored the importance
of their participation in other organizations like churches, that could help focus
the voice of the community. Southern governments, of course, were all too
aware of the "incendiary" dangers posed by any assembly of blacks, even (or
perhaps especially) an assembly of God. After all, Nat Turner, who had led a
famous slave revolt in the 1830's, had been a black preacher-hence the
Mississippi Black Code cited by Trumbull, prescribing thirty-nine lashes for
any black exercising the functions of a minister.372 But Republicans like
Trumbull strongly affirmed the "civil" rights of blacks to assemble and preach,
even as these same Republicans disclaimed any intent to confer "political"
rights like the franchise upon blacks.373 Charles Sumner provided the Joint
Committee on Reconstruction yet another dramatic example of black speech,
laying before the Committee a petition "from the colored citizens of South
Carolina," claiming to represent "four hundred and two thousand citizens of
that State, being a very large majority of the population." Unsurprisingly, the
petition prayed for "constitutional protection in keeping arms, in holding public
assemblies, and in complete liberty of speech and of the press., 374
The gloss of the Fourteenth Amendment experience on the First Amend-
ment text has important doctrinal implications. As the paradigmatic speech in
need of constitutional protection shifts from a localist criticizing the central
government to a Unionist defending its Reconstruction policies, carpetbagging
federal judges appointed in Washington, D.C. become more trustworthy guard-
ians of First Amendment freedoms than localist juries. When the core of the
Amendment was protection of the people collectively from unrepresentative
government, perhaps an unelected federal judge on the federal payroll was a
more suspect sentry;375 but when the central mission of free speech shifted
to protection of currently unpopular ideas from a current majority, an Article
III officer with life tenure, sheltered from current political winds and sensitive
to the long-term value of free speech, enjoyed certain advantages over a jury
structured to reflect today's dominant community sentiment. If women and
blacks were central speakers in the Reconstruction paradigm, would a jury of
371. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 193 (1865); CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 2615 (1864).
372. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 474 (1866).
373. See supra text accompanying note 295.
374. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 337 (1866).
375. See Amar, supra note t, at 1150-51, 1191-95.
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twelve white men be in every sense a jury of their "peers"? And if not, there
was less reason to expect that such a jury would represent their interests and
rights any better than would a federal judge.
Thus, it is largely the Fourteenth Amendment experience, I submit, that best
justifies the emphasis in modem First Amendment doctrine on federal judges,
rather than juries, as guardians of free speech. Yet the reigning doctrinal
approach of jot for jot incorporation has obscured the significance of the
Fourteenth Amendment, which all but drops out of the free speech picture.
Advocates and scholars focus all their analytic and narrative attention on the
Founding, not the Reconstruction. Thus, in championing the rights of Commu-
nists and Jehovah's Witnesses in the twentieth century, the ACLU has analo-
gized to Zenger more than to the abolitionists-who are the truer forebears of
modem political and religious speakers perceived as "nuts" and "cranks" by
the dominant culture. Similarly, in the landmark First Amendment case of our
era, New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, Justice Brennan quoted Madison and
thoughtfully reflected on the lessons of the Alien and Sedition Act controversy,
but said virtually nothing about the Reconstruction Amendment except that it
incorporated the First Amendment against states (presumably jot for jot).376
Yet the facts before the Court in Sullivan almost cried out for comparison with
the Reconstruction era. Southern followers of the Reverend Martin Luther King,
many of them black and many of them religious, had used a Northern newspa-
per to criticize Southern officials; and a Southern jury composed of good ole
boys had socked the speakers with massively punitive damages. Many of the
doctrinal rules crafted by Sullivan and its progeny reflect obvious suspicion of
juries-resulting, for example, in various issues being classified as legal
questions or mixed questions of law and fact inappropriate for unconstrained
jury determination -- yet that suspicion is much better justified by the Re-
construction experience than by the Founding.
But if various jury-restricting doctrines are indeed products of the interac-
tion between the First and Fourteenth Amendments, how to justify the Court's
application of these doctrines in pure First Amendment cases involving only
the federal government? Can it be argued that the Fourteenth Amendment has
a doctrinal "feedback effect" against the federal government, despite the
Amendment's clear textual limitation to state action?
Yes it can. To begin with, consider Professor Monaghan's reminder that
constitutional text does not specify precisely which institutional, procedural,
and doctrinal rules best implement the First Amendment's substantive val-
ues.37 8 In Monaghan's elegant phrase, the text does not supply a complete
theory of "First Amendment due process," specifying, for example, the precise
376. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
377. See, e.g., William J. Brennan, Jr., The Supreme Court and the Meiklejohn Interpretation of the
First Amendment, 79 HARV. L. REv. 1, 7-8 (1965).
378. Henry P. Monaghan, First Amendment "Due Process," 83 HARV. L. REV. 518 (1970).
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respective roles of judge and jury. In crafting such a theory, interpreters must
obviously consider the First Amendment's primary purpose-but this too is not
textually specified, so structural inferences may thus loom larger. For example,
the failure of the original First Amendment to explicitly restrict state legislation,
combined with Madison's structural observation in The Federalist No. 10 that
state governments were more majoritarian than Congress, plausibly implies that
the core purpose of the original First Amendment was to prevent not majority
tyranny, but self-dealing by unrepresentative government agents.379 Given an
agency-cost theory of free speech, a jury may well be the best guardian of the
First Amendment's core-a conclusion buttressed by the efforts of eighteenth-
century speakers like Zenger and Callender to appeal from judge to jury.380
But if the original "First Amendment due process" theory is built in part on
structural inferences from Barron, then Barron's repudiation by the Fourteenth
Amendment requires us to rethink the original assumptions that led us to juries.
Once the Fourteenth Amendment is on the books, the "agency" theory of free
speech is less explanatory than the minority-protection theory since the latter
better accounts for speech limitations on majoritarian state legislatures. And the
minority-protection theory suggests a different optimal allocation between judge
and jury. To put the structural point textually, the parallel language between
the First Amendment and the Fourteenth should strongly incline us towards a
unitary theory of freedom of speech against both state and federal governments.
It might at first seem as if we have once again simply reached the same
result as Hugo Black-identical treatment of First and Fourteenth Amendment
speech cases-but by a much more tortuous route. On the contrary, refined
incorporation reaches a different conclusion from Black's: that "freedom of
speech" was subtly redefined in 1866, just as "freedom of the press" was subtly
redefined in 1789.381 The 1866 redefinition changed the central purpose and
optimal "due process" implementation of freedom of speech, making central
certain types of speech that had previously been far more peripheral: religious
speech, artistic speech and, most importantly, minority speech.
We can chart a similar inversion of core and periphery in "the right of the
people peaceably to assemble, and to petition." These words, as originally
written, linked up tightly to popular sovereignty theory. In its strictest sense,
"the people" encompassed voters-the same adult male citizens who, roughly
speaking, constituted "the militia" equated with "the people" in the very next
sentence of the Bill of Rights. And the paradigmatic exercise of (We) "the
[P]eople's" right to assemble was a constitutional convention called by political
rights-holders (adult male citizens) to alter or abolish government. Other
meanings of "the people" and "assembly" were also encompassed, but popular
379. Indeed, so I have argued elsewhere. See Amar, supra note t, at 1146-52.
380. See id. at 1150-51, 1191-95.
381. See supra text accompanying notes 310-14.
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sovereignty theory colored the Amendment's core." 2 By 1866, all this had
subtly changed. The phrase "the people" was still read relatively strictly-we
have seen, for example, that the Senate refused to allow foreigners to peti-
tion 83 -but clearly encompassed those who were not political rights-holders.
American women deluged the 1866 Congress with petitions precisely because
they were not voters. So too, Sumner's petition from the South Carolina
"convention" of "colored citizens" came from a group excluded from the vote,
the militia, and the jury-excluded from the polity, strictly defined. Likewise,
while the debate on the Fourteenth Amendment was drawing to a close in the
Thirty-ninth Congress, another prominent convention of nonvoters-the Elev-
enth Women's Rights Convention-was meeting in New York City.3
In introducing a women's suffrage petition in 1866, Senator Thomas
Henderson sharply distinguished between the rights of suffrage and petition:
"The right of petition is a sacred right, and whatever may be thought of giving
the ballot to women, the right to ask it of the Government [by petition] cannot
be denied them. '38s Though dubious of granting women the political right of
the vote, Henderson declared that "no civil right," presumably including the
right to petition, "can be denied her."386 In a similar vein, the Republican New
York Evening Post rejected the notion that the Civil Rights Act embraced
political rights like jury service and office holding, but cheerfully conceded that
the rights of speech, press, petition, and assembly, though unenumerated, were
clearly covered by the Act.387 So too, in Professor tenBroek's rich account
of abolitionist theory in the antebellum era, the core right of assembly at issue
seems to be the right of blacks "to assemble peaceably on the Sabbath for the
worship of [the] Creator. 3 88
In a nutshell, the hybrid rights of petition and assembly were increasingly
being characterized as civil, not political rights-a shift reflected in and perhaps
caused by the exercise of these rights by women and blacks. Petitions and
assemblies by the disenfranchised were no longer seen as peripheral to, or
derivative of, a popular sovereignty core celebrating the right of the (political)
people to (re)assemble, through specially elected representatives, in constitution-
al conventions. Whereas the lived experience of 1787-89, with precisely such
conventions of "the people" actually assembling, glossed the text with popular
382. See Amar, supra note t, at 1152-55.
383. See supra text accompanying note 152.
384. JAMES, supra note 201, at 130.
385. CoNO. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 951 (1866). The feminist leader Elizabeth Cady Stanton
agreed that under extant law, petition was "the only right [woman] has in the Government." ELIZABETH
CADY STANTON, EIGHTY YEARS AND MORE 244 (Schocken Paperback ed. 1971) (1898) (reprinting letter
dated Jan. 2, 1866); see also SARAH GRnIMKl, LETTERS ON THE EQUALITY OF THE SEXES AND OTHER
ESSAYS 71, 72 (Elizabeth Ann Bartlett ed., 1988) (reprinting September 6, 1837 letter on legal disabilities
of women: "Woman has no political existence. With the single exception of presenting a petition to the
legislative body, she is a cipher in the nation .... ").
386. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 952 (1866).
387. FLACK, supra note 146, at 42.
388. TENBROEK, supra note 64, at 124-25.
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sovereignty theory, a different lived experience in the 1860's offered a different,
civil rights gloss on the very same words.
CONCLUSION
The Fourteenth Amendment's subtle transformations of speech, press,
petition, and assembly rights are by no means unique. As I hope to show in
future work, similar stories can be told about many of the other clauses and
doctrines of the original Bill when they chemically interact with the Reconstruc-
tion experience. With the model of refined incorporation in place, we can thus
chart how the right to keep and bear arms becomes a quintessentially individual
right; how a libertarian theory of privacy comes to connect the Third, Fourth,
and (perhaps) Ninth Amendments; how the Tenth Amendment comes to be read
out of "the Bill of Rights," and how the very phrase is thus redefined; how
"rights" and "structure" come to be separated in modem constitutional dis-
course; and much more.
Application of this refined model of incorporation will not be simple or
mechanical, but the reward will, I believe, richly repay the effort. For we are
now poised to see-at first clause by clause, and then globally-what has
heretofore been hidden from view: the pervasive and powerful ways that the
Fourteenth Amendment has reconstructed the meaning of the Bill of Rights in
both the popular and the legal mind.
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